Muslim Brotherhood’s War of Documents

The ‘war of documents’ is the theme defining the latest episode of the internal conflicts inside the Muslim Brotherhood group. In mid-October, the London-based front, under the leadership of Deputy Supreme Guide Ibrahim Munir, published a ‘Political Document’ to forestall the announcement of the Change Front’s document. The Change Front is a jihadist youth faction, inside the Muslim Brotherhood, that introduces itself as an alternative to the fighting elders. 

Jihadists and Politicians 

The conflict between the group’s leaders reached a peak point last year when the standoff between the Istanbul-based Mahmoud Hussein front and the London-based Ibrahim Munir’s front escalated from randomly throwing media statements at each other to exchanging serious accusations of administrative and financial corruption. The bosses’ rivalry pushed the century-old group to the edge of a cliff, especially as it coincided with a sharp decline in funding and popular base support.  

Amidst leadership conflicts, the Muslim Brotherhood’s younger members, who have been working under the umbrella of Hussein’s front in Istanbul for seven years, decided to use the momentum of polarization and division inside the group to ascend as the new leaders. They have been active since 2015, under the title of ‘Kamalists.’ In late 2020, they changed their title to the Change Front, ran internal elections, and designed their own bylaws separate from the rules set by the group’s leadership.  

The Kamlaists are a group of Muslim Brotherhood youth, who were trained by Mohamed Kamal, one of the most prominent middle leaders of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Kamal organized several violent attacks on civilians and state facilities in Egypt, between 2013-2014, to avenge the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood regime from power. He used the anger of the group’s youth to fuel those attacks. His goal was to cause extreme chaos that forces the military to return the Muslim Brotherhood regime back to power. 

After he was killed in a clash with the Egyptian police forces in late 2014, his affiliated youth groups went on to form their own militias. The most famous of these militias are HASM and Liwa Al-Thawra, which are designated as foreign terrorist organizations in the United States. HASM leaders fled to Turkey, in early 2015. From there, they continued to command operations using the younger Muslim Brotherhood members who could not leave the country. Senior state officials and police and military personnel were the main targets of HASM-led operations. Their biggest crime was the assassination of the Egyptian Attorney General, Hisham Barakat, in June 2015.

Two of the HASM leaders spoke at the Change Front’s conference, held in Istanbul earlier this month. They endorsed the Change document and asserted the importance of “waging jihad against the Egyptian state.” The Egyptian people and leadership watched the scene with much disappointment in Turkey’s leadership, which previously promised to limit the Muslim Brotherhood activities on Turkish land, as part of a political rapprochement with Egypt. The Turkish state has, previously, declined to extradite the Muslim Brotherhood members living in Turkey to Egypt. The Egyptian judiciary has already charged most of them with committing acts of terrorism. HASM leaders are at the top of the list. The reappearance of HASM in Istanbul openly inciting violence against the Egyptian state will most likely harm the already slow reconciliation process between Cairo and Ankara. 

The Rebellion 

The so-called ‘Change Document’ carried the logo of the Muslim Brotherhood and was introduced in the name of the group’s General Office. In the lengthy document, the Change Front leaders, took the liberty to speak in the name of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian people, and even the Egyptian Arab Spring revolution. They tried to introduce their vision, which mostly revolves around the concept of violent Jihad, as the best solution to the ongoing leadership crisis in the group, as well as the ongoing economic crisis in Egypt. They clearly called for a revolution on the existing ruling regime in Egypt. 

The Change Document started by reviewing the mistakes committed by the Muslim Brotherhood leaders during the recent political stages that the group has gone through, extending from “the revolution and the [Muslim Brotherhood’s] state ruling phase, as well as the mistakes committed by the group’s allies and competitors, in the context of the Egyptian revolution.” The purpose of this review, as the document explains, is to build a new vision to liberate the Egyptian people from the grip of what they call a ‘military capitalist’ system. The vision, however, is set to be implemented by “establishing a system of governance that is compliant with the Islamic Sharia.”

