Egypt's Economic Crisis: What the Government is Doing to Stop the Bleeding

Egyptian citizens from all social and professional backgrounds are deeply affected by the economic crisis. The wealthy, the poor, and the middle class are all struggling to adjust to the new reality, to varying degrees, and for different reasons.

Egyptian officials insist that the current economic crisis is not their fault, but rather the predictable consequence of global crises that have hit the world in the last two years, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the global recession caused by the ongoing war in eastern Europe. Although part of this statement is undeniably true, many Egyptians refute it by holding the government accountable for its inability to implement a macroeconomic reform program capable of effectively healing Egypt's chronic economic crisis, which has plagued the country since the 1950s. In this debate, the bitter truth remains that Egyptians are deeply depressed as a result of a severe economic crisis, and the government must act.

The Challenge

The Egyptian government is grappling with the limited options available to resolve the renewed economic crisis and reassure the concerned citizens about their financial security and economic prospects. The flotation of the Egyptian pound in pursuit of a small loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has created a shockwave that has severely impacted the already troubled macroeconomic system. Furthermore, premature policies to disrupt importation to preserve dollar reserves have contributed to price increases in food and basic commodities. Despite the Central Bank of Egypt's (CBE) extreme monetary policies, which have pushed interest rates to unprecedented levels, inflation rates have skyrocketed to above 20% in the last two months.

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in February 2022, the Egyptian economy has been weathering significant pressures, blowing away the hard-earned gains of the national economic reform program that the government launched seven years ago. Over the past year, the hot money investors withdrew from the Egyptian market causing a sharp decline in foreign investment rates. As a result, the dollar reserves in the CBE started to deplete, especially that the tourism sector, too, has become unable to generate appropriate revenues because of the sharp fall in Russian and Eastern European tourist turnout.

Between the end of November and early December, the dollar scarcity issue got more complicated as more citizens started to purchase dollars to hedge against inflation. In December, the CBE announced that official inflation rates reached slightly over 21%, adding huge pressure on the purchasing power of the Egyptian Pound. In the unofficial market, the dollar exchange rates spiked to 32-40 EGP compared to 28-31 EGP in official banks. 

“The influence of the war in eastern Europe on the global supply chains of food and energy is burdening the Egyptian economy with 130 billion Egyptian pounds in direct cost, in addition to 335 billion Egyptian pounds to handle the indirect consequences;” the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mustafa Madbouly noted earlier.

The Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, made three speeches in the past three weeks at three carefully selected strategic platforms: the Coptic Orthodox Cathedral, the Military Academy, and the Police Day Ceremony. The president’s choice to deliver his message via these particular venues was not an accident, but a means to put a political frame around his economic message to the general public and international allies and stakeholders. The message of the president could be summarized as follows: “The economy is doing well, no need to panic or worry, we will survive the economic crisis the same way we survived previous political and security crises.” In response, the most skeptical Egyptians have decided to wait and see what the government can do to keep the Egyptian economy boat afloat.

The Uncertainty 

The Egyptian public's opposing views on the current and previous IMF loans are particularly intriguing. When the Egyptian government announced its intention to seek an IMF loan in 2016, most Egyptians applauded the decision and pledged to support the political leadership in completing the comprehensive economic reform plan attached to the loan. In contrast, the Egyptian public is skeptical of the new IMF loan approved last month. 

Egypt is the second largest lender from the IMF, despite having a rocky history with IMF loans. Since the 1960s, these loans have both kept governments from collapsing amidst economic crises, but they always caused hardships to middle-class citizens. The only exception was the 2016 IMF loan overseen by Christine Lagarde, which transformed Egypt's socio-economic circumstances and brought hope to the hearts of the poor. However, these gains are now in jeopardy due to the Egyptian government's attempts to fulfill the requirements of a much smaller and more restrictive loan. 

The current IMF leadership is way more rigid than the previous IMF leadership of Christine Lagarde in terms of applying the loan-attached conditions of state policy and structural reform. From a compassionate and understanding position, Lagarde gave priority to directing the Egyptian government to make tangible progress on the social development agenda. However, the current IMF leadership is giving the ultimate priority to fast-forwarding the market liberation process even if it happens at the expense of slowing down the national development projects and crushing the middle class.

In 2016, the Egyptian government received an IMF loan of $12 billion over three years through the IMF's Extended Fund Facility. The loan and the linked technical support program provided a tremendous buffer for the Egyptian economy against the challenges of the reform program, especially those related to the first shocks of inflation and the floating of local currency. When the COVID-19 pandemic broke out in 2020, the IMF intervened with two additional financial support instruments to support the Egyptian economy against the consequences of the pandemic. In May 2020, Egypt received US$2.8 billion in emergency financial assistance through the IMF’s Rapid Financing Instrument. Then, in June 2020, the IMF’s Standby Arrangement availed US$5.4 billion for Egypt to withdraw over a period of twelve months.

Thanks to the success of the IMF’s technical support program, Egyptians started to report tangible improvements in their living conditions and greater flexibility in their microeconomic decision-making in the first months of 2022. Around the same dates, Egypt was reaffirmed by the three Credit Rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P Global) at B and B+ with a stable outlook. In December 2021, an IMF report expected that Egypt, by the end of 2022, will become the second largest economy in Africa, after Nigeria, and the second largest economy in all Arab countries, after Saudi Arabia, with a record Growth Domestic Product (GDP) that exceeds US$438 billion. And, then, Russia’s President Putin decided to invade Ukraine!

When the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war started to reflect on the Egyptian economy, the first instinct of the Egyptian government was to knock on the doors of the IMF once more. After almost a year of negotiations between Egyptian government officials and IMF executives, a sudden cabinet reshuffle, and a change in the leadership of the Central Bank of Egypt, the IMF finally approved a small loan of three billion dollars to Egypt in mid-December. The small loan will be paid to the Egyptian government in installments over a long period of 46 months and may be frozen or completely withdrawn if the Egyptian government does not show steadfast progress on the list of harsh conditions.

The list of macroeconomic reform policies that the Egyptian government approved and committed itself to them, to receive the $3 billion IMF loan include but are not limited to: floating the Egyptian pound against the US dollar, removing subsidies on oil and gas to match international prices, slowing down the mega infrastructure and social development projects, accelerating and widening the process of collecting taxes, selling state-owned assets to private investors, and listing military-owned enterprises at the stocks market (The Egyptian Exchange).

The middle class is the citizen group most concerned about the consequences of the IMF loan conditions on their lifestyle and standard of living. Such conditions are expected to downgrade their purchasing power and thus curtail their ability to provide for themselves the basic services that the government is not offering them, such as quality education, health care, and unsubsidized food and energy products. 

Survival Plan

The government policy to survive the current economic crisis and avoid future crises is happening through three timebound phases: immediate, medium-term, and future. 

In the short term, the government’s top priority is to control inflation and stabilize the market. That is mainly through restoring depleted dollar reserves to a level that allows the resumption of imports and thus mitigates the soaring prices of basic commodities. Such a step is crucial for both economic and political reasons. It may participate in improving citizen satisfaction with the performance of the government and mitigate public stress. To achieve this, the government worked on two parallel tracks. 

The first track is where the government, with the help of military-owned enterprises, is focused on keeping the basic commodities, such as food and energy products, abundantly available in local shops. Since the beginning of the crisis in March, the Egyptian government has been exerting a huge effort to keep food products, especially bread and oil, available to most consumers at affordable prices. In the process, the government had to postpone its plans to remove the subsidies on bread, fuel consumption, and electricity subscriptions until the current crisis is resolved.

The second track is where the CBE has been taking radical fiscal measures to close the gap between the dollar exchange rate in the official and non-official (or the black) market. Floating the Egyptian pound against the dollar in conjunction with raising interest rates encouraged most Egyptians to invest in high-rate EGP certificate deposits rather than hedging against inflation by purchasing and saving dollars or gold. In December, the CBE’s Policy Committee decided in its last routine meeting of 2022 to raise the interest rate by 3% to control inflation and strengthen the Egyptian pound before allowing it to float per IMF instructions. Since March, the CBE gradually raised the interest by 8%. 

