Muslim Brotherhood Between June 30 and the New Republic

As the date for holding the first session of the comprehensive national dialogue, in early July, is quickly approaching, the organizing committee of the dialogue had to put an end to the widely raised controversy about the potential participation of the Muslim Brotherhood. 

“The national dialogue shall include all shades of the Egyptian political sphere. Everyone is invited and welcomed, except for those whose hands are stained with the Egyptian blood, and those legally labeled as terrorists;” confirmed Diaa Rashwan, the General Coordinator of the National Dialogue, in clear reference to the Muslim Brotherhood group. 

Since December 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood has been officially designated, in Egypt and some Arab countries, as a terrorist organization. Over the past five years, the Egyptian judiciary has sentenced hundreds of the Muslim Brotherhood members, including supreme and middle leaders, to lifetime and death penalties. Most of these sentences are based on evidence, validated by the courts, that the Muslim Brotherhood elements had been involved in committing violent crimes against civilians, policemen, and state facilities, between 2013 and 2015, with the purpose to disturb the public order, following their ouster from power in June 2013.

Ironically, around the same time the inaugurating session of the national dialogue is supposed to be convened, the Egyptian state will be celebrating the eighth anniversary of the June 30th uprising that ousted the Muslim Brotherhood regime from power, and paved the way for the building of the new republic under the leadership of the current president Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. According to the coordinating committee of the national dialogue, the main goal of bringing all the political parties together is “to renew the spirit of national unity that prevailed throughout the June 30 revolution, which aimed to save the Egyptian nation-state by forcing the Muslim Brotherhood regime out of power.”

This is, allegedly, the first time an official statement is clearly declared in response to the Muslim Brotherhood calls for reconciliation with the Egyptian state. As soon as the Egyptian President called for a comprehensive political dialogue, in April, the Muslim Brotherhood leaders, who are now divided in two warring factions working from London and Istanbul, responded to the call by declaring willingness to participate. They, also, offered conditions for concession, including for example demanding the Egyptian state to release the member of the Muslim Brotherhood from the Egyptian prisons. 

At least four times, since their ouster from power, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially those based in London, offered negotiations for reconciliation with President El-Sisi. They, even, tried to push some secular Egyptian and western politicians and media figures, who are sympathizing with them, to mediate for convincing the Egyptian leadership to talk with them. However, their calls have always been received with aloofness by the Egyptian state. To their disappointment, the latest statement by the coordinator of the national dialogue cut their last hope for making a return to the Egyptian politics.

What the Muslim Brotherhood fails to understand is that they cannot make an easy comeback to the Egyptian politics, at the time being. On one hand, the Muslim Brotherhood is intensely enfeebled by the horizontal divisions, on the level of leadership, and the vertical divisions, on the level of grassroots supporters. There is no unified leadership that can lead negotiations or even instruct the future of the group.

On the other hand, the current Egyptian state, coined as “the new republic,” is preserving a stable and coherent political environment that is much different from the chaotic aftermath of the Arab Spring aftermath, which enabled the group to reach the top of power. In addition, the current Egyptian state is adopting a completely different approach and strategy, than the accommodating approach that the Mubarak regime adopted towards the Islamist group.

The legacy and the popularity of the current state leadership is mainly based on the central role that President El-Sisi had played in ridding Egypt from the Muslim Brotherhood. That is, also, one of the main reasons why the state is generously supported by Arab Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has dedicated themselves to fighting against the rising power of the Muslim Brotherhood, following the eruption of the Arab Spring revolutions, a decade ago. 

Although it is not realistic to expect that the Muslim Brotherhood may be allowed to return back to practicing politics from Egypt, any time soon, it is also unrealistic to expect that this will remain the case forever. Sooner or later, the Muslim Brotherhood could get over divisions and try to open new direct or indirect channels of communication with the Egyptian state.

Biden’s Compulsory Return to the Middle East

The United States’ President, Joseph Biden, is finally making his first official visit to the Middle East on 13th-16th of July. According to an official statement by the White House, the American president will first stop in Israel, where he will meet with Israeli and Palestinian officials. Then, he will fly to Jeddah to attend a regional summit coined as ‘GCC+3 Summit,’ which is organized and hosted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In the Summit, Biden is expected to meet with leaders of all the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in addition to the heads of Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan. The drastic shift in Biden’s stance towards the Middle East, from cold and distant to warm and open, is clearly a desperate attempt to redeem the lost popularity of his administration and his Democratic Party. 

All similar trips by former American presidents to the Middle East region were important. Each of them marked fundamental changes in the political and economic agendas of the region, that eventually echoed into the global policies of western countries, including the United States, itself. Yet, the particular significance of the prospected visit by President Biden to Saudi Arabia, next month, is that, for the first time, the United States is trying to catch the train of regional change that is moving forward without its consent and despite its will, at a time when the western world is overwhelmed by the consequences of the war in Ukraine. What is even more interesting is that the driver of the new Middle East train is Saudi Arabia, the U.S. oldest ally in the Arab Gulf region, which President Biden unjustifiably labeled as an adversary to please his voters from the extreme leftists and Islamists.

Ballot Box Redemption  

Unlike his predecessors, either from the Democratic or the Republican camps, it took President Biden more than 18 months, highlighted by massive economic losses and puzzled foreign and defense policies, to realize that the success of his administration, as was the case with most of the former U.S. administrations, is closely correlated to what he can achieve in the Middle East. The fact that his administration could not score a big triumph on the global stage, after almost two years in power, is not going to serve the member of his Democratic Party, who are going to compete in the mid-term elections of the Congress and the Senate, this November. Likewise, it may reflect badly on his party’s chances in the coming presidential elections, in 2024. 

The declining approval ratings of President Biden is a clear indication on that. The latest survey by the Politico and the Morning Consult, conducted on June 4-5, found that 58% of voters disapprove of Biden’s job performance, which is the lowest approval rating and the highest disapproval rating that Biden got, since he took office in January 2021. Ironically, his Republican predecessor, Donald Trump, did much better on citizen satisfaction surveys. According to the same institution, 45% approved of Trump’s performance, despite the challenges imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic towards the end of his term.

If the Abraham Accords between Israel and some of its Arab neighbors is the chef-d'oeuvre of former Republican president, Donald Trump, and the nuclear deal with Iran was the masterpiece of former Democratic president, Barak Obama, what exactly Biden’s accomplished or targeted master stroke is. For almost two years in power, the Biden Administration has done nothing other than obsessively altering every decision, either good or bad, that had been made under the Trump Administration. That simply led to muddled policies that are not doing any good to the U.S. or its allied. 

That includes, for example, appeasing Iran on the expense of tearing long-established ties with U.S. historical allies in the Arab Gulf region. Add to this the record that Biden Administration achieve by giving the slowest response ever by a U.S. administration to the episode of war that erupted in Gaza, four months after Biden took office. And, above all is the hasty and chaotic withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, which resulted in jeopardizing hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, creating a new refugees’ crisis, and availing the space for terrorist organizations to re-arise.

Disappointed Middle East 

There are several important items on the agenda of the GCC+3 summit, that President Biden may see as a priority. They, probably, include blocking threats to regional security, especially from Iran, the potential of more Arab countries normalizing ties with Israel, improving human rights conditions in Arab states, and finding solutions for the global food and energy crises that are arising from the global standoff around the Russia-Ukraine war. However, in fact, the main goal of the Biden visit should be to fix strained ties with key Arab countries and find a way to regain their trust, so his administration can benefit from what the region can offer to the current global crises, that the U.S. cannot handle on its own. 

It was clear to all observers that the Middle East is not the top priority for the new US Administration of President Biden, unlike the case with almost all his predecessors. On his first few months in office, President Biden divorced himself from the headaches and troubles of the Middle East. Even, he decided to review all the decisions President Trump has made in favor of some Arab Gulf countries, including the crucial arms sales deals to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Then, everyone got surprised by the decisions paving the way for US withdrawal from the Middle East. That was particularly highlighted by Biden Administration’s decision to withdraw US troops from Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The Middle East uncertainties towards Biden Administration were magnified by the fact that during his electoral campaign, Biden was largely vague about his prospected foreign policy in the Middle East. When asked about the Middle East, he only repeated some nostalgic phrases from the Obama era about adopting a new approach towards the Islamic world. Meanwhile, he did not hesitate to fire threats against the ruling regimes of some key Arab countries, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to please his political Islamist voters and campaigners. 

Today, the participation of the United States as a leading partner to Middle East countries in handling these regional and international challenges, is no longer needed as urgent as it was before. During the intentional long absence of the Biden Administration away from the region, the Middle East countries have managed to build a new geo-political structure, wherein Saudi Arabia plays the most influential role, to deal with their own problems and lead their own future.

Within the past 18 months, the intra-disputes between Arab countries were successfully resolved by the Gulf reconciliation. At the same time, the long-term diplomatic conflicts between Arab and non-Arab states of the Middle East – namely, Turkey, Israel, and Iran – are either resolved or brought to negotiation table. Even the difficult topic of normalizing ties between Israel and more Arab countries, without the involvement of the United States as a facilitator, has become even more possible.

