Last week, two major events with a direct influence on Egypt’s national security, took place on Egypt’s western and southern borders; respectively in Libya and Sudan. Turkey, which stands at odd with Egypt on almost all regional intricacies, is a key player in both events. Meanwhile, the Egyptian state got pre-occupied by pleasing friends, rather than taking a decisive action to deter, or at least neutralize, the quick moves of the rivals.
In a surprise leap in Turkey-Sudan relationship, a high-profile delegation of Sudanese officials, headed by the Chairman of the Transitional Sovereign Council, Lieutenant-General Abdul Fattah Al-Burhan, visited Ankara, on Thursday August 12th. Following a meeting between Al-Burhan and the Turkish President Erdogan, six cooperation agreements between the two countries were signed in the sectors of military, agriculture, energy, media, and foreign affairs. The signing ceremony was reminiscent of the recent event, in April, of signing five cooperation agreements between Turkey and Libya, which made Turkey’s position in Libya much stronger than all of its competitors.
Sudan and Turkey had previously signed a dozen of economy-related and military-related cooperation agreements, in 2017 and 2018. But they failed to be appropriately activated because of the political turmoil that Sudan lived through, especially after the overthrow of Omar Al-Bashir regime in April 2019. Since then, the post-revolution government in Sudan has been mostly reluctant to strengthen its relationship with Turkey, in order not to offend Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Egypt showed a strong support to the Sudanese Supreme Military Council that took over, following Al-Bashir’s ouster from power. At that time, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were primarily concerned by the agreement of leasing Suakin Island in the Red Sea, for 99 years, that Al-Bashir regime had signed with Turkey. Several Turkish officials confirmed that Turkey’s interest in the island is mainly cultural because of its historic linkage to the era of the Ottoman Empire. However, it is widely believed, at least in the Arab countries, that Turkey’s undisclosed purpose is to turn this island into a military base in the Red Sea, which may represent a threat to both Egypt and Saudi Arabia given their long-term tense rivalry with Turkey.
Nevertheless, the Suakin island is not the only concern for Egypt right now, in light of its deteriorated relationship with Turkey in contrast to Turkey’s growing economic and military influence over Libya and Sudan, which respectively represent Egypt’s western and southern strategic depths. The reproachment between Turkey and Sudan may hurt Egypt’s position in its conflict with Ethiopia over the distribution of the water resources of the Nile River, which represents a matter of life or death to Egypt.
In his meeting with Sudan’s Al-Burhan, on Thursday, Erdogan highlighted his concern regarding the ongoing conflict between Sudan and Ethiopia, regarding the border city of Al-Fashaga, as well as the broader regional conflict over the Nile River, due to Ethiopia’s persistence on building and filling the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Yet, Erdogan’s concerns are not working in Egypt’s favor.
Unfortunately, the Egyptian-Turkish reconciliation efforts, which intensified between March and May, seems to be failing already. Political clashes between the two countries are once again heating up the region. In June, Egypt’s President voiced absolute support to Greece in its historical maritime conflict with Turkey. Earlier in August, Turkey’s President Erdogan contacted Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and declared his absolute support to Abiy Ahmed agendas, on domestic and regional conflicts, including of course the GERD conflict with Egypt. Cairo got too offended by Erdogan’s statements that it declined to send fire-fighting helicopters to help Turkey in its recent forest fires crisis, as it did with Greece. Also, in Libya, once again, Egypt and Turkey returned to standing against each other.
Therefore, as the traditional regional and international coalitions are rapidly changing, Egypt urgently needs to keep pace. The Egyptian state should appropriately review its foreign policy, especially in its immediate environment extending across the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and northern and eastern Africa, based on its own needs, interests, and priorities.