This seemingly extremely liberal policy succeeded in attracting massive investments from Egyptians, local and living abroad, in the high-profit Egyptian pound certificates of deposits offered at Egyptian national banks. In the medium term, this policy seems to be able to control the inflation rates and bring the exchange rates to a reasonable range. Official statements show that Egyptians poured more than three hundred billion EGP into these certificates of deposit, within only two weeks. This policy has also encouraged Egyptians abroad to pour money into the Egyptian banking system in a way that partially compensated for the fleeing hot money investors. 

In the past few years, Egyptians abroad made financial contributions to the Egyptian sovereign fund to support the state-led comprehensive development plan. The size of Egyptians living and working worldwide is roughly estimated at 14 million people. They have the financial muscle to make a real difference in the future of the Egyptian economy. In August, the CBE highlighted a record increase of 1.6% in the remittance inflow by Egyptians abroad, reaching 31.9 billion dollars for the first time. 

In the near future, the government’s main goal is to encourage foreign investors to return to the lucrative Egyptian market, which includes hot money investors and foreign direct investments that would bring much-needed money and employment opportunities to the Egyptian macroeconomic system. In the past two weeks, the Egyptian Prime Minister held several meetings with local business owners and foreign investors to discuss ways to facilitate their operations and increase their volumes of production.  

This goes hand in hand with improving the tourism sector and opening the door for new tourists from eastern Asia to compensate for the shortage of traditional Russian and European tourists, who are curtailed by the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war. Egyptian tourism companies have already started to arrange trips for tourist groups coming from China, the first of which arrived in Cairo and visited the Red Sea resorts earlier this month. In his meeting with the Indian Prime Minister this week, President El-Sisi made sure to assert that Egypt would welcome an increase in Indian tourists interested in visiting Egypt. Tourism is one of two frontiers of foreign currency, besides the revenues of the Suez Canal. 

In the long term, the policy documents that the government is currently proposing to regulate taxation rules and the military role in the economy are also believed to contribute to lasting reforms. Over the coming four years, the government plans to list state-owned stocks with a value of 10 billion dollars every year, ultimately compounding to 40 billion dollars by the end of the period, for foreign and local investors to buy. At the same time, the government plans to increase the participation of Egyptian private sector businesses in state-run national projects to 65%, compared to the current rate of 30%. That is expected to offer a golden opportunity to the growing community of entrepreneurs and startups that resembles one of the strongest pillars of support to the future of the Egyptian economy.

In that regard, the government is currently working on a taxation policy document that will regulate the process of collecting taxes from businesses and individuals. The proposed policies have already been met with objections from a wide range of business owners and individual professionals. Meanwhile, the government has recently issued the state ownership policy document which outlines the key principles governing the scope of state and military interventions in the market. However, the complete withdrawal of the military institution from the market does not seem realistic or even possible any time soon. Military enterprises have always been the backbone of the Egyptian economy and the safety net for Egyptian people in times of crisis. Therefore, the taxation and state ownership policy documents should be implemented at a slow pace and continued revisions to avoid any setbacks or backfiring.

The Hope 

There are always hidden opportunities in every crisis. In the case of Egypt’s current economic crisis, the hidden opportunity could be accelerating the process of establishing a modern macroeconomic system in place of the old and barren structure that kept the Egyptian economy struggling for seven decades.

Despite the painful pressures on the spending power of most Egyptian citizens, especially from the middle class, there are some promising indicators on the state / governmental level. For example, Egypt’s GDP has grown by 4.4% at the end of 2022 compared to the 3.3% growth rate in 2021. Egypt's non-oil exports rose during the period extending from January to October by about 12% to reach $30.4 billion compared to $27.1 billion during a similar period last year. Meanwhile, the government has not given up on its mega national projects targeting to improve the infrastructure and protect the poor.

That being said, we have to keep in mind that all the efforts exerted by the government to contain the current economic crisis are only going to provide a temporary fix to a chronic disease that has been dragging Egypt for seven decades.

After 12 years, is another protest Tahrir possible in Egypt? | Harici Special Interview with Dalia Ziada

Originally published on Harici

Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year rule in Egypt came to an end with the popular movement that finalized on January 25th 2011. After the initial wave of protests, which lasted for 18 days, Mubarak was compelled to resign on February 11th.

In 2013, a new round of actions and military intervention brought an end to Mohammed Morsi’s administration, which had been elected to power after Hosni Mubarak. The leader of the military coup during the polls in May 2014, Defense Minister Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, won the presidency with 90 percent of the vote while just 45 percent of eligible voters cast ballots.

The “crazy projects” of the Sisi administration, such the construction of a new headquarters in the Egyptian capital Cairo, had a major impact on the nation’s economy in the past ten years, when the Egyptian army was swiftly modernized and significant resources were allocated to this sector.

The Russian-Ukrainian war, the pandemic, and other health concerns caught the Egyptian economy off unprepared. The foreign capital that Russian and Ukrainian tourists had brought to Egypt was lost. Foreign investors withdrew about $25 billion in fresh capital from the Egyptian market in less than a year. Egypt’s currency, the lira, dropped by 50% from the previous year as it quickly lost value against the US dollar.

Due to the rapid currency increase, import prices increased. Accessing basic consumer goods has been more difficult for the underprivileged. Meat and eggs are now often regarded as high-end goods. The middle class’s standard of living has declined.

In Egypt, a nation of 104 million people where 70% of the populace receives bread subsidies, the grain crisis has also turned into a serious national security concern.

Egypt called the IMF for the fourth time in the previous six years due to these challenging circumstances. The Sisi administration, which took $3 billion, was forced to agree to the IMF’s stringent requirements.

The IMF’s requirements include privatization, a cessation of currency manipulation, and limitations on the military’s influence over the economy. The swift fall of the lira was the first sign that letting exchange rates float

What kind of future has in wait for Egypt, the center of the Arab world, where skyscrapers are rising on one side but poverty is spreading on the other?

Will the deteriorating economic situation lead to a new Tahrir uprising?

How eager are Egyptians to demand their rights in the squares in light of the bitter experience of the last 10 years, when social upheavals quickly turned into civil wars?

It appears that the huge winds of revolution have temporarily turned to a disappointment. However, it is absolutely impossible to lose belief in the Nile River’s never-ending flow.

12 years had passed since December 25th 2011, when tens of thousands of people started to swarm the Tahrir Square,. We questioned Dalia Ziada, the director of the Center for Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East Studies, on the state of Egypt’s economy and the broken ties between Egypt and Turkey.

• “Things are difficult, but we are in control of it and we will be able to overcome it,” said President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi in Military Academy. As I understand President Sisi is trying to give message to Egyptian to be relax and calm So, what kind of economic challenges Egypt is currently facing. During the past few months, the dollar has been in rise. What is the current pressing economic issue, and what steps will Cairo take to overcome it?

• What is the army’s role in economy? It is being criticized by the West.

• If I remember it correctly Egypt took IMF loan four times … Well, didn’t IMF’s credit programs work in Egypt?

• Economic issues may be caused by the Coronavirus era or the conflict in Eastern Europe, and the devastation it caused on a worldwide scale is evident. Particularly in Europe, one might observe several protests against the government in France or England. I’m not sure how these public protests will affect or will change politics in Europe, but I wonder if social movements could start in the Middle East again, especially in Egypt after the so called Arab Spring. Is there any possibility in Cairo or the other capitals in the Middle East?

• I would like to ask to you the current feelings of the middle class? After 10 years what is their mood?

• There is rapprochement process between the Arab nations between Türkiye and Arab World and also we can add Iran to this list. So, how do you evaluate this process? What king obstacles we have between Ankara and Cairo?

• The process has frozen. What is the expectations of Cairo from Ankara?