Apparently, President Biden has realized that he is hurting the interests of his country by withdrawing from the Middle East, under the propaganda of reallocating the U.S. resources spent on the Middle East to confront the growing Chinese power. The new reality of the Middle East and the changing world order have created a situation where the United States’ balance and power is heavily dependent on the well-being of the Middle East; not the other way around. Under the ongoing global crises, the Middle East can survive without needing the help of the United States, but neither the United States nor the west can survive without benefiting from economic and geo-strategic power of the Middle East.

Therefore, Biden’s top priority goal of his prospected visit to the region, next month, should be to win the Middle East leaders on his side. To do so, he simply needs to follow the recipe of President Trump. Most regimes in the Middle East, including non-Arab countries, had been praying that Donald Trump could have remained in power for another term. The pragmatic approach of the Trump Administration, which relied on ‘personal diplomacy’ was the perfect political language that the Middle East leaders could understand and respond to. This proximate, non-institutional, communication between Trump and the leaders of the region, created a better off situation for almost all the countries of the region, while limiting the Iranian threat in a tight corner.

Winning Back Saudi Arabia

The United States cannot afford losing Saudi Arabia as a key partner in the Middle East. That has been brutally proven by the role of Saudi Arabia in handling the global energy crisis, and the regional challenges ranging from the civil war in Yemen, the security threats coming from Iran and Afghanistan, and the economic crises bursting out in several Arab countries. The main characteristic defining the newly formed regional order is the fracture of Egypt and Syria as the main complementary poles responsible for keeping the region in balance, and the growing reliance on Arab Gulf monarchies, especially Saudi Arabia, in designing and leading the future of the Middle East. 

The rise of Taliban in Afghanistan, following the United States withdrawal and the revival of the Islamic State (IS) terrorists in Syria and Iraq are additional threats at the eastern gates of the Arab Gulf region, that are not expected to fade away any time soon. Out of this reality, Saudi Arabia’s main role in the next phase will be forming new coalitions, inside the Middle East, and with neighbor regions and countries, that can block the rising security threats and keep the region moving in the right direction. 

One proposed coalition, with high potential of success, is composed of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey. The new coalition, which is currently being formed, on a very slow pace though, could mitigate and control most of the strategic threats the region is currently facing or expected to face, in the future. That is mainly because of these countries’ strategic geographic locations, at the gates of the main three continents, as well as the complementary military and economic powers they have.

As the most politically and diplomatically experienced country in the Arab Gulf region, the Saudi leadership has been calmly working on fixing strained ties with neighbor non-Arab countries, with the understanding that building steady foreign relations requires time and guarantees. In face of these complications, Saudi Arabia is blessed by a young leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who understands the size of the regional challenge and is actively preparing himself and his country for it, despite the many obstacles thrown on his way by some western powers, including the United States.

Immediately after President Biden’s inauguration, in January 2021, the U.S. State Department decided to review Trump Administration’s decision to designate the Houthis in Yemen as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The next day, the State Department announced holding for review arms and ammunition sales agreements that the Trump administration signed with Saudi Arabia, and to temporarily pause the sale of F-35 fighter jets that are due to UAE upon a contract signed with Lockheed Martin under the Trump administration. Meanwhile, the Biden administration announced its intention to revive talks with Iran on the nuclear deal and ease the suffocating economic sanctions imposed by Trump.

In less than a year, Saudi Arabia and the UAE started to pay for the flawed policy of the Biden Administration. The missile and drone attacks launched by the Houthis on Saudi Arabia intensified and frequented, targeting strategic economic sites in Saudi main cities. By the beginning of this year, the Houthi started to expand their operations to target the UAE with a deadly drone attack that hit an oil facility close to Abu Dhabi Airport. There is no logical argument that can appropriately explain why the American President is adopting such a policy that is militarily weakening Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while re-empowering Iran and its affiliated proxies and militias. 

In an official press briefing, the White House confirmed that the American President will meet with the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammed Bin Salman, during his participation in the GCC+3 Summit, in Jeddah, in July. The face-to-face encounter between President Biden and Prince Mohammed is, allegedly, the most important event of the whole visit. If successfully accomplished this will mark a whole new era in the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, which will erase the effects of the flawed policy that Biden adopted towards the region during his first two years in office, and will be positively reflected on the serving the interests of the United States and the Middle East countries. 

A Lesson from History 

Around the same timing, one century ago, the World Wars (1914-1945) marked the death of an old world and the rebirth of a whole new one. It was not an easy process, but eventually it resulted into a world capable of coexisting under one universal system of governance, represented by the United Nations. This was a unipolar system, wherein the United States of America acted as the one great power that enjoyed the greatest cultural, economic, political, and military influence over the world for more than seven decades. The current cluster of health, economic, and security crises, on the global stage, is causing an effect similar to that of the World Wars, in terms with its huge influence on changing the balance of power in the world. It is still in the hands of the Biden Administration to keep the United States on the top as the most powerful country, or simply leave the court open for eastern rivals – Russia and China – to emerge as the new superpowers of the newly emerging world. The policy that the Biden Administration is going to adopt towards the Middle East, in the next half of his first term, is the determining factor in this world game of chess. 

Egypt: Can the National Dialogue Fix the Political System?

One of the early upshots of the Egyptian president’s call for a national dialogue is that it abruptly opened the Pandora’s box of the extremely messy political scene. Egypt has a massive number of new and established political parties, trade unions, and civil society organizations. However, they are working randomly in an extremely chaotic sphere, where their roles and missions are usually intermixed, pushing many of them to be either idle or manipulative.

The chaos in the Egyptian political system is one of the factors that may hinder the success of the national dialogue, or at least prevent the best utilization of its outcomes. But, at the same time, fixing this political chaos is one of the topics that needs to be openly addressed by the participants of the national dialogue. 

A comprehensive political reform is the most engaging topic on the agenda of the national dialogue sessions, that should take off on the first week of July. According to the official statistics announced by the National Training Academy (NTA), which is the institution responsible for the logistical organization of the dialogue sessions; 70 out of the 386 proposals submitted by the interested participants are about political reform and guaranteeing more civil and political rights. Meanwhile, the topics related to economic reform and socio-economic rights came later. 

This public craving for political practice is, apparently, a natural reaction to the closeness of the political space, during the past seven years, while the state was pre-occupied by controlling the security mess that followed the Arab Spring revolution, in 2011, and the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013. Yet, in fact, the complications of the Egyptian political stage go way back to the establishment of the Egyptian republic, in the 1950s.

Ironically, Egypt is one of the oldest countries, in the world, to have a multiparty political system and a vibrant community of civil society organizations, even before many of today’s western democracies were founded. In the 1907-1908, Egypt’s seed political parties were established by the popular political activists of that era, such as the secular writer Moustafa Kamel and Al-Azhar’s Sheikh Ali Youssif. These parties managed to contain many of the Egyptian youth, from all social and political backgrounds. 

In the two decades following the 1919 revolution, Egyptians grew fonder of social and political activism. Therefore, strong civil society organizations and political parties were formed, including Al-Wafd Party, which is still active up till today. These parties proved to be successful in organizing the grassroots citizens and challenging the rule of the Mohammed Ali dynasty and the British occupation. They wrote the constitution, represented the public in the parliament, held the king accountable, and formed the government. Also, during that era, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded, and started to be politically active against the liberal parties.

However, unfortunately, this vivacious political life was mercilessly suffocated by the Free Officers movement that took lead of the country following the July 1952 revolution. For more than quarter of a century, the Egyptians were prevented from officially organizing political parties, and the political activists who attempted to organize themselves in groups were brutally suppressed by the regime. 

In 1976, former President Anwar El-Sadat, who adopted a relatively more liberal and progressive way of thinking than his predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser, decided to re-open the space for citizen social and political participation, via political parties, trade unions, and civil society organizations. Still, the lack of the political momentum, the lingering fear from political practice inherited from the previous reign of Nasser, and the many limitations leveled by the regime on the emerging and returning parties, created what is known today as ‘cartoon political parties.’ That means, they existed on paper, but without any real influence either on the regime or on the citizens. 

Despite the many transformative political events that took place over the past decade, the ‘cartoon parties’ problem has not been solved. Currently, Egypt has more than one-hundred registered political parties, including at least 27 parties that were formed in the years following the fall of Mubarak and the Muslim Brotherhood regimes. However, the grassroots citizens can hardly name two or three of them.

The National Dialogue could be an ideal opportunity to breathe life back into these ‘cartoon parties’ and, thus, orchestrate the entire political stage within a liberal democratic system that enriches and elevates the political life, in Egypt. 

Egypt: Is the Economic Crisis Hurting El-Sisi’s Approval Ratings?

Under the escalating pressures of the Russia-Ukraine war on the Egyptian economy, and the uncertainty about when this stress is going to end, the issue of citizen approval ratings of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi has made a strong comeback. Should we look at the return of the talk about citizen satisfaction, in Egypt, in the same context of media cynicism, or is it an alarm call that should be taken seriously? 