Later in the document, one may not be surprised to see that the Muslim Brotherhood’s Change Front is playing with terminology to falsely hide their self-centered goals in the details of the bigger picture of Egypt’s political scene. When they speak about “freeing Egyptians,” they actually mean releasing the detainees of the Muslim Brotherhood from prisons by applying force on the existing regime. The Change Front, in their new guiding document, describes the Muslim Brotherhood prisoners as “hostages to the military authority in Egypt.” They claim that the successive military-led regime that ruled Egypt detained the members of the Muslim Brotherhood “to protect their rule and bury any expected revolutionary spark against them.”  

In what seems to be direct permission to the group’s prisoners to maneuver the Egyptian authorities, the document encouraged them to do whatever they think is necessary to convince the Egyptian authorities to release them. That includes for example lying about their willingness to review their ideological beliefs and disowning the Muslim Brotherhood. This tactic has been used by several extremist groups, in the past, to deceive the authorities and leave prison. 

“The detainees are the masters of their own minds when it comes to dealing with the military authority… Every prisoner has the right to choose his strategy to obtain freedom,” stressed the document after declaring that the Change Front, which assigned itself as the new leading power of the group, will not force the Muslim Brotherhood prisoners to abide by collective action. 

Nonetheless, the document asserted that individual attempts of the prisoners should happen in parallel with applying external pressure on the Egyptian leadership to force the release of the Muslim Brotherhood prisoners. “The authoritarian regimes throughout history do not release political detainees voluntarily except under real pressure exerted by the change forces and liberation movements,” emphasized the document. “The military regime in Egypt will not resolve the political detainees’ crisis unless a revolution applies pressure on it to do so.” 

Ironically, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Change Movement is introducing itself as the master of this prospected revolution and the one who will take Egypt’s leadership after it happens. They even proposed a “social contract” between the citizens and their prospected Sharia rule. With utter illogical contradiction, the so-called social contract speaks about empowering civil society, fighting corruption, and encouraging co-existence and freedom of speech.

Most of the principles of this so-called social contract are playing on the soaring strings of the current economic crisis in Egypt, by focusing on redefining the economic relationship between the state, the military institution, and the private sector businesses. The Muslim Brotherhood’s contract claimed “Guaranteeing economic competitiveness, increasing the national productivity and sources of income, eliminating poverty, and encouraging the peaceful transfer of political power.”

The fun part, though, is what the document describes as the methodology by which the Muslim Brotherhood’s Change Front is going to implement its plan of mobilizing the public to start a revolution that brings the Muslim Brotherhood back into power. They said that they will free themselves from the centrist approach that led to the failure of the group’s rule in 2013. They insisted on practicing political activism “within the general framework of national concerns,” by discretely infiltrating into other political factions whose interests intersect with theirs. 

“We will allow the Muslim Brotherhood members, youth, specialists, and scholars to engage in political activism through working under different [Egyptian] political parties and movements that correspond to our vision of national renaissance;” the document noted. That seems like permission to the youth of the Muslim Brotherhood, who still live in Egypt, to start joining liberal and leftist political parties and movements to revive the social power of the group among grassroots citizens the same way the previous generation of the Muslim Brotherhood did in the late 1990s and early 2000s, under the Mubarak regime.

The Reconciliation 

In clear contrast to the Change Front’s rebellious approach, the Ibrahim Munir front, in London, seeks reconciliation with the Egyptian people and the military institution. On more than one occasion, Munir confirmed that he and his followers are giving up on political competition over power in Egypt. “We completely reject violence and we consider it outside the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood – not only the use of violence and arms but to have a struggle for power in Egypt in any form;” Munir told Reuters in an interview in July. “We reject the struggle for power even if between political parties through elections organized by the state. This is rejected by us.”