It is a very good question to start the conversation with, because this is what is preoccupying the minds of everyone right now either in Egypt or worldwide but specifically in Egypt. Because this time, unlike before, the crisis is too complicated in many ways because it is in a sense a combined crisis. It is not new, it is not made by the Covid or by the Russia-Ukraine War but these recent global events have enhanced the crisis that has been in place since the 1960s or even 1950s in Egypt.

I call it the chronic crisis of the Egyptian economy. So, right now we are facing this challenge, which we are at a crossroads. Perhaps the economic plan or macroeconomic policy at that time did not start on the right foot. They first started as a communist republic and started to apply socialist policies. And then years later they said let’s have try on liberal market policies. And then all this has changed and we ended up with a very distorted macroeconomic system that we had to deal with throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In addition, of course to a long heritage of administrative and financial corruption. All this led to the image of the distorted economy or macroeconomic systems that we are having in Egypt today. So, the two crises that came each other, the Covid- and then the Russian Ukraine War, have brought Egypt at a crossroads. So now you have either to deal with this chronic crisis and solve it for good and start a whole new macroeconomic system or you just turn a blind eye to what’s going on and keep going on like this. And sooner or later this will lead to the collapse of the macroeconomic system and the entire political stability that we have been trying to keep for a while.

In the past week we have seen several statements by the senior state officials starting from the President, the Prime Minister, assuring the public that everything is fine while trying to keep it under control but unfortunately this is not translated on the ground. When you tell this to me as a citizen, I get happy and excited, but when I go out to the street to buy food or do any other activity that I used to do as a middle-class person, it has simply become too difficult. For example, in Türkiye and in many other countries when there is a such case of inflation, they are always accompanied by raises in salaries and the minimum wage, we do not have this here in Egypt because the country is already in deep debt and they cannot even afford an increase in salaries. On the contrary they are talking about removing subsidies on essential household commodities goods like the bread, cooking oil and energy which also will end up in more inflation. There is zero control over the market.

This military-owned enterprises issue is somehow complicated for someone who does not understand how things are working in Egypt. The military is I would call, the backbone of the Egyptian State both politically and economically. In other words, the civilian government here in Egypt can’t do without the military being involved, as a safety net or as an insurance I would say in both politics and economy. Of course, like from a democratic point of view this is completely wrong and it should change one day if we really want Egypt to become a democratic country. But are we ready for this now? Unfortunately, no. The economic reform that the IMF is currently requesting, are very tough on the Egyptian market and for the merchants and the manufacturers, as much as they are on the Egyptian people itself. And the only entity in the country that have an autonomous economic system of its own and that is not affected by what is happening in the market is the military. And they have enterprises that can fill the gap between what the civilian government can offer and what the people need. Because this gap is believe me, really big. Only entity in Egypt right now that can fill in this gap, is the military. So, in the long run, yes the military should get completely out of the market and allow private investors to do their work and for the market to be liberated because this is essential if we really want to develop the Egyptian economy and the Egyptian political life in general. But right now, it would be a very tough decision with all the mess that we are having in especially in the economic arena.

Since the 1960s we have been receiving loans from the IMF. It is not only the recent ones but in these ones are very different. I would speak specifically and make a very quick comparison between the current loan that is three billion dollars over 48 months. And the previous loans which comprised of about twenty billion dollars, came in three parts like first twelve billion dollars, and then two emergency loans of the IMF that are I think something around five and two billion dollars, totaling in twenty billion dollars in these past six years. And why is these six years in particular being important because they are the years when we have this new regime in Egypt of President Al-Sisi. Before that it was a different state and a completely different scenario in politics and macroeconomics. The first loan which was given to us in 2016, was based on some policies that I think worked very much in the favor of the Egyptian people. That is not only serving to rescue the state from collapse. But they included some policies, which I think is because of Christine Lagarde’s activist spirit, which was towards development and socio-economic wellbeing, all tied together. So, this loan helped Egypt to improve its infrastructure in a very positive way, and provided a good support to the poor and social development in general in Egypt. For example, these programs were made for the Haya Karima, which means “Dignified Life”, for the people who cannot afford a living and also for urban redevelopment for the people who are living in slums.

So, all these definitely had a good effect in improving the standard of living in Egypt, and also for attracting foreign investors until the start of the Russia-Ukraine War. Although it is happening in a very distant geography it affected us dramatically, because Egypt relays on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in two basic sectors, the food sector and the tourism sector. So, the shockwave of the Russia Ukraine war on Egypt was much bigger than it was on any other country I assume, so we ended up having falling again into this loop of crises. So now we are asking for a new loan, but this new loan is very strict in applying the policies that seek structural reform including of course the military withdrawal from the market and slowing down the national projects which was made by the former loans, which may actually risk the gains that we have got from the 2016 loan. This is what is making the most Egyptians pessimistic I would say, about the new loan.

Why people came out against Mubarak at that time, was partly due to similar policies like privatization, selling state-owned assets to foreign investors etc. So, of course this question came to the minds of many observers and analysts that the Egyptians will go out against Al-Sisi to protest his policies and actually I am talking to from Cairo right now. and from what I am seeing is that people throughout the past 10 years, is that we have gone through a lot including political transitions, the lack of security and stability at certain times, and now with the economic crisis, I think the people are very much in a case of fatigue that may not be able take such an action. They are also having a general mindset in the street is that “Yes we know we are suffering, and it is not good” and many people completely disagree with the policies of the government, especially in the economic part of the equation. But they are making this compromise “if we go to the street now and make a protest this will lead to chaos again and the chaos will lead to more economic trouble and more economic complications and will take another 10 years to get over these complications”. So, they are waiting to see what the government can really do with this crisis. I do not think they may come out anytime soon. If we also look in the past protesters that happened over the past 10 years since the Arab Spring up till now it is not the poor. It is always the middle class. It is the middle class, the educated the employees, the bureaucrats that are the ones who come out to the streets and make real protests that make real changes.

Now the middle class is very depressed in many ways. One of them of course is economic as we are speaking about the economic part here. But also, another part is political because we had these high hopes about a more democratic country, more freedoms, more human rights or better performance by the government on human rights. Unfortunately, today we are still struggling with the same issues we have been struggling with 10 years ago, regarding freedom of speech, human rights democratization. And even when changes happen and things open up a little bit, they get closed again by economic crises or security issues like fighting against terrorism etc. So, the depression is coming from the fact that we fear that these dreams will be forgotten, in the process of doing economic reform, or facing security challenges. But hopefully people will keep pressing in a positive way not in a destructive way to make this happen in the future. But this all sticks us again to the point that you can advocate for you know democracy human rights in a country that is stable with a good economy. But usually when these things are not well, the security is not good enough and economy is not good enough. As human rights activists or civil rights activists we do not get the popular support needed to help our work. So, this is basically the main challenge here.

Great question actually. Let me start by saying that I am very happy with the new foreign policies of president Erdogan of Türkiye has been adopting in the past two years, which is mainly about approaching Arab countries of all over the Arab geography, and also communicating on a basis of fixing ties regardless of the ideological differences, either on the Mediterranean or in the Middle East and Türkiye, since I consider Türkiye a part of the Middle East of course. The good thing here is that most of the Arabs do not look at Türkiye in the same negative light that they look at Iran for example. For most Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia, which is the biggest Gulf country and one of the main leaders in the region right, now Iran is still seen as an enemy. But while it is not that much in countries in North Africa, but Türkiye for everyone has always been a friend. Of course before past seven or eight years of diplomatic and media rivalries, but before that Türkiye has always been integral to this region and a very important partner and an important regional player in the region. For Egypt and Türkiye in particular, the relationship is even more critical than any other country. That is not only because of the geographic proximity between the two countries, which allows lots of opportunities for economic cooperation between the two countries given the fact that Egypt is literally at the gates of Africa, and Türkiye is literally at the gates of Europe, but we can do a lot of things together. Again unfortunately because of political differences in the past eight or nine years, all this potential was hindered for no good reason. We could have been able to communicate and cooperate for so long. But also there is this religious and historical factors. There is a lot of cultural similarities between Türkiye and Egypt. Of course, this applies to most of the countries in North Africa are heavily influenced by the Turkish culture. And this is making or creating a space for understanding that you would not see in other countries. So despite of course the political tensions that happened in the last decade or so between the two governments, still the people have a lot in very much in communication and in understanding with each other for example between Türkiye and its neighbors in in Syria or Iraq etc. Although they are closer like right on your border but if you look at the North Africa side, the understanding and communication was much better. After the historic handshake between the two Presidents Al-Sisi and Erdogan, actually hopes were very high here in Egypt as well that maybe finally we have come to the point of proper communication and things show are moving in the right direction. But sadly, none of this is happening. It has been two months now and there is no follow-up from the intelligence bureaus in both countries or even a follow-up by the Foreign Ministries in both countries. Things are still same.