The last time a private or governmental research center surveyed the Egyptian public about their satisfaction with the performance of the government or the president of the state, was in 2016, before the launch of the national economic reform plan. These surveys were mainly used as tools in the media war between those who supported and those who opposed the economic reform program, at that time. 

But this time, there is a general concern that is shared by analysts, media personnel, that the current economic stress could instigate public protests that may renew the political instability that the country had witnessed following the Arab Spring revolutions. The alarming part, here, is that the Egyptian president, El-Sisi, has publicly declared that he shares the same worries.  

“The issue is no longer about availing lucrative investment opportunities. My concern is to preserve the state of political stability in Egypt. If the [economic] pressures increase further, what should we expect them to do?” President El-Sisi warned, on June 13th, while opening a new national complex for animal and diary production, in Menoufia Governorate. “I am not keen on preserving political stability for my own benefit. When I talk about keeping the public satisfaction rates high, I am not aiming to preserve the power of the regime or the president. Rather, I am talking about the lives of the 100 million citizens that will be jeopardized if people come out [in protests] as a result of being unsatisfied.”

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in February, the Egyptian economy has been weathering a significant amount of stress. The sharp decline in eastern European tourist turnout to the Red Sea resorts, the disruption of food supply chain, especially in relation to wheat imports, and the spike in exchange rates of the Egyptian pound against the U.S. dollar due to international policies made to contain the unprecedented inflation rates; are some of the reasons leading to the heightened economic weight that the Egyptian government is trying to handle. 

This pushed analysts, in the eastern and the western media, to make wild speculations about the potential of overthrowing El-Sisi leadership via a public revolution similar to the one that ousted Mubarak’s regime from power, in 2011. However, a closer examination of the crisis causations, the government performance to contain its consequences, and the traditional dynamism of the Egyptian politics indicate otherwise. 

It is true that the Egyptian people are deeply frustrated by the economic regress, that came at a moment when they should have been harvesting the fruit of the macroeconomic reform program that has been successfully progressing over the past seven years. However, they are not angry at the government or the president. The bond of trust between the general public and El-Sisi’s leadership is still intact. The grassroots citizens still believe that El-Sisi is not corrupt and that he is sincerely working for their interest, not for the interest of a privileged elite of his own, as was the case under Mubarak. The poor, who benefited from El-Sisi’s socio-economic initiatives, such as “Hayah Karima,” know by experience that El-Sisi’s leadership cares for protecting them. 

It may not be an exaggeration to claim that the Egyptian political leadership can, easily, benefit from the crisis in increasing its popularity among the public citizens, and thus avoid the scenario of jeopardizing the hard-won status quo of political stability. The key to overcome the current economic crisis, as well as all the potential crises in the future, is for the government to let go of its centralized approach, in economics and politics, and open a greater space for the private sector, political parties, and civil society organizations to share the burdens as well as the profits. The Egyptian government has already started to take unprecedented steps in that direction. 

Despite heated criticism from some of the socialist members of the parliament, the Egyptian government is determined to proceed with its ambitious plan to liberalize the economy, while bending in the wind of the Russia-Ukraine war. The plan is to shrink government’s involvement in the market, as a competitor, to avail a space as large as 65% for the local private sector and the foreign investors to compete over the many lucrative opportunities that the huge and prolific Egyptian market has to offer. The government hopes that these new macroeconomic reforms should attract foreign investments of 40 billion dollars over the coming four years. 

The initial reaction of the foreign investors and international lenders to these brave steps by the Egyptian government is quite promising. In less than one month, since the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mostafa Madbouly, announced the roadmap to opening the market, the government has been able to make deals of future investments with foreign investors and international lenders, that total as more than 30 billion dollars. Moreover, the ‘hot money’ investors, who fled the country in the past two years, started to crawl their way back to benefit from the new opportunities.

Moreover, on June 17th, at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, the Egyptian president announced that Egypt is expecting an increase in the economic growth rate by 5.5% compared to 3.3% in 2021, and that non-oil exports have increased to 32 billion dollars in the second quarter of 2022, despite the significant influence of the global crises, including the global economic standoff around the Russia-Ukraine war, as well as the COVID-19 pandemic. 

Therefore, the Egyptian government should not allow itself to be dragged by the media claims about the decline of citizen satisfaction rates. Up till this moment, there is not a credible survey or data that proves or denies that. However, we know for sure that citizens are not angry at the leadership of President El-Sisi. Rather, the public citizens are frustrated by the economic retreat. 

There is a huge difference between a citizen being ‘angry’ and being ‘frustrated’. In the first case, the government and the entire regime should be changed as this indicates failure. But, in the second case, the state leadership, which is still respected by the public citizens, should find a way to turn citizen’s frustration into a power that fuels positive changes that eventually brings hope back to their hearts. That is exactly what President El-Sisi and his administration should focus on, in the coming period.

مصر: هل تتسبب الأزمة الاقتصادية في غضب شعبي على الرئيس السيسي؟

 

في ظل الضغوط الناجمة عن الحرب الروسية الأوكرانية على الاقتصاد المصري، وما يرتبط بها من حالة عدم اليقين بشأن موعد انتهاء الحرب، عادت قضية شعبية الرئيس عبد الفتاح السيسي تحت الأضواء بقوة. فهل هي مجرد عودة لتصفية معارك إعلامية وسياسية مؤجلة بين مؤيدي السيسي ومعارضيه، أم أنها إنذار حقيقي يجب أن تأخذه الدولة المصرية على محمل الجد؟

كانت آخر مرة تم فيها إجراء استطلاع للرأي العام المصري، بواسطة مركز أبحاث مستقل أو حكومي، حول الرضاء الشعبي عن أداء الحكومة أو رئيس الدولة، في عام ٢٠١٦، قبل أسابيع من إطلاق البرنامج الوطني للإصلاح الاقتصادي، والذي تمت مواجهته بحملات إعلامية منظمة وقتها، خصوصاً في الإعلام الغربي. وقد تم استخدام هذه الاستطلاعات بشكل أساسي كأدوات في الحرب الإعلامية بين المؤيدين والمعارضين لبرنامج الإصلاح الاقتصادي في ذلك الوقت، ولم تكن تعكس، رغم عنوانها، حقيقة درجة الرضاء الشعبي عن الرئيس آنذاك. 

لكن هذه المرة، هناك حالة من القلق العام، يشترك فيها محللين وإعلاميين، بعضهم مصريين وعرب، خوفاً من أن الضغوط الاقتصادية الحالية قد تثير احتجاجات شعبية قد تجدد حالة عدم الاستقرار السياسي التي شهدتها البلاد في أعقاب ثورات الربيع العربي، وربما الأمر الذي يفاقم من هذه المخاوف، هو أن الرئيس المصري، نفسه، قد عبر علناً عن أنه يحمل نفس المخاوف. 

عندما كان يفتتح مشروعاً للإنتاج الحيواني، في محافظة المنوفية، يوم ١٣ يونيو، قال الرئيس المصري في حديث تم بثه على الهواء مباشرةً أنه يخشى أن زيادة الضغط على المواطنين قد يضر بحالة الاستقرار الذي تعيشها البلاد، قائلاً: "هنا، لم يعد الموضوع مجرد اتاحة فرص للاستثمار، هنا الموضوع الذي أتكلم فيه مع القطاع الخاص ومنظمات المجتمع المدني والحكومة أصبح عن المحافظة على حالة الاستقرار في البلد، لأن المواطن لو زاد الضغط عليه، ماذا نتوقع أن يفعل؟" ثم استطرد السيسي: "أنا لا أقول استقرار من أجل مصلحة شخصية، عندما أتكلم عن الحفاظ على حالة الرضاء المجتمعي، فأنا لا أستهدف من ذلك حفظ النظام أو حفظ الرئيس في منصبه، ولكن أنا أتكلم عن حياة ١٠٠ مليون مواطن معرضة للضياع لو حدث أي أمر (يقصد مظاهرات شعبية) بسبب أن الناس غير راضية".

منذ بداية الغزو الروسي لأوكرانيا، في شهر فبراير، يعاني الاقتصاد المصري من ضغوط كبيرة، بسبب التراجع الحاد في نسبة إقبال السياح من شرق أوروبا على منتجعات البحر الأحمر، وتعطل سلسلة الإمداد الغذائي، خاصة فيما يتعلق بواردات القمح، والارتفاع الحاد في أسعار صرف الجنيه المصري مقابل الدولار الأمريكي بسبب السياسات الدولية لاحتواء معدلات التضخم العالمية غير المسبوقة. دفع هذا المحللين، في وسائل الإعلام الشرقية والغربية، إلى طرح تكهنات جامحة حول إمكانية الإطاحة بالرئيس السيسي من خلال ثورة شعبية مماثلة لتلك التي أطاحت بنظام مبارك من السلطة، في عام ٢٠١١. إلا أن النظر بشيء من المنطق، وبشكل محايد تماماً، في أسباب الأزمة الحالية، وأداء الحكومة المصرية في احتواء تداعيات الأزمة، وفهم طبيعة الديناميكية السياسة في مصر، يثبت عدم مصداقية هذا السيناريو المظلم.