On the eve of the Change Front’s conference, Munir’s front allowed affiliated news sites to publish a “Political Document” that was internally distributed in mid-September. The Political Document echoes Munir’s press statements about the group’s desire to reconcile with the Egyptians and return to practicing social, rather than political, activities inside Egypt. The document avowed that “seeking power is not anymore one of the group’s goals.” Similar to the Change Front’s document, Munir’s document is implicitly assuming that the current Egyptian state is about to collapse amidst the current economic crisis in Egypt. It, thus, introduces the group’s vision of what the Muslim Brotherhood will do when this happens. 

Munir’s document sets three political priorities for the Muslim Brotherhood, regarding its work in Egypt, in the coming period, which the document describes as a “critical moment in Egypt’s history.” These priorities are: “Closing the political detainees’ file, reaching societal reconciliation, and building a broad partnership with national factions that responds to the demands of the public, in terms of achieving political and economic reform.” The document asserted that realizing these priorities requires the Muslim Brotherhood to “overcome the power struggle in a political environment dominated by polarization and incitement, and in a society facing the specter of division.” 

The Political Document also emphasized the group’s need for national collaboration with other active political and social groups, similar to what the Change Document noted. However, Munir’s front sees this political collaboration as a means to “contribute to saving the nation” through working with a “national coalition, that excludes no one, to achieve the ‘Bread, Freedom, Social Justice, and Human Dignity [which was the main slogan chanted in 2011 revolution].”

Munir’s document, also, highlighted the need for reforming the governance system, ending corruption, and guaranteeing freedom of expression and freedom of belief to all Egyptians. That carries a direct message to the Egyptian Coptic Christian citizens, who were among the most determined socio-political groups that opposed the Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt in 2013. “We are responsible, along with other national partners, to exert the necessary effort to build a national consensus that befits the sacrifices of the Egyptians;” Munir’s document asserted. “This inclusive partnership will happen through full democratic practice, which sincerely embraces the Egyptian national fabric, Muslims, Christians, Islamists, liberals, and leftists. Men and women, old and young, labor and businessmen, educated and illiterate.” 

The Power of Words

Guiding documents have always been the main tool of communication between the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, younger affiliates, and supporting bases. They have always been kept for the internal use of the members, as they are usually loaded with instructions and plans about how the group should behave in a specific political context at a specific timeframe. The guiding documents written by the group’s founding father, Hasan Al-Bana in response to political and social issues, had been used to set the constitution of the group that the Muslim Brotherhood members still follow up to this day. 

During and after the Arab Spring revolutions, which witnessed a quick rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood as a powerful political actor, the group’s leadership used the guiding documents on a broader scale to communicate with the general public in the countries they operate in. That was very clear in the examples of Arab Spring countries Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria. The documents released recently by the conflicting fronts of the Muslim Brotherhood leadership are not only directed to the members of the group. They carry political messages to the Egyptian people, political parties, and the Egyptian state leadership.

The Political Document and the Change Document are almost identical in terms of the goals and the priorities that they suggest. Yet, Munir’s document is carried through a reconciliatory tone, while the Change Front’s document is loudly voicing a jihadist revolutionary approach. Munir’s document is mainly addressing the Egyptian people from a political perspective, which they believe is likely to be accepted among the Egyptian grassroots citizens, who previously rejected the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule in 2013. In contrast, the revolutionary approach of the Change Front’s document is mainly talking to the young members of the group, who still live in Egypt. Most of the Muslim Brotherhood youth have lost confidence in the group’s leadership, especially after the arousal of conflicts between the bosses scattered between Britain and Turkey. 

Each of the two documents proposes a vision for the future of the Muslim Brotherhood's role in Egypt, in anticipation of the collapse of the current Egyptian state under the escalating economic crisis. There is no real evidence to support the Muslim Brotherhood’s assumption about the Egyptian state’s potential loss of power at any time in the foreseeable future. However, such claims serve as a tool to keep the group’s foreign sponsors interested and popular supporters inside Egypt engaged, even by hanging on