I think the main reason why these talks are frozen, is because there are three main files that are still open and it is somehow very difficult for both countries to come to a compromise. Number one is Libya of course. Libya is the country that shares the longest border with Egypt. For Egypt, here the state considers Libya national strategic depth. So any actions that happens there directly affects us. Now I can see more tolerance to the fact that Türkiye have its troops in Libya, and is trying to make agreements with Libya. There is some kind of more tolerance here than it was in 2020 when there was these clashes and Egypt was very angry for the presence of the Turkish troops are there. But now there is this greater tolerance because the state of Egypt started to understand that Türkiye is not a threat to our national security, which I think is very important point that Türkiye was able to communicate clearly to the Egyptian officials here.

On the other hand, Türkiye and Egypt still support two different sides in the Libyan conflict. And Egypt cannot afford not to support the Eastern factions, because they are controlling Egypt’s Western border and they are preventing the smuggling of weapons into Egyptian Western desert, or preventing terrorism from leaking into Egypt. So, they cannot afford actually losing them at the same time Türkiye is believing that Tripoli is the legitimate government and they continue to support it because it is recognized by the UN, and also Türkiye has geo-economic or geopolitical interests over the Tripoli based government, so it makes sense for them to support it. With all these complications I think like to get to a compromise on the Libya issue, needs lots of talks between two sides.

“Egypt involved in Türkiye – Greece conflict”

Another critical issue of course is the Eastern Mediterranean. As we have seen in the past three years Egypt in particular got heavily involved in the conflict between Greece and Türkiye. Since the time of Mubarak we were always avoiding in intervening in this conflict. Even in 2005 when Greece started to ask Egypt to sign agreements or delimitation, Egypt has always used to say “No go first solve your problem with Türkiye, and then come back to us and then we can talk”. This is out of respect to Türkiye’s borders or out of respect to Türkiye’s rights in the Mediterranean. But unfortunately amidst the political tensions that happened in the past seven or eight years, has made it easier for Greece to request to make such requests to Cairo, and made it even more possible for Cairo to respond positively to these requests and we ended up having this agreement with Greece and the Greek Cyprus in in 2020, followed by the formation of the Eastern Mediterranean gas Forum which is sadly has excluded Türkiye or I would say unfairly has excluded Türkiye although it is the country with the longest shoreline in the Mediterranean. Despite the agreements that Egypt has signed with the Greek Cyprus and Greece, Egypt has always been careful not to trespass the area that Türkiye refers to has its Maritime Zone which is also a positive indication. So I think although Egypt is having this agreement towards Greece now and Greek Cyprus and other players or other actors in the Mediterranean, this should not prevent Egypt from having a similar agreement with Türkiye. For sure either on delimitation or we call it Maritime agreement, or whatever we call it but we should have some kind of an agreement on what is happening in the Mediterranean with Türkiye. And again this needs a lot of communication and lots of negotiations. The third and final issue which is not as big as the first two in my opinion, is the Muslim Brotherhood issue. Egypt insists all the members of the Muslim Brotherhood, whether they are the people who are in the armed movement and or the peaceful members of the Muslim Brotherhood who did not practice any acts of violence be sent back to Egypt to be punished. At the same time Türkiye sees it in a humanitarian perspective and does not see a good reason to send back the people who were only practicing political opposition against Egypt and not really has not been involved in acts of violence. Two states needs to come to an agreement on this too but I think this this particular part is much more marginal than the two first two big issues of the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya.

 

Mısır’da 12 yıl sonra ikinci bir Tahrir yolda mı? | Harici özel söylesi | Dalia Ziada

Originally published on Harici

25 Ocak 2011’de başlayan halk ayaklanmasıyla 30 yıllık Hüsnü Mübarek dönemi Mısır’da son buldu. 18 gün süren birinci eylem dalgasını takiben 11 Şubat’ta Mübarek istifaya zorlandı.

Mübarek’in ardından seçimle iş başına gelen Muhammed Mursi yönetimi ise 2013 yılında yeni bir eylem dalgası ve askerin müdahalesiyle sona erdi. Askeri müdahalenin lideri olan Savunma Bakanı Abdülfettah es-Sisi, 2014 Mayıs ayında düzenlenen, katılımın yüzde 45’lerde kaldığı seçimlerde oyların yüzde 90’ını alarak Cumhurbaşkanı seçildi.

Mübarek’in devrilmesinden bu yana geçen 12 yılda Mısır’da hem çok şey hem de çok az şey değişti. Daha özgür daha müreffeh bir toplum için sokaklara çıkanların talepleri ise yerini hayal kırıklığına bıraktı.

Zengin Körfez ülkelerinden, IMF ve Dünya Bankası’ndan aktarılan kaynaklara rağmen Mısır ekonomisinin kronik sorunlarına çözüm getirecek köklü iyileştirmeler gerçekleşmedi.

Mısır ordusunun hızla modernleştirildiği ve bu alana büyük kaynakların aktarıldığı son 10 yıllık dönemde Sisi yönetiminin başkent Kahire’de yeni bir yönetim merkezi inşasına girişmek gibi mega yatırımları, Türkiye’deki tabirle “çılgın projeleri” de ülke ekonomisinde önemli bir paya sahip oldu.

Pandemi ve sağlık krizini takip eden Rusya – Ukrayna savaşı, köklü sorunları dönüştürmede başarısız olan Mısır ekonomisini hazırlıksız yakaladı. Mısır, Rus ve Ukraynalı turistlerin getirdiği dövizden mahrum kaldı. Yabancı yatırımcılar bir yıl içinde Mısır piyasasından 25 milyar dolara yakın sıcak parayı çekti. Ülke parası dolar karşısında hızla değer kaybetti ve Mısır lirası geçen yıla göre yüzde elli oranında eridi.

Dövizin hızlı yükselişi ithalat maliyetlerini artırdı. Temel tüketim mallarına yoksulların erişimi zorlaştı. Milyonlar için et, yumurta gibi ürünler lüks tüketim malzemesi haline geldi. Orta sınıf ciddi bir refah kaybı yaşadı.

Tahıl krizi de ekmek sübvansiyonlarının nüfusun yüzde 70’ini kapsadığı 104 milyonluk Mısır’da tam anlamıyla bir milli güvenlik meselesi haline geldi.

Bu ağır koşullar sonucunda Mısır, son altı yılda dördüncü kez IMF’nin kapısını çaldı. Dört yıllığına 3 milyar dolar kaynak bulan Sisi yönetimi IMF’nin sıkı koşullarını kabul etmek zorunda kaldı.

IMF’nin koşulları arasında döviz kuruna müdahalenin sonlanması, ordunun ekonomideki rolünün kısıtlanması ve özelleştirme yer alıyor. Döviz kurlarının dalgalı rejime bırakılması ilk etkisini, Mısır parasının hızla değer yitirmesiyle gösterdi. Liberalleştirme kapsamında diğer iki başlığın etkileri muhtemelen orta vadede kendisini gösterecek.

Bir yanda yükselen gökdelenler diğer yanda derinleşen yoksullukla Arap dünyasının kalbi Mısır’ı nasıl bir gelecek bekliyor?