صحيح أن الشعب المصري محبط للغاية من الانحدار الاقتصادي، الذي جاء في وقت كان ينبغي فيه أن يحصد الشعب ثمار برنامج الإصلاح الاقتصادي الشامل الذي كان يتطور بنجاح مشهود على مدى السنوات السبع الماضية. لكن، الأمر لا يتجاوز مرحلة الإحباط، بمعنى أن الشعب ليس غاضب على الحكومة أو الرئيس كما يدعي البعض. لا تزال رابطة الثقة بين عامة الشعب وقيادة الرئيس السيسي قوية، ولا يزال المواطنون على مستوى القاعدة الشعبية يعتقدون تماماً أن السيسي ليس رجلاً فاسدًا، مثلما كان مبارك مثلاً، وأنه يعمل بإخلاص من أجل مصلحتهم، وليس لصالح نخبة خاصة في بلاطه. كما أن الغالبية العظمى من فقراء المواطنين الذين استفادوا من مبادرات السيسي الاجتماعية والاقتصادية، مثل برنامج "حياة كريمة"، يعرفون بالتجربة أن قيادة السيسي تهتم بحمايتهم.

قد لا يكون من المبالغة الادعاء بأن القيادة السياسية المصرية يمكن أن تستفيد من الأزمة الاقتصادية الحالية في زيادة شعبيتها بين المواطنين، وبالتالي تجنب سيناريو تعريض الاستقرار السياسي، الذي تم تحقيقه بشق الأنفس، للخطر. مفتاح التغلب على الأزمة الاقتصادية الحالية، فضلا عن جميع الأزمات المحتملة في المستقبل، هو أن تتخلى الحكومة عن نهجها المركزي، في المسارين المتوازيين، الاقتصادي والسياسي، وفتح مساحة أكبر للقطاع الخاص والأحزاب السياسية ومنظمات المجتمع المدني لتقاسم الأعباء وكذلك الأرباح مع الدولة. ولقد بدأت الحكومة المصرية بالفعل في اتخاذ خطوات غير مسبوقة في هذا الاتجاه. 

على الرغم من الانتقادات الشديدة من بعض أعضاء البرلمان ذو التوجه الاشتراكي، فإن الحكومة المصرية مصممة على المضي قدمًا في خطتها الطموحة لتحرير الاقتصاد، بينما تراوغ رياح الحرب الروسية الأوكرانية. تتمثل الخطة في تقليص مشاركة الحكومة في السوق كمنافس، من أجل إتاحة مساحة كبيرة تصل إلى ٦٥٪ للقطاع الخاص المحلي والمستثمرين الأجانب للتنافس على العديد من الفرص المربحة التي يقدمها السوق المصري الضخم. تأمل الحكومة أن تجذب هذه الإصلاحات الاقتصادية الشاملة استثمارات أجنبية بقيمة ٤٠ مليار دولار على مدى الأربع سنوات المقبلة.

كان رد الفعل الأولي للمستثمرين الأجانب والمقرضين الدوليين على هذه الخطوات الشجاعة من قبل الحكومة المصرية واعدًا للغاية. في أقل من شهر، منذ أن أعلن رئيس الوزراء المصري، مصطفى مدبولي، عن خارطة الطريق لفتح السوق، تمكنت الحكومة من عقد صفقات استثمارات مستقبلية مع مستثمرين أجانب ومقرضين دوليين، يصل مجموعها إلى أكثر من ٣٠ مليار دولار. علاوة على ذلك، بدأ مستثمرو "الأموال الساخنة"، الذين فروا من البلاد في العامين الماضيين، بالزحف إلى طريق العودة للاستفادة من الفرص الجديدة.

بالإضافة لما سبق، أعلن الرئيس المصري، يوم ١٧ يونيو، في منتدى سان بطرسبرغ الاقتصادي الدولي، أن مصر تتوقع زيادة في معدل النمو الاقتصادي بنسبة ٥,٥٪ مقارنة بـ ٣,٣٪ في عام ٢٠٢١، وأن الصادرات غير النفطية من مصر ارتفعت إلى ٣٢ مليار دولار في الربع الثاني من العام الجاري، على الرغم من التأثير الكبير للأزمات العالمية على الاقتصاد المصري، بما في ذلك الأزمة الاقتصادية العالمية حول الحرب الروسية الأوكرانية وكذلك الشلل الاقتصادي العالمي في بداية جائحة كورونا. 

لذلك، يجب على الدولة المصرية ألا تسمح لنفسها بالقلق من أو اللهث وراء ادعاءات بعض الكتاب أو الإعلاميين عن تراجع معدلات رضاء المواطنين عن رئيس الدولة. حتى هذه اللحظة، لا يوجد مسح إحصائي أو بيانات موثوقة تثبت ذلك أو تنفيه. لكننا نعلم على وجه اليقين أن المواطنين ليسوا غاضبين على الرئيس السيسي أو الحكومة، بقدر ما هم يشعرون بحالة من الإحباط المركب بسبب التراجع الاقتصادي الذي أتى في وقت خاطئ تماماً. 

هناك فرق شاسع بين أن يكون المواطن "غاضباً" أو "محبطاً". في الحالة الأولى، يكون ذلك علامة على فشل الدولة والحكومة، وبالتالي يتطلب تغيير النظام السياسي بالكامل. أما في الحالة الثانية، وهي القائمة الآن في مصر، فإن القيادة السياسية ورئيس الدولة ما زالوا محل احترام وتقدير لدى المواطن، ومن ثم يجب عليها أن تجد طريقة لتحويل إحباط المواطنين هذا إلى قوة دافعة تغذي التغييرات الإيجابية التي تعيد الأمل في النهاية إلى قلوبهم. هذا بالضبط ما يجب أن يركز عليه الرئيس السيسي وإدارته في الفترة المقبلة.

 

Egypt’s National Dialogue Is Finally Getting into Shape

One can hardly see any positivity in the long cluster of the economic and political crises suffered by the world, at large, as a result of the global standoff around the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, pushing countries, like Egypt, to update its outdated economic system and adopt a whole new inclusive approach on the political stage are, perhaps, some of the gems hidden in the sludge of the ongoing war in eastern Europe.

Amidst the dark waves of the global standoff around the Russia-Ukraine war, the inclusive national dialogue that Egypt’s President El-Sisi called for, in April, is finally getting into shape, as an independent organization that will work on integrating all the political and economic factions of the Egyptian society into one harmonious mosaic. On the first week of July, the national dialogue’s first session will take off, and will be followed by a series of other sessions that will attempt to integrate as many voices, from all political backgrounds, as possible.

That is not an easy task in a country that has gone through two revolutions, followed by years of political instability, economic struggle, and lack of security, within a period of only one decade. The character, priorities, and ambitions of the Egyptian citizens have changed a lot over this decade. However, this should not prevent us from being optimistic about the many positive outcomes that may result the national dialogue, especially on the process of democratization, if properly accomplished. 

The initial statistics mentioned by the newly appointed dialogue’s coordination committee proves that political change is underway, and the Egyptian society, either on the elite or the grassroots levels, is so eager to embrace it. According to the National Dialogue coordination committee, 96% of the invited political parties and civil groups gave a positive response, while 4% asked for guarantees to their participation, that includes the release of their affiliated prisoners. 

In addition, the online application on the website of the National Training Academy (NTA), which is the body responsible for the logistics of organizing the national dialogue, received 69,530 responses from groups and individuals, who represent various sectors of the Egyptian society, from 20 target groups, that includes politicians, civil society professionals, think tank leaders, religious scholars, human rights activists, journalists, and technical professionals.

Despite the large range of diversity of the targeted participants, politics remain the most important issue on the list of the national dialogue priorities. 70 out of the 386 proposals submitted by the interested parties are about political reform. Meanwhile, economic issues and social issues come in the second and third place with 57 and 56 proposals, respectively. Other issues related to education, culture, media, health, and security followed with limited number of proposals. 

Obviously, this public craving for political practice and discussions is a natural reaction to the closeness of the political space, during the past seven years. However, the newly appointed General Coordinator of the National Dialogue, Diaa Rashwan, confirmed that the national dialogue will not be a mere practice of pouring hearts among the opposing political elite. “The national dialogue is not going to be a mere exchange of arguments between the participants,” Rashwan stressed. “We aim to reach clear outputs that are agreed upon by most participants, despite their different political stances.”

In fact, the selection of Diaa Rashwan to lead this complicated effort, on behalf of the state, holds a lot of promise that this national dialogue may actually succeed. Rashwan’s professional profile and long career history embodies a perfect balance that enables him to stand tall at the very narrow common strip of ground between the state and the opposition. 

Currently, Rashwan is the Head of the Journalists’ Syndicate, but at the same time he is the President of the State Information Service (SIS). Along his life, he has been known for being the brave journalist, who politically leans to the leftist/socialist wing, where most of the current opposition parties belong to. He, also, has a long record of standing up in defense of freedom of expression and exposing human rights violations and corruption under the former regimes. He is definitely the perfect person for that not so easy job.

The next step for the national dialogue coordination committee should be to form a board of trustees that includes elite figures, who represent the 20 target groups that the national dialogue aims to involve. Then, they will set together to figure out the best way to integrate the different approaches and the outcomes of the discussions into a base for the desired political progress that everyone, in Egypt, aspires to have. 

هل يستفيد الاقتصاد المصري من تعويم الشركات الوطنية المملوكة للجيش؟

 

رغم الانتقادات الحادة من بعض الأعضاء الاشتراكيين في البرلمان، فإن الحكومة المصرية مصممة على المضي في خطتها الطموحة لتحرير الاقتصاد في ظل أزمة الحرب الروسية الأوكرانية. تتمثل الخطة في تقليص مشاركة الحكومة في السوق، كمنافس، للاستفادة من مساحة تصل إلى ٦٥ في المائة للقطاع الخاص المحلي والمستثمرين الأجانب للتنافس على العديد من الفرص المربحة التي توفرها السوق المصرية الضخم والغزير. وتأمل الحكومة أن تجذب هذه الإصلاحات الاقتصادية الكلية الجديدة استثمارات أجنبية بقيمة ٤٠ مليار دولار على مدى السنوات الأربع المقبلة.

 

كان رد الفعل الأولي للمستثمرين الأجانب والمقرضين الدوليين على هذه الخطوات الشجاعة من قبل الحكومة المصرية واعدًا للغاية. وفي أقل من شهر، منذ أن أعلن رئيس الوزراء المصري، مصطفى مدبولي، عن خارطة الطريق لفتح السوق، تمكنت الحكومة من عقد صفقات استثمارات مستقبلية مع مستثمرين أجانب ومقرضين دوليين، يصل مجموعها إلى أكثر من ٣٠ مليار دولار. علاوة على ذلك، بدأ مستثمرو الأموال الساخنة، الذين فروا من البلاد في العامين الماضيين، بالزحف إلى طريق العودة للاستفادة من الفرص الجديدة.

 

بالإضافة إلى الفوائد طويلة المدى لهذه الخطة على النظام الاقتصادي بشكل عام، فهي تساهم أيضًا في تخفيف ضغط الحرب في أوروبا الشرقية على الاقتصاد المحلي. بفضل هذا النهج اللامركزي الجديد للسوق، تمكنت الحكومة المصرية من عقد صفقات تجارية للسلع الغذائية الأساسية مع دول أخرى للمناورة بتعطيل سلاسل التوريد حتى تنتهي الحرب في أوروبا الشرقية.

 

تعتبر اللامركزية في نظام الاقتصاد الكلي هي السمة الغالبة لعملية تحديث الاقتصاد المصري. بأي حال من الأحوال، هذه ليست مهمة سهلة في بلد مثل مصر له تاريخ طويل في تفضيل القطاع العام حتى عندما كان فاشلاً أو غير مؤهل لإدارة الأصول الوطنية الثمينة تحت سيطرته. ما يجعل العملية أكثر تعقيدًا وتحديًا هو أن الشركات الوطنية المستهدفة بالتعويم لا تقتصر على تلك التي تخضع لإدارة الحكومة المدنية. فبعض الشركات التجارية المملوكة للجيش مدرجة أيضًا على القائمة.

 

 

الرؤية الرئاسية

 

في خطابه التاريخي، عقب الإفطار الرئاسي الذي أقيم في أبريل الماضي، أصدر الرئيس المصري عبد الفتاح السيسي أوامره للحكومة ببدء العمل على "إدراج الشركات المملوكة للقوات المسلحة المصرية في البورصة المصرية قبل نهاية هذا العام". وجاءت التعليمات الرئاسية في إطار شرح رؤية الدولة لإصلاح العيوب المزمنة للاقتصاد المصري. وتتلخص رؤية قيادات الدولة في هذا الصدد في ثلاثة مسارات متوازية.

 

الهدف الأول هو تقليل عجز الميزانية وتضييق الفجوة بين الدين القومي والناتج المحلي الإجمالي. بينما المسار الثاني الذي يجب اتباعه هو تعزيز دور شركات القطاع الخاص المحلي، وخاصة في القطاع الصناعي، من خلال تزويدهم بالحوافز المتعلقة بجدولة الضرائب واستخدام البنية التحتية والمرافق. أما النقطة الثالثة التي يتم التركيز عليها فهي توسيع حجم البورصة المصرية، من خلال زيادة عدد الشركات المدرجة، وبالتالي جذب عدد أكبر من المستثمرين المحليين والأجانب. وهنا يأتي دور إدراج الشركات المملوكة للجيش.

 

وعلى عكس ما يعتقده معظم المراقبين، فإن قرار الرئيس المصري بتعويم الشركات المملوكة للجيش ليس جديدًا، وليس مدفوعًا على وجه التحديد بالأزمات المتفاقمة لوباء كورونا الذي أعقبته المواجهة العالمية حول الحرب الروسية الأوكرانية. فقد كانت المرة الأولى التي قدم فيها الرئيس السيسي مثل هذا الاقتراح الجريء في أكتوبر (تشرين الأول) ٢٠١٩ خلال زيارة لمرفق طبي عسكري، عندما قال: "يجب أن تحظى شركات القوات المسلحة بفرصة في العروض التي تقدمها الحكومة.. يجب أن تكون هذه الشركات مدرجة في البورصة لإعطاء المصريين فرصة الحصول على أسهم فيها".

 

ومع ذلك، في أوائل عام ٢٠٢٠، أكد الصندوق السيادي المصري أن الأسهم المملوكة للجيش، التي سيتم إدراجها في البورصة المصرية، لن تُباع حصريًا للمصريين. بدلاً من ذلك، سيستخدم الصندوق السيادي المصري المشاريع المجدية اقتصاديًا لأكبر مؤسسة تجارية للقوات المسلحة- جهاز مشروعات الخدمة الوطنية للقوات المسلحة- لجذب المستثمرين الأجانب، مع مبيعات تستهدف ما يصل إلى مائة في المائة من الأسهم المعروضة. يعتبر الصندوق السيادي المصري وسيطًا في العروض العامة الأولية لجهاز مشروعات الخدمة الوطنية، وفقًا لاتفاقية موقعة بين الصندوق السيادي المصري والقوات المسلحة في فبراير (شباط) ٢٠٢٠. ومع ذلك، بعد شهر واحد من ذلك، ضربت جائحة كورونا مصر بشدة، وبالتالي كان لا بد من تعليق عملية إنشاء وإدراج أسهم جهاز مشروعات الخدمة الوطنية.

 

من ناحية أخرى، لقي الخبر استحساناً من رجال الأعمال في القطاع الخاص الذين ظلوا يشكون من عدم قدرتهم على منافسة الشركات المملوكة للجيش، خاصة في قطاعي البناء والصناعات الغذائية. وبالمثل، رحبت النخبة السياسية، التي تروج لمفهوم "السيطرة المدنية على القوات المسلحة" كخطوة أساسية في عملية التحول الديمقراطي، بهذه الخطوة. وفي أثناء ذلك، تلقى قسم كبير من الجمهور المصري الأخبار بقلق، ربما بسبب الجدل الذي أثير حول موضوع إخضاع الاقتصاد العسكري لسيطرة الحكومة المدنية أو البرلمان في أعقاب الربيع العربي عام ٢٠١١.

 

من الناحية النظرية، يبدو أن تعويم الشركات التجارية المملوكة للمؤسسة المستقلة للقوات المسلحة المصرية خطوة مثالية في الاتجاه الصحيح. ومع ذلك، من الناحية العملية، يجب اتخاذ هذه الخطوة الحاسمة بخطى بطيئة. خلاف ذلك، قد يؤدي إلى ضرر أكثر من نفعه على تماسك الدولة الوطنية ككل. إن استباق الأحداث من خلال تهميش التدخل العسكري في الاقتصاد قبل بناء ديمقراطية مستقرة قادرة على احتواء هيكل اقتصادي ليبرالي دائم، قد يعرض للخطر الاستقرار السياسي والاقتصادي الكامل للدولة الوطنية.

 

 

العمود الفقري للدولة الوطنية

 

يشرف جهاز مشروعات الخدمة الوطنية للقوات المسلحة على مجموعة من الشركات التي تعمل في قطاعات مختلفة؛ من تعبئة المياه إلى البناء والعقارات. جهاز مشروعات الخدمة الوطنية للقوات المسلحة هو العمود الفقري للنظام الاقتصادي العسكري المستقل، والنظام الاقتصادي العسكري هو العمود الفقري للدولة الوطنية المصرية. وقد تأسس جهاز مشروعات الخدمة الوطنية للقوات المسلحة عام ١٩٧٩، لكنه انطلق كمشروع اقتصادي ناجح في أوائل الثمانينات، عندما تولى المشير عبد الحليم أبو غزالة منصب وزير الدفاع. كان أبو غزالة ذائع الصيت بين العسكريين، وكذلك عامة الناس، بسبب تفكيره المتقدم وطموحه في تطوير المؤسسة العسكرية وتنميتها، لا سيما على مستوى التسلح وبناء الكوادر. لتحقيق هذا الهدف، استفاد أبو غزالة على أفضل وجه من المساعدات العسكرية التي بدأت مصر في تلقيها من الولايات المتحدة في ذلك الوقت، وفقًا لبنود معاهدة السلام الموقعة بين مصر وإسرائيل عام ١٩٧٩.