Ağırlaşan ekonomik koşullar yeni bir Tahrir ayaklanmasını beraberinde getirir mi?

Orta Doğu’da toplumsal ayaklanmaların hızla iç savaşlara dönüştüğü geçmiş 10 yılın acı tecrübesi düşünüldüğünde Mısırlılar hakkını meydanlarda aramaya ne ölçüde istekli?

Şimdilik, büyük devrim rüzgârlarından geriye hayal kırıklığı ve bekleme duygusu kalmış gibi görünüyor. Ancak Nil nehrinin sonsuz akışından umudu kesmek kesinlikle mümkün değil…

Tahrir’de milyonların meydanları doldurmaya başladığı 25 Aralık 2011’in üzerinden 12 geçti. O günden bu güne Mısır’ın içinde bulunduğu ekonomik koşulları ve Arap Baharı fırtınasıyla yıkılan Türkiye – Mısır ilişkilerini Doğu Akdeniz ve Orta Doğu Araştırmalar Merkezi Başkanı Dalia Ziada’ya sorduk.

• Mısır Cumhurbaşkanı Abdulfettah es-Sisi, Askeri Akademi’de yaptığı konuşmada “Zorluklar var ama işler kontrolümüz altında ve bu krizin üstesinden geleceğiz” dedi. Anladığım kadarıyla Cumhurbaşkanı Sisi, Mısır toplumuna “sakin olma” mesajı vermeye çalışıyor. Şu an Mısır ne tür ekonomik zorluklarla karşı karşıya ve yönetim bunların üstesinden gelmek için ne tür adımlar atıyor?  

• Mısır ordusunun ekonomideki rolü Batılı uzmanlar tarafından eleştiriliyor. Bu konu hakkında ne düşünüyorsun?

• Rusya- Ukrayna savaşının yıkıcı etkilerini Mısır’da Türkiye’de, Avrupa’da ve dünya ölçeğinde görüyoruz. Özellikle Avrupa’da hükümetlere karşı büyük protestolara tanık oluyoruz. Eylemlerin Avrupa siyasetini nasıl şekillendireceğini bilmiyorum ancak bu tip eylemlerin Mısır’da ve Orta Doğu’da olması ihtimalini nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

• Orta sınıfın hissiyatını sormak istiyorum. Bundan 10 yıl önce bu kesimler birçok şeyi protesto etti. Belki büyük hayalleri ve Mısır’ın geleceğine dair umutları vardı. Ardan geçen 10 yılın ardından hissiyat nedir?

• Arap Baharı’nın ardından Orta Doğu’da oldukça karmaşık bir “normalleşme” süreci yürüyor. Araplar arasında bir süreç var. İran ile Arap dünyası ve Türkiye ile Arap devletleri arasında normalleşme süreçleri yaşanıyor. Ankara ve Kahire arasındaki diyaloğu nasıl değerlendiriyorsun? Ne gibi engeller var?

• Süreç dondu ve Kahire’nin Ankara’dan ne tür beklentileri var?

Mısır’da herkesin zihnini meşgul eden şey tam olarak bu. Bu sefer kriz, öncekilere göre birçok yönden daha karmaşık. Çünkü bir anlamda bütünleşik bir krizden bahsediyoruz. Bu kriz yeni değil, Kovid’le ya da Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı ile başlamadı. Ancak bu son küresel ölçekteki olaylar Mısır’da 1960’lardan ve hatta 1950’lerden beri var olan krizi daha da körükledi. Ben buna Mısır ekonomisinin kronik krizi diyorum. Yani, şu anda bir yol ayrımında olduğumuz bir zorlukla karşı karşıyayız.

Geçmişte ekonomik plan veya makroekonomik politikalar, daha başından doğru bir şekilde uygulanmadı. Önce komünist bir cumhuriyet olarak başladık ve sosyalist politikalar uygulamaya koyulduk. Sonra liberal piyasa politikalarını deneyelim dedik. Ve sonra her şey birbirine girmişken 1990 ve 2000’ler boyunca çok çarpık bir makroekonomik sistemle karşı karşıya kaldık. Buna ek olarak, elbette uzun bir idari ve mali yolsuzluk mirasını da bugüne kadar getirdik. Bu süreç bugün Mısır’ın bu çarpık ekonomi veya makroekonomik sistemine yol açtı. Dolayısıyla birbiri ardına gelen bu iki kriz, bugün Mısır’ı bir yol ayrımına getirdi. Şimdi ya bu kronik krizi kesin olarak çözecek ve yepyeni bir makroekonomik sistem kuracağız ya da tüm bunlara göz yumup bu şekilde devam edeceğiz. Ancak işlerin bu şekilde gitmesi er ya da geç makroekonomik sistemin ve bir süredir tutmaya çalıştığımız toplam siyasi istikrarın da çöküşüne yol açacaktır.”

“Mısır borç içinde”

Geçen hafta Cumhurbaşkanı, Başbakan ve Bakanlar başta olmak üzere tüm ekonomi yönetimi ve üst düzey devlet yetkililerinin her şeyin yolunda olduğuna dair çeşitli açıklamalar duyduk, ancak maalesef bu sahaya istendiği gibi yansımıyor. Şöyle ki bu açıklamaları duyduğumda bir vatandaş olarak ben mutlu oluyorum, ancak yiyecek almak için sokağa çıktığımda veya orta sınıf bir insan olarak yaptığım herhangi bir aktivitede artık çok zorlanıyorum. Örneğin, Türkiye ve diğer birçok ülkede böyle bir enflasyona, her zaman maaşlarda ve asgari ücrette yapılan zamlar eşlik eder, ancak Mısır’da buna sahip değiliz. Çünkü ülke zaten derin bir borç içinde ve maaşlarda herhangi bir artışı göze alamıyorlar. Aksine, bazı olumlu mesajlar verirlerken diğer yandan yemeklik yağ ve enerji gibi temel tüketim üzerindeki sübvansiyonların kaldırılmasından bahsediyorlar ve bu da maalesef daha fazla enflasyona sebep oluyor. Şu an piyasa üzerinde hiçbir kontrol sağlanamıyor.

“Silahlı kuvvetler Mısır devletinin bel kemiği”

Bu da çok iyi bir soru, çünkü bu orduya ait işletmeler meselesi, Mısır’da işlerin nasıl yürüdüğünü anlamayan biri için çok karmaşık bir mesele. Silahlı Kuvvetler, Mısır Devleti’nin hem siyasi hem de ekonomik olarak bel kemiği diyebilirim. Başka bir deyişle, Mısır’daki sivil hükümet; ordunun hem siyasette hem de ekonomide güvenlik ağı veya sigorta işlevi olmaksızın, hiçbir şey yapamaz. Tabii ki, demokratik bakış açısıyla bu tamamen yanlış ve Mısır’ın demokratik bir ülke olmasını gerçekten istiyorsak bu bir gün değişmeli. Ama soru şu, biz buna şimdi hazır mıyız? Maalesef hayır.

“IMF reformları Mısır için çok zor”

IMF’nin şu anda talep ettiği ekonomik reformlar, Mısır halkı için olduğu kadar Mısır piyasaları, tüccarlar ve üreticiler için de oldukça zor. Ülkede kendine ait özerk bir ekonomik sisteme sahip olan ve piyasada olup bitenlerden etkilenmeyen tek yapı ise ordu. Ordunun sivil hükümetin sunabileceği ile halkın ihtiyaç duyduğu emtialar arasındaki boşluğu doldurabilecek işletmeleri var. Çünkü bu boşluk inanın bana, gerçekten düşündüğünüzden daha büyük. Neticede Mısır’da bu boşluğu doldurabilecek tek yapı ordudur. Bu nedenle uzun vadede, evet, Mısır ekonomisini ve genel olarak Mısır siyasi yaşamını gerçekten geliştirmek istiyorsak ordu piyasadan tamamen çekilmeli ve özel yatırımcıların işlerini yapmalarına izin vermeli. Ancak şu anda, özellikle ekonomik arenada yaşadığımız tüm bu karmaşada, bu çok zor bir karar olur.

Rusya-Ukrayna savaşının etkileri ve IMF’nin şartları

Rusya-Ukrayna savaşı çok uzak bir coğrafyada olmasına rağmen bizi çok etkiledi. Çünkü Mısır; Rusya, Ukrayna ve Belarus’a iki temel sektörde, gıda ve turizmde çok büyük ölçüde bağlı. Bu yüzden, Rusya-Ukrayna savaşının Mısır’a etkisinin, diğer ülkelerden çok daha büyük olduğu kanısındayım. Bu yüzden tekrar bahsettiğim kriz döngüsüne düştük. Evet, şimdi yeniden kredi talep ediyoruz, ancak bu kredi elbette askerin piyasadan çekilmesi ve eski kredilerle yapılan ulusal mega projeleri yavaşlatma gibi IMF’nin talep ettiği yapısal reformları çok katı bir tutumla uygulamada kullanılacak. Bu da aslında 2016 kredisinden elde ettiğimiz tüm kazanımları riske atabilir. Bu durum, Mısırlıları yeni IMF kredisine olumsuz yaklaşmasına sebep oluyor.

Mübarek’i deviren nedenler ve ikinci Tahrir tartışmaları 

O dönemde insanların Mübarek’e karşı çıkmasının nedenleri arasında özelleştirmeler, devlete ait varlıkların yabancı yatırımcılara satılması gibi politikalar mevcuttu. Bu nedenle, elbette birçok analistin aklına Mısırlıların Sisi’yi protesto etmek için sokaklara çıkıp çıkmayacakları sorusunu geliyor. Kahire’den konuşuyorum ve gördüğüm kadarıyla son 10 yılda insanlar; siyasi geçişler, belirli zamanlarda güvenlik ve istikrar sorunu da dahil çok şey yaşadı ve şimdi ekonomik krizle birlikte, insanların böyle bir eylemde bulunamayacak bir yorgunlukta olduklarını düşünüyorum.

“Protesto kaosa neden olur düşüncesi var”

Sokakta “Evet, sıkıntı çektiğimizi biliyoruz ve durum iyi değil” gibi genel bir yaklaşım var ve birçok insan hükümetin politikalarına, özellikle ekonomik kısmına katılmıyor. Ama aynı insanlar “Şimdi sokağa çıkıp bir protesto düzenlersek, bu yine kaosa yol açacak ve kaos daha fazla ekonomik sıkıntıya neden olacak. Nihayetinde bu sıkıntıları aşmak için 10 yıl daha süre gerekecek” gibi bir fikre kapılıyor. Bu yüzden, hükümetin bu krizde gerçekten ne yapabileceğini görmek için henüz bekliyorlar. Dolayısıyla yakın zamanda halkın sokağa çıkabileceğini sanmıyorum. Arap Baharı’ndan bu yana geçen 10 yılda meydana gelen protestoculara da bakarsak, bunların yoksul kesimden olmadığını görürüz. Her zaman orta sınıf sokağa çıktı. Sokağa çıkarak gerçekten değişime yol açan hep orta sınıf, eğitimli kesim ve bürokratlardı.

“Mısır orta sınıfı ekonomik ve politik olarak büyük bir buhran yaşıyor”

Orta sınıf birçok yönden çok büyük bir buhranın içinde. Bunlardan birisi elbette ekonomik, çünkü burada ekonomik bir sınıftan bahsediyoruz. Ama aynı zamanda başka bir kısmı da siyasi. Çünkü hükümetin demokratik değerler, özgürlükler ve insan hakları konusunda daha iyi performans göstereceği konusunda çok büyük umutlarımız vardı. Maalesef bugün hâlâ 10 yıl önce mücadele ettiğimiz ifade özgürlüğü, insan hakları ve demokratikleşme gibi sorunlarla boğuşuyoruz. En ufak bir değişiklik olduğunda ve olumlu bir açılım yapıldığında bile “ekonomik krizler” veya “terörle mücadele” gibi güvenlik sorunları gerekçe gösterilerek hemen rafa kaldırıldı. Dolayısıyla bu siyasi buhranın kaynağı, ekonomik reform sürecinde veya güvenlik sıkıntılarıyla karşı karşıya kalındığında, bu hayallerin unutulmasından korktuğumuz gerçeği. Umarım insanlar gelecekte bunun gerçekleşmesi için yıkıcı bir şekilde değil de, yapıcı bir şekilde baskı yapmaya devam ederler. Ancak tüm bunlar bizi, ancak ekonomik olarak istikrarlı bir ülkede demokrasiyi ve insan haklarını savunabileceğimiz noktasına getiriyor.

Rötarlı normalleşme: Ankara-Kahire diyaloğu yavaşladı

Türkiye’yi elbette Orta Doğu’nun bir parçası olarak görüyorum. Burada lehimize olan şey, Arapların çoğunun Türkiye’ye, örneğin İran’a baktıkları gibi olumsuz bir şekilde bakmamalarıdır. En büyük Körfez ülkesi ve bölgedeki ana aktörlerden biri olan Suudi Arabistan da dahil olmak üzere çoğu Körfez ülkesi için bugün İran hâlâ bir düşman olarak görülüyor. Ama Kuzey Afrika’daki ülkelerde o kadar olmasa da, Türkiye hemen hemen herkes için her zaman dost olmuştur. Elbette son yedi, sekiz yıldaki diplomatik ve medya rekabetinden önce Türkiye her zaman bu bölgenin ayrılmaz bir parçası, çok önemli bir ortak ve bir oyuncu olmuştur. Özellikle Mısır ve Türkiye için bu ilişki diğer tüm ülkelerden de daha kritik. Bu sadece iki ülke arasındaki coğrafi yakınlıktan kaynaklanmıyor ki o da önemli: Afrika’nın kapısında olan Mısır ve Avrupa’nın kapısında olan Türkiye arasında ekonomik işbirliği her iki ülkeye de birçok fırsat sunuyor ve birlikte birçok şey yapabilecek durumdayız. İki Devlet Başkanı Sisi ve Erdoğan arasındaki tarihi el sıkışmadan sonra, aslında Mısır’da da umutlar çok yükseldi ve belki de sonunda doğru noktayı bulduğumuzu ve işlerin doğru yönde ilerlediğini düşündük. Ama ne yazık ki, bunların hiçbirisi gerçekleşmedi. Aradan iki ay geçti ve ne istihbarat teşkilatlarından ne de Dışişleri Bakanlıklarından yeni bir adım geldi. Hâlâ aynı noktadayız.

Üç anlaşmazlık noktası: Libya, Doğu Akdeniz, İhvan

Bence bu görüşmelerin dondurulmasının temel nedeni, her iki ülkenin de uzlaşmaya varmasını zorlaştıran üç ana konunun varlığı. Birincisi elbette Libya. Libya, Mısır ile en uzun sınırı paylaşan ülke. Dolayısıyla Mısır için burada devlet, Libya’yı ulusal stratejik derinliğin bir parçası olarak görüyor. Yani orada gerçekleşen herhangi bir eylem bizi doğrudan etkileyecektir. Şimdi burada, Türkiye’nin Libya’daki varlığı ve Libya ile anlaşmalar yapmaya çalışması konusunda daha fazla hoşgörü görebiliyorum. Çatışmaların yaşandığı ve Mısır’ın Türk askerlerinin varlığına çok kızdığı 2020 yılına göre çok daha fazla hoşgörü var. Çünkü Mısır devleti, artık Türkiye’nin ulusal güvenliğimiz için bir tehdit olmadığını anlamaya başladı ki bence Türkiye’nin buradaki Mısırlı yetkililerle net bir şekilde iletişim kurabilmesi çok önemli bir atılımdı.