 

وعلى مر السنين، أصبح جهاز مشروعات الخدمة الوطنية للقوات المسلحة المشروع الأكثر نجاحًا للنظام الاقتصادي العسكري. فالاستقلالية التي تتمتع بها المؤسسات العسكرية وعزم وانضباط الهرم القيادي أو القوات المسلحة، جعلت جهاز مشروعات الخدمة الوطنية للقوات المسلحة محصنًا ضد ممارسات الفساد في ظل نظام مبارك. وفي عام ٢٠١٢، عندما دعا أعضاء مجلس النواب من جماعة الإخوان المسلمين إلى إخضاع الشركات المملوكة للجيش لرقابة الحكومة، تلقوا ردًّا عنيفًا من قيادة المجلس الأعلى للقوات المسلحة.

 

وفي مارس (آذار) ٢٠١٢، عقد مساعد وزير الدفاع للشؤون المالية مؤتمرا صحافيا لتسليط الضوء على مخاطر تعريض الاقتصاد العسكري للحكومة المدنية، خاصة عندما كانت الدولة في حالة عدم استقرار سياسي حاد بعد الثورة. وكان مساعد وزير الدفاع للشؤون المالية قد شرح الوضع الآتي: "نمت أعمال [الجهاز]، الذي يعمل في عدة قطاعات، من ١١ مليون جنيه في عام ١٩٧٩ إلى ٦٤٤ مليون جنيه في عام ١٩٩٠ إلى ٦,٣ مليار جنيه في عام ٢٠١١، محققًا صافي ربح قدره ٧,٧ مليار جنيه بين عامي ١٩٩٠ و٢٠١١. سوف نحارب من أجل حماية مشاريعنا، ولن نسمح لأي جهة بتدمير الجهود التي كرسناها بصدق لبذلها لمدة ثلاثين عامًا، كما إننا لن نسمح لأحد بالاقتراب من مشاريع القوات المسلحة".

 

ومع ذلك، فإن جزءًا كبيرًا مما يُقال عن هيمنة الجيش على الاقتصاد المدني، أو أن الاستقلال الاقتصادي العسكري هو "إنشاء دولة داخل الدولة" ليس دقيقًا. قد تستند معظم هذه الادعاءات على مقارنات غير عادلة بين مصر والدول الغربية الأخرى ذات أنظمة الحكم الديمقراطية المتقدمة. في عام ٢٠١٢، أوضح مساعد وزير الدفاع للشؤون المالية آنذاك، أن الشركات المملوكة للجيش تدفع الضرائب، وأن تدخلها في السوق العامة محدود للغاية، ولا يحدث إلا في أوقات الأزمات. وفي عام ٢٠١٨، قال الرئيس السيسي في مقابلة تلفزيونية إن مشاركة الجيش في الاقتصاد الوطني تتراوح بين ٢ في المائة و٣ في المائة. وفي مقابلة إعلامية أخيرة مع رئيس الوزراء الحالي، أكد أيضًا أن التدخل العسكري في الاقتصاد بالكاد يتجاوز واحد في المائة.

 

 

شبكة الأمان في الأزمات

 

أداء كل من الزوايا الثلاث للاقتصاد المصري- أي الحكومة والقطاع الخاص والمؤسسة العسكرية- تحت ضغط جائحة كورونا، في عام ٢٠٢٠، دليل غير قابل للتفاوض على أن استقلال الاقتصاد العسكري أمر بالغ الأهمية للحفاظ على تماسك الدولة الوطنية في مواجهة الأزمات غير المتوقعة. في ذلك الوقت، امتنعت شركات القطاع الخاص عن دعم الحكومة في إدارة الأزمة، واستغلّت بوقاحة حالة الذعر بين الناس لزيادة أرباحهم من خلال ممارسة احتكار السلع الطبية والغذائية الأساسية. وقد أدى ذلك على الفور إلى تدخل القوات المسلحة، من خلال جهاز مشروعات الخدمة الوطنية للقوات المسلحة، لمساعدة الحكومة المدنية طوال الأزمة، مع وقف احتكار القطاع الخاص للسلع الغذائية والطبية.

 

بعد فترة وجيزة، عقد الرئيس السيسي اجتماعا مع قادة جهاز مشروعات الخدمة الوطنية للقوات المسلحة، تم بثه على الهواء مباشرة على التلفزيون الوطني، لشكرهم. وفي نهاية الاجتماع، خاطب الرئيس السيسي المواطنين بالقول إن الغرض من زيارة مرافق جهاز مشروعات الخدمة الوطنية للقوات المسلحة هو "استكشاف جاهزية القوات المسلحة لمساعدة الحكومة المدنية في إدارة الأزمة، وطمأنة المصريين أن هناك ترتيبًا موازيا جاهزًا لتلبية احتياجات الناس".

 

لم تكن هذه هي المرة الأولى التي تتدخل فيها القوات المسلحة لإنقاذ المصريين في أوقات الأزمات الاقتصادية أو السياسية. في الواقع، يلعب جهاز مشروعات الخدمة الوطنية للقوات المسلحة حاليًا دورًا هائلاً في تلبية احتياجات الناس من المنتجات الغذائية طوال الأزمة الناتجة عن الحرب الروسية الأوكرانية. وغني عن الذكر الدور الذي لعبته القوات المسلحة في الحفاظ على تماسك الدولة بعد ثورات الربيع العربي التي أطاحت بمبارك عام ٢٠١١. حيث أعلن المجلس الأعلى للقوات المسلحة، الذي قاد البلاد في المرحلة الانتقالية التي أعقبت تنحية مبارك عن السلطة، في مارس ٢٠١٢، أنه يتعين على المؤسسة العسكرية دعم ميزانية الدولة بنحو ٢.٥ مليار جنيه، بالإضافة إلى إقراض البنك المركزي المصري مليار دولار لتعزيز احتياطي النقد الأجنبي.

 

كما أوضح رئيس الوزراء عند تقديم خارطة طريق الإصلاح الاقتصادي في مايو، أن هيمنة الدولة على المشاريع الوطنية، في الغالب من خلال المؤسسات المملوكة للجيش، كانت ضرورية للحفاظ على تدفق الاقتصاد في غياب المستثمرين الأجانب الذين انسحبوا من أعمالهم خلال الاضطرابات الأمنية التي أعقبت الإطاحة بنظام الإخوان المسلمين عام ٢٠١٣. وأوضح رئيس الوزراء مدبولي: "خلال الفترة من ٢٠١٥ إلى ٢٠٢١، خلقت المشاريع الوطنية التي تقودها الدولة أكثر من خمسة ملايين فرصة عمل للشباب المصري وأعادت تمكين شركات القطاع الخاص المحلية من خلال دعوتهم للعمل كمقاولين في هذه المشاريع".

 

وأكمل: "هذا لا يعني أنه سيتم تأجيل أو إبطاء هذه المشاريع الوطنية في الفترة المقبلة. إنها تظل أولوية وسنواصل العمل عليها لأنها أثبتت أهميتها الكبيرة للمواطنين المصريين، كما أنها تمهد الطريق لعودة الاستثمارات الأجنبية".

 

وبدلاً من تقدير دور المؤسسة العسكرية في تعزيز الاقتصاد المصري، ألقى أباطرة القطاع الخاص وبعض الخبراء الأكاديميين باللوم على نجاح المؤسسة العسكرية في عدم كفاءة القطاع الخاص. وقالوا إن منشآت القوات المسلحة تعتمد على العمالة الرخيصة من المجندين وغير ملزمة بدفع ضرائب على مبيعاتهم التجارية، وبالتالي، تتمتع الشركات المملوكة للجيش بميزة نسبية، من حيث تسعير البضائع، عن شركات القطاع الخاص.

 

 

خطوات حذرة إلى الأمام

 

لطالما كان الاقتصاد العسكري شبكة الأمان التي تعتمد عليها الدولة الوطنية، في الأوقات الصعبة للاضطرابات السياسية والأزمات الاقتصادية. وبهذا المعنى، فإن الحفاظ على قوة الاقتصاد العسكري، من خلال الحفاظ على استقلاله عن الاقتصاد المدني، أمر بالغ الأهمية لضمان الانتقال السلس من النظام الاقتصادي الحالي غير المجدي إلى اقتصاد السوق المفتوح المنشود. عندها فقط، من الناحية المثالية، قد يُسمح للحكومة برفاهية مناقشة جدوى تعويم الاقتصاد العسكري. علاوة على ذلك، فإن السماح للاستثمارات الأجنبية بالتسلل إلى النظام الاقتصادي المستقل للقوات المسلحة المصرية، دون وجود شبكة أمان مناسبة حولها، سيعرض المؤسسة العسكرية للعديد من الفروق الاستراتيجية.

 

من خلال فهم هذه الحقائق المهمة، تحاول الدولة المصرية إيجاد حل وسط يمكّنها من المضي قدمًا في خطة تحرير السوق، دون تعريض الهيكل الاقتصادي العسكري للمخاطر. في الأسبوع الماضي، صرح مدير الصندوق السيادي المصري لوسائل الإعلام أن الصندوق السعودي الفرنسي يؤسس صندوقًا فرعيًا مخصصًا لإدارة الأسهم المملوكة للدولة، بما في ذلك أسهم الشركات المملوكة للجيش التي سيتم إدراجها في البورصة.

 

وفي أبريل الماضي، قال رئيس الصندوق السيادي المصري إنهم أكملوا بالفعل إعادة الهيكلة القانونية لشركتين مملوكتين للجيش لإدراجهما في البورصة قبل الصيف. الشركتان المملوكتان للجيش هما: لشركة الوطنية لبيع وتوزيع المنتجات البترولية (وطنية)، والشركة الوطنية للمشروعات الإنتاجية "صافي". كلتا الشركتين ناجحتان للغاية وبالتالي من المتوقع أن تكونا جذابتين للغاية لكل من المستثمرين المحليين والأجانب. في غضون ذلك، تعمل مؤسسة المشروعات الصغيرة والمتوسطة مع قيادة جهاز مشروعات الخدمة الوطنية للقوات المسلحة على إعادة الهيكلة القانونية للشركات الأخرى للإدراج في البورصة المصرية قبل نهاية العام، وفقًا لتعليمات الرئيس السيسي.

 

إن نجاح شركتي "وطنية" و"صافي" المملوكتين للجيش في اجتياز اختبار الظهور في قوائم البورصة المصرية، لأول مرة في تاريخ الدولة المصرية، يعد ضروريًا لنجاح خطة تحرير السوق بأكملها التي عزمت الحكومة على متابعتها حتى النهاية. كما أنه سيكون خطوة كبيرة إلى الأمام في فك واحدة من العقد الكبيرة التي تعقد عملية التحول الديمقراطي.

 

Will the Egyptian Economy Benefit from Floating the Military-Owned Companies?

Despite heated criticism from some of the socialist members of the parliament, the Egyptian government is determined to proceed with its ambitious plan to liberalize the economy, while bending in the wind of the Russia-Ukraine war. The plan is to shrink government’s involvement in the market, as a competitor, to avail a space as large as 65% for the local private sector and the foreign investors to compete over the many lucrative opportunities that the huge and prolific Egyptian market has to offer. The government hopes that these new macroeconomic reforms should attract foreign investments of 40 billion dollars over the coming four years. 

The initial reaction of the foreign investors and international lenders to these brave steps by the Egyptian government is quite promising. In less than one month, since the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mostafa Madbouly, announced the roadmap to opening the market, the government has been able to make deals of future investments with foreign investors and international lenders, that total as more than 30 billion dollars. Moreover, the ‘hot money’ investors, who fled the country in the past two years, started to crawl their way back to benefit from the new opportunities.

In addition to the long-term benefits of this plan on the economic system, in general, it is also contributing to easing the pressure of the war in eastern Europe on the domestic economy. Thanks to this new decentralized market approach, the Egyptian government has managed to make trade deals of basic food commodities with other countries, to maneuver the disruption of the supply chains, until the war in eastern Europe comes to an end.

The decentralization of the macroeconomic system is the dominant feature of the process to modernize the Egyptian economy. By any means, that is not an easy mission in a country like Egypt with a long history of favoring the public sector even when it was failing or underqualified to run the precious national assets under its control. What makes the process even more complicated and challenging is that the national companies targeted with floating are not limited to those falling under the administration of the civilian government. Some of the military-owned commercial enterprises are also on the list. 

Presidential Vision

In his milestone speech, following the presidential iftar that was hosted in April, the Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, gave orders to the government to start working on “listing the companies owned by the Egyptian Armed Forces in the Egyptian stock market, before the end of this year.” The presidential instruction was made within explaining the state’s vision to fix the chronic flaws of the Egyptian economy. The state leaderships vision, in this regard, is summarized in three parallel tracks. 

The first point of target is to minimize the budget deficit and narrow the gap between the national debt and the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The second track to pursue is to strengthen the role of the local private sector businesses, especially in the industrial sector, by providing them with incentives related to taxation scheduling and infrastructure and facilities utilization. The third point of focus is to expand the size of the Egyptian stock market (EGX), through increasing the number of listed companies, and thus attracting a larger number of local and foreign investors. Here is where the inclusion of military-owned companies came into play. 

Unlike what most observers believe, the decision of the Egyptian President to float the military-owned companies is not new, and is not precisely motivated by the compounding crises of the COVID-19 pandemic followed by the global standoff around the Russia-Ukraine war. The first time President El-Sisi made such a bold proposal was in October 2019, during a visit to a military-owned medical facility, when he said: “The companies of the Armed Forces ought to have an opportunity in the offerings made by the government… These companies must be listed in the stock market to give the Egyptians the opportunity to acquire shares in them.”

However, in early 2020, the Sovereign Fund of Egypt (SFE) confirmed that the military-owned stocks, to be listed in EGX, will not be exclusively sold to Egyptians. Rather, the SFE will use the economically viable projects of the Armed Forces’ largest commercial enterprise – the National Services Projects Organization (NSPO) – to attract foreign investors, with target sales that aims as high as 100% of offered shares. The SFE is the intermediary to the initial public offerings (IPOs) of the NSPO, per an agreement signed between the SFE and the Armed Forces in February 2020. Yet, one month after that, the COVID-19 pandemic hit Egypt hard and thus the process to create and list the stocks of NSPO had to be put on hold. 

The news was received with applaud by the business people, in the private sector, who has been complaining about their inability to compete against the military-owned companies, especially in the sectors of construction and food industry. Likewise, the political elite, who promote the concept of “the civilian control of the armed forces” as an essential step in the process of democratization welcomed the move. Meanwhile, a great portion of the Egyptian public received the news with unease, perhaps because of the controversy that was raised around the issue of subjecting the military economy to the control of the civilian government or the parliament, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring revolution in 2011.

In theory, floating the commercial companies owned by the autonomous institution of the Egyptian Armed Forces sounds like an ideal step in the right direction. However, in practice, this crucial step needs to be taken with a slow pace. Otherwise, it may entail more harm than good to the coherence of the nation-state as a whole. Jumping the gun by sidelining the military involvement in the economy before building a stable democracy that is capable of containing a durable liberal economic structure, may jeopardize the entire political and economic steadiness of the nation-state.

Backbone of the Nation-State

The National Services Projects Organization (NSPO) supervises a group of companies that work in different sectors, ranging from bottling water up to construction and real-estate. The NSPO is the backbone of the autonomous military economic system, and the military economic system is the backbone of the Egyptian nation-state. 

The NSPO was founded in 1979, but it took off as a successful economic enterprise, in the early 1980s, when the Field Marshal, Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, took the position of the Minister of Defense. Abu Ghazala was very popular among the military personnel, as well as the general public, because of his forward thinking and ambition to develop and grow the military institution, especially on the level of armament and capacity building. To achieve that goal, Abu Ghazala made the best use of the annual military that Egypt started to receive from the United States, at that time, per the stipulations of the peace treaty signed between Egypt and Israel in 1979.

Over the years, the NSPO has become the most successful project of the military economic system. The autonomy enjoyed by the military institutions and the determination and discipline of the leadership hierarchy or the Armed Forces, kept the NSPO immune against the practices of corruption under the Mubarak regime. In 2012, when members of the parliament from the Muslim Brotherhood called for subjecting the military-owned companies to the supervision of the government, they received a fierce response from the leadership of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). 

In March 2012, the Assistant Minister of Defense for Financial Affairs held a press conference to highlight the risk of subjecting the military economy to the civilian government, especially when a country was in a case of severe political instability after the revolution. “The business of the [NSPO], which operates in several sectors, has grown from 11 million Egyptian pounds in 1979 to 644 million pounds in 1990 to 6.3 billion pounds in 2011, achieving net profits of 7.7 billion pounds between 1990 and 2011;” he explained. “We will fight for protecting our projects, and will not allow any body to destroy the efforts that we have been sincerely dedicated to exerting for thirty years… We will not allow anyone to approach the projects of the armed forces.”

However, a great part of what is being said about the dominance of the military over the civilian economy, or that the military economic independence is “creating a state within the state” is not accurate. Most of these claims are based on unfair comparisons between Egypt and other western states with advanced democratic systems of governance. 

In 2012, the then Assistant Minister of Defense for Financial Affairs, clarified that the military-owned companies pay taxes, and that their intervention in the public market is very limited, and happens only during the time of crises. In 2018, President El-Sisi said in a televised interview that the involvement of the military in the national economy is somewhere between 2% to 3%. In a recent media interview with the current Prime Minister, he also confirmed that the military intervention in the economy is barely above 1%.

Safety Net in Crises 

The performance of each of the three angels of the Egyptian economy – i.e.; the government, the private sector, and the military institution – under the pressure of the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2020, introduced a non-negotiable proof that the independence of the military economy is crucial for preserving the coherence of the nation-state in face of unforeseen crises. At that time, the private sector businesses declined to support the government in managing the crisis, and shamelessly abused the state of panic among the people to increase their profits by practicing monopoly over basic medical and food commodities. That immediately prompted the intervention of the Armed Forces, through the NSPO, to assist the civil government throughout the crisis, while halting private sector monopoly over food and medical commodities. 

Short after, President El-Sisi held a meeting with the leaders of the NSPO, that was broadcast live on national television, to thank them. At the end of the meeting, President El-Sisi addressed the public citizens by saying that the purpose of visiting NSPO facilities is to “explore the readiness of the Armed Forces to assist the civil government in managing the crisis, and to assure the Egyptians that there is a ‘parallel arrangement’ ready to satisfy people’s needs.”

This was not the first time for the Armed Forces to intervene to save the Egyptians in times of economic or political crises. In fact, the NSPO is currently playing a tremendous role in fulfilling people’s needs from food products throughout the crisis resulting from the Russia-Ukraine war. Needless to mention is the role that the Armed Forces played in preserving the coherence of the state following the Arab Spring revolution that ousted Mubarak in 2011. The Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), which led the country in the transitional phase that followed Mubarak’s removal from power, declared in March 2012, that the military institution had to support the state budget with nearly 2.5 billion Egyptian pounds, in addition to lending the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) one billion dollars to enhance its foreign reserves. 

When presenting the economic reform roadmap, in May, the Prime Minister explained that the state dominance over national projects, mostly via military-owned institutions, was a necessity to keep the economy flowing in absence of the foreign investors who withdrew their businesses during the security turmoil that followed the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood regime, in 2013. “Over the period from 2015 to 2021, the state-led national projects created more than five million jobs for the Egyptian youth and re-empowered the local private sector companies by inviting them to act as contractors in these projects;” Prime Minister Madbouly explained. “That is not to say that these national projects are to be postponed or slowed down, in the coming period. They remain a priority and we will continue working on them as they proved to be of great importance to the Egyptian citizens, and are also paving the way for the return of foreign investments.”

Rather than appreciating the role of the military institution in enhancing Egypt’s economy, the private sector tycoons, and some academic experts, find muse in blaming the success of the military institution for the incompetency of the private sector. They say that the Armed Forces’ enterprises depend on cheap labor from the conscripted soldiers and are not required to pay taxes on their commercial sales, and thus the military-owned companies have a comparative advantage, in terms with pricing the goods, over the private sector businesses. 

Careful Steps Forward 

The military economy has always been the safety net that the nation-state leaned on, in the difficult times of political turbulence and economic crises. In that sense, keeping the military economy strong, by maintaining its independence from the civil economy, is crucial for ensuring a smooth transition from the existing futile economic system to the desired open market economy. Only then, ideally, the government may be allowed the luxury of discussing the viability of floating the military economy. Moreover, allowing foreign investments to infiltrate into the autonomous economic system of the Egyptian Armed Forces, without having a proper safety network around it, will expose the military institution to several strategic nuances.

Understanding these critical facts, the Egyptian state is trying to find a middle ground that enables it to proceed with the market liberalization plan, without exposing the military economic structure to risk. Last week, the director of the Sovereign Fund of Egypt (SFE) told the media that the SFE is creating a sub-fund that is dedicated to managing the state-owned stocks, including the stocks of military-owned companies, that will be listed on the stock market. 

In April, the SFE president said that they have already completed the legal reframing of two military-owned companies to list on the EGX before the summer. The two military-owned companies are: The National Company for the Sale and Distribution of Petroleum Products (Wataniya), and the National Company for Producing Natural Water (Safi). Both companies are very successful and thus are expected to be highly attractive to both local and foreign investors. Meanwhile, the SFE is working with the leadership of the Armed Forces’ NSPO on legal reframing of other companies to list in the EGX before the end of the year, per President El-Sisi instructions. 

The success of the military-owned Wataniya and Safi companies in passing the test of showing up at the EGX lists, for the first time in the history of the Egyptian state, is essential for the success of the entire market liberalization plan that the government is full determined to pursue till the end. It will be, also, a huge step forward in untying one of the large knots that is complicating the process of democratization.

What to Expect After Mohammed Bin Zayed and Hulusi Akar Meeting?

In Abu Dhabi, on the last day of May, UAE’s President, Mohammed Bin Zayed, and Turkey’s Minister of Defense, Hulusi Akar, sat to talk head-to-head for the first time. Both are political leaders, with a military background. Their countries are politically and militarily active, on opposite sides though, in all the diplomatic and armed conflicts of the ever-boiling region of the Middle East, extending from Libya in North Africa to Syria and Iraq in the Levant region, and even in Afghanistan. 

This important meeting may not add new benefits to the bilateral relationship between Turkey and the UAE, which was recently given a second chance through a haste reconciliation process pushed by the compounding security and economic challenges facing the region. However, the influence of the meeting, between these two shrewd military strategists, will mark a milestone in the formation of the new Middle East, by instigating a cluster of changes in areas of armed conflict, where the two countries are active against each other. Most likely, northern Syria will be the first spot where this change in attitude, at least from the UAE side, is going to manifest.

According to the statements of the Turkish Minister of Defense, the UAE Chief of Staff will visit the Turkish Chief of Staff in Ankara, in the near future, to discuss the technical aspects to start military cooperation and training program between the two countries. Since the reconciliation between the two countries was announced, in November 2021, the UAE has shown eagerness to make defense deals with the Turkish side, similar to the strong military ties between Turkey and Qatar.

On the 7th of December 2021, while Turkey's President Erdogan and his top ministers were in Qatar for strategic talks, a UAE delegation visited Ankara for negotiating defense deals, that included offers to buy shares in ASELSAN, Turkey's leading electronic defense manufacturer. ASELSAN opened a branch in Doha, in January 2021, as part of the military agreement between Qatar and Turkey. But in the end, the Emirati delegation returned empty-handed, as the negotiations did not lead to any positive results. The main reason was that despite the improvement of relations between the two countries, on the political and economic level, the rivalry between Abu Dhabi and Ankara, on the military and strategic level, still existed.

Therefore, it was not surprising to know that one of the most important goals behind the UAE's invitation to the Turkish Defense Minister to visit the UAE and meet with President Mohammed Bin Zayed, is to resolve this tension with Hulusi Akar. In the briefing that Hulusi Akar gave at the headquarters of the Turkish Embassy in Abu Dhabi before his return to Ankara, the Turkish Defense Minister hinted that President Mohammed bin Zayed would not oppose the military operation that Turkey plans to launch in northern Syria in the coming period, despite the fact that the UAE has always been one of the strongest regional backers of the Kurdish organizations in northern Syria and Iraq, and has often supported their positions and activities against Turkey.

“We had the opportunity to present our work to the UAE President, who welcomed us with great kindness and sincerity. We were pleased to see that [Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed] agreed with the information and the assessment that we provided;” Hulusi Akar noted in a video briefing from Abu Dhabi. “The UAE President, also, expressed that he supports the work we have done and the progress made in this area.”

The goal of the military operation, which the Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, announced, in early May, is to establish a “safe corridor” of 30 kilometers in depth, on the southern borders of Turkey and the northern borders of Syria and Iraq. The operation is part of the “Pence Kilit” operations that the Turkish military has been leading in northern Syria and Iraq, for a while, to hunt terrorists from the YPG and the PKK organizations, who are hiding in the Kurdish-dominated area, there. Several regional and international policymakers expressed concern that this is not an acceptable offensive on the sovereignty of Syria and Iraq that will hurt the innocent civilians living there.

However, according to Minister Hulusi Akar, the establishing of the ‘safe corridor’ is the only means to prevent the terrorists, in this region, from establishing a ‘terror corridor’ that threatens the security of Turkey. "Our only target is terrorists. Kurds and Arabs are our brothers. Some people still confuse the issue, either out of ignorance or with ulterior motives. Our only target is terrorists. PKK and YPG are terrorists;” Hulusi Akar said. “Our sole purpose from these activities is to guarantee the security of Turkey’s borders. We will not allow a terror corridor to be built there… I want everyone to know that our military is determined and capable of making this happen.”

The UAE’s changing position towards the activities of the Turkish military in the Kurdish dominated areas in northern Syria and Iraq, is part of the new policy that the UAE is adopting towards the region. It is in the best interest of the UAE to build strong relationships with the non-Arab countries of the Middle East, Turkey, Israel, and Iran, rather than to continue with fighting against them on behalf of the Arab countries affected by their interventions. That is not only limited to the Levant region. Most Likely, the UAE may withdraw itself from the Libya conflict, soon, in order to avoid renewing the confrontation with Turkey’s military leadership, which will definitely move the troops to Libya as soon as it is done with the safe corridor operation in Syria.