Mısır’ın “Suriyesi” Libya sınırı

Ancak öte yandan, Türkiye ve Mısır, Libya çatışmasında hâlâ iki farklı tarafı destekliyor ve Mısır, Doğu gruplarını desteklememeyi göze alamaz, çünkü Mısır’ın Batı sınırını kontrol ediyorlar ve Mısır’ın Batı çölüne silah kaçakçılığını engellemede veya terörizmin Mısır’a sızmasını engellemede çok önemli rolleri var. Dolayısıyla, Türkiye’nin Trablus’un meşru hükümet olduğuna inandığı ve BM tarafından tanındığı için onu desteklemeye devam ettiği ve ayrıca Türkiye’nin Trablus merkezli hükümet üzerinde jeo-ekonomik veya jeopolitik çıkarları olduğu sırada onları kaybetmeyi göze alamazlar. Bu yüzden onu desteklemeleri de kendilerince mantıklı.

“Türk-Yunan gerilimine Mısır dahil oldu”

Bir diğer kritik konu da elbette Doğu Akdeniz. Son üç yılda gördüğümüz gibi, özellikle Mısır, Yunanistan ile Türkiye arasındaki çekişmelere yoğun bir şekilde dahil oldu. Mübarek döneminden beri bu çatışmaya dahil olmaktan her zaman kaçınıyorduk. Yunanistan’ın Mısır’dan deniz yetki anlaşması imzalamasını istemeye başladığı 2005 yılında bile Mısır hep “Hayır, önce gidip Türkiye ile sorununuzu çözün, ancak ondan sonra konuşabiliriz” dedi. Bu, Türkiye’nin deniz yetki alanlarına ya da Türkiye’nin Akdeniz’deki haklarına saygısından yapılan bir hareketti. Ancak ne yazık ki son yedi-sekiz yılda yaşanan siyasi gerginlikler, Yunanistan’ın Kahire’ye bu tür taleplerde bulunmasını kolaylaştırdı ve Kahire’nin de bu taleplere olumlu yanıt vermesini mümkün kıldı. Ancak Güney Kıbrıs Rum Kesimi ve Yunanistan ile imzaladığı anlaşmalara rağmen Mısır, Türkiye’nin ilan ettiği deniz yetki alanına girmemek için her zaman dikkatli olmaya devam etti ve bu da aslında olumlu bir duruma işaret etmektedir. Dolayısıyla Mısır’ın Güney Kıbrıs ve Yunanistan’la yaptığı anlaşmaların, Kahire’nin Ankara ile benzer bir anlaşmaya varmasını engellememesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum.

“Müslüman Kardeşler sorunu Libya ve Akdeniz kadar önemli değil”

Bana göre ilk ikisi kadar büyük olmayan üçüncü ve son mesele ise Müslüman Kardeşler meselesidir. Mısır, Müslüman Kardeşler’in silahlı kanadına dahil olan veya herhangi bir şiddet eylemine karışmayan üyeleri fark etmeksizin hepsinin Mısır’a iadesini ve cezalandırılmasını istiyor. Türkiye ise daha insani bir perspektiften yola çıkarak, sadece Mısır’a karşı siyasi muhalefet uygulayan ve aslında şiddet olaylarına karışmamış kişileri geri göndermek için iyi bir neden görmüyor. Bu iki devletin bu konu üzerinde de anlaşmaya varması gerekiyor ama bence bu kısım Doğu Akdeniz ve Libya gibi iki büyük meseleden daha ufak bir teferruat.

Blurring Lines of Politics, Freedom, Racism

Now and then, the European governments and collegiate bodies issue statements criticizing Middle East countries for their frail performance on human rights. My home country, Egypt, is probably the country that receives the most criticism. But, when it comes to the systematic acts of racism against Muslim minorities in Europe, most European politicians turn their heads away and decline to intervene to stop such a gross violation of Muslims’ basic human right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

For more than a decade, Rasmus Paludan, a Danish-Swedish lawyer has been repetitively insulting and burning the Muslim holy book – the Quran – in daylight and under the protection of Swedish policemen. While he is doing it to gain political influence, the Swedish government is tolerating his racism under the flag of freedom. 

I do not remember reading in any international instrument that people are free to practice racism and discrimination against an entire religion or ethnicity. Paulden’s practice of hate against more than one billion Muslims worldwide is a severe violation that needs to be punished, instead of being protected, by the Swedish government.

It is not an exaggeration to say that Paludan’s entire political career and fame are shamefully based on hating Muslims. Paludan is a far right-politician, who leads a party called “Stram Kurs” or Hard Line. Since 2010, he has been devoting acts of hate against the Muslim minority in Sweden to attract voters to his party. Unfortunately, his malicious tactics worked every time as there is, apparently, a large number of people who support his extremist stand against Muslims. 

Last year, Paludan led a domestic tour in Sweden to collect voter signatures prerequisite to securing candidature in the general elections that took place in September. Paludan’s campaign was simply about burning Quran in public during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. He did not talk to the targeted voters about what he can do in politics or the economy. Instead, he only showed how much he hates Muslims to get their support. Sadly, his tour inspired far-right extremists in neighboring Norway to do similar racist rallies, wherein they tore pages of the Quran and spit on the holy book. 

This week, Paludan decided to level up his racist/political game to spark a cross-border crisis. He took his rally to the capital city of Stockholm to burn Quran outside the walls of the Turkish embassy. Paludan’s action targeted Turkey as a state and the Turkish leadership that represents itself as a political representative of Muslims worldwide. During his rally, members of the outlawed Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) gathered to shout against the Turkish state for asking Sweden to stop protecting them.   

Sweden, alongside Finland, has been begging Turkey for months to approve their admission to NATO. They fear Russian aggression similar to what happened in Ukraine in February. Turkey has been vetoing the NATO decision to annex Sweden and Finland unless they stop supporting and protecting members of the terrorist organizations that threaten Turkey’s national security (e.g., PKK, YPG, and FETO). Meetings between Turkish and Swedish officials have been held, over the past months, to discuss the issue. However, no tangible progress has been achieved. 

In response to Paludan’s hateful rally, Turkey’s Defense Minister, Hulusi Akar, canceled a meeting with his Swedish counterpart who was supposed to visit Ankara, next week, to discuss his country’s admission to NATO.  This is the first time the Swedish state receives an official retaliation for allowing racists to burn the Muslim holy book. Over the years, Middle East politicians only voiced routine condemnations of the acts of the anti-Muslim racist groups in Sweden, mainly to calm down the Muslim public in the countries that they lead. Sadly, this never prompted Sweden to take decisive action against the anti-Muslim racists.

Worried about the Turkish reaction, the Swedish Prime Minister wrote a mild tweet expressing his sympathy with the affected Muslims and describing Paludan’s misconduct as a form of free expression. Kristersson’s statement is very reminiscent of the comment of French President Macron on the insult of the Muslim Prophet in the local press. 

“Freedom of expression is a fundamental part of democracy. But what is legal is not necessarily appropriate. Burning books that are holy to many is a deeply disrespectful act. I want to express my sympathy for all Muslims who are offended by what has happened in Stockholm today.” Swedish Prime Minister, Ulf Kristersson, wrote in a tweet.

European politicians' use of the terminology of freedom and democracy to justify discrimination against Muslim minorities in their countries is a disgrace. By tolerating discrimination against minorities, they are hurting democracy. Targeting hate at Muslims, repetitively, is not only inappropriate or disrespectful. It is racism. Racism is not free expression. It is a crime that political leaders need to punish and block, especially to protect the diversity in society, which is the core of democracy.

The European far-right extremists, like Paludan and his supporters, are no less dangerous than the Islamist terrorists from Daesh (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda. In fact, they are constantly fueling the terrorist groups with the “state of victimhood” they need to recruit followers and justify their terrorist operations, especially against non-Muslims. The most heartbreaking fact in all this dark scene of hate and discrimination is that neither the politicians nor the extremists pay the price of religion-based hate. Only innocent civilians do.

What is Behind U.S. Renewed Interest in Libya?

William Burns, the Director of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paid an ambiguous visit to Libya, last week, where he reportedly met with the rival political elite in Tripoli and Benghazi. The scarcity of official statements on the details of Burns’ recent visit to Libya, and the sensitivity of his current position as a chief spy, in addition to his decades-long experience in Libya, are creating a wave of speculations about the motives behind the United States renewed interest in the war-torn North African country. In the meantime, the Libyans are wondering if the United States' intervention on that senior level could participate in breaking the political stalemate and accelerating the process of holding elections after being blocked twice by the power conflicts of the political elite.

Burns has a seasoned career as an American diplomat leading tough missions in the Middle East and North Africa. Speaking of Libya, Burns was the engineer of the U.S. rapprochement to Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 2004. In his capacity as Under Secretary of State, in 2014, he was the first U.S. official to visit Libya since the terrorist attack on the U.S. embassy in Benghazi in late 2012. One month after his visit the civil war that dragged Libya into hell for six years had erupted. For another ironic coincidence, Burns was appointed as CIA Director at the same time the civil war in Libya came to an end by the Un-brokered elections of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in early 2021.   

Handshakes and Cold Shoulders 

Looking into the names of the Libyan politicians that the CIA Director had chosen to give a handshake or a cold shoulder can provide a clue for the motives behind the U.S. re-involvement in Libya. Since the beginning of the Libyan civil war in 2014, the United States administrations of presidents Obama and Trump remained quite neutral about the conflict but attempted to diplomatically mediate for a working solution through special envoys and ambassadors. William Burns is the first senior American official to visit the country since then.

The Libyan local media reported that Burns held separate meetings with political leaders in Tripoli and Benghazi. In Tripoli, he had talks with GNU’s Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, Foreign Minister Najla Al-Mangoush, and the Director of Libyan Intelligence, Hussein Al-Ayeb. The GNU media office published photos from the meeting and mentioned in a statement that “Burns stressed the need to develop economic and security cooperation between Libya and the United States.”

The same statement quoted Dbeibeh vowing his government’s commitment to hold elections to ensure long-term stability in Libya. Al-Mangoush wrote that her meeting with the CIA Director highlighted fruitful discussions on security cooperation, paving the way for political stability through elections in Libya.

Some local media resources also mentioned that Burns met with Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the unofficial forces known as the Libyan National Army (LNA), in Benghazi. However, there is no credible evidence that this meeting happened. The traditional and social media platforms affiliated with Haftar have not published any photos from the alleged meeting, and the LNA spokesperson unusually declined to confirm or deny the news. Some other reports claim that Burns traveled to Benghazi for the sole purpose of meeting with a few dozen of American military and CIA personnel who are working from a campsite on the outskirts of the city.   

Nevertheless, the senior American official has not met with the designated leader of the parallel Government of National Stability (GNS), Fathi Bashagha, and his backers at the Tobruk-based parliament, especially Aguila Saleh, the speaker of the parliament. Saleh is also a close ally of Haftar. He has been continuously using his legislative powers to pressure the Tripoli-based governments to make political and economic concessions to Haftar.

The CIA Director’s choice to meet with Dbeibeh, and not with Bashagha, clearly indicates that the United States has started to stop playing the mediator role between the conflicting factions in Libya and will instead ally itself with the side that could serve its best interests in the region and beyond. 

U.S. Interests

Some analysts are linking the visit of CIA Director, Burns, to Libya with the recent extradition of Lockerbie bombing suspects by the GNU. However, the visit seems to be more strategic than merely paying thanks to Dbeibeh for his cooperation on a case that happened in 1988. This visit cannot be seen in isolation from the global standoff between the western and eastern superpowers over the war in Ukraine. The United States renewed interest in Libya is motivated by the many cards that Libya can throw to influence the U.S. security and economic competition with Russia and China. 

Libya, due to its geostrategic location, could be the gateway for the United States to gain influence in Africa and thus curb the economic influence of China and the security influence of Russia on the fertile, but underdeveloped, continent. In mid-December, Washington hosted a three-day summit under the title “US-Africa Leaders’ Summit,” calling in forty-nine political leaders from Sub-Saharan and North Africa as well as the Commissioner of the African Union to discuss ways to revive and enhance America’s socio-economic partnerships with the continent. A senior U.S. official told the press that “the summit is rooted in the recognition that Africa is a key geopolitical player and one that is shaping our present and will shape our future.”

From another angle, Libya is swimming in a wealth of fossil fuels that could be used to influence the global energy market in favor of U.S. foreign policies, especially after OPEC+ declined to involve their oil wealth in the current economic clash between the western and eastern superpowers. Libya is a member of OPEC with oil production that exceeds 1.2 million barrels per day. That is close to the crude oil production volumes of some wealthy Arab Gulf countries, such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Dbeibeh told the CIA Director, last week, that he has the plan to stabilize and increase the oil production to three million barrels per day.

Moreover, Libya possesses the highest volume of proven oil reserves in Africa, and the second-highest volume of Natural Gas in the Mediterranean after Algeria. For decades, Libya has been successfully feeding Europe with Natural Gas via the Green Stream offshore pipeline (length: 540 km) extending from Mellitah Port in Libya to the shores of Sicily in Italy. Plus, Libya enjoys a unique strategic position in the south of the Mediterranean, through which it can easily ship cargos of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) to energy-deprived Europe. Right now, Libya is already the fourth top exporter of Natural Gas to Europe and the 21st world producer of Natural Gas.

On a broader scale, Libya is the equivalent playground to Syria when it comes to competition between Russia, Turkey, and the United States. Turkey, with the help of Russia, has been knocking on the doors of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria for the past few months. In December, the Turkish Minister of Defense, Hulusi Akar, and Intelligence Director, Hakan Fidan, flew to Moscow to meet with Syrian counterparts for security discussions. The meeting is believed to pave the way for the reconciliation between Ankara and Damascus, in a way that will serve and enhance Russia’s interests in the Middle East and also in Ukraine. 

In Libya, Russia and Turkey are at odds as they back conflicting factions. However, they have been able to create some kind of an undeclared compromise to avoid clashing of interests or troops. By stepping into the Libyan playground, the United States can disturb this equilibrium in a way that may strategically shake Russia’s plans in Ukraine.

Tough Playground

Libya is a complicated playground that the United States needs to tread with caution if it plans to step into as an international competitor rather than a mediator. 

For over a year, Libya has been stuck in a grave political stalemate that threatens the renewal of the civil war at any moment. Hundreds of Libyans have been killed or injured in the militiamen street fights, in Tripoli, last summer. The clashes were mainly incited by the political conflict between the two parallel governments of Dbeibeh and Bashagha. 

Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh leads the Government of National Unity (GNU) from Tripoli, since March 2021. The GNU is an interim government elected in an UN-supervised process by the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF). GNU’s main mission was to reconcile eastern and western rivals, unite the armed forces held by both sides, and hold presidential and parliamentary elections before a deadline, that has already expired in June 2022.

When the GNU failed to hold the presidential elections in December 2021 due to what the electoral commission described, at the time, as “force majeure;” the Tobruk-based parliament hired Fathi Bashagha on top of a new parallel government, that they called the Government of National Stability (GNS). 

Some Arab countries, including Libya’s direct neighbor – Egypt, showed immediate support to Bashagha’s GNS, while Turkey continued to back Dbeibeh’s GNU. However, Dbeibeh refused to cede power and insisted that his government will not leave Tripoli until presidential and parliamentary elections are held. That quickly escalated to serious clashes between militiamen affiliated with Dbeibeh and Bashagha in May-August 2021.

On one level, the U.S. will need to compromise power with influential rivals, Russia and Turkey. Turkey is a NATO ally but its relations with Russia are still solid. On another level, the U.S. will need to apply a proper amount of political pressure to force the conflicting politicians in the eastern and western of Libya to come to an agreement and hold the due elections. Most importantly, the U.S. will need to handle the irregular groups of mercenaries and local militias that are indirectly setting the course of competition between the political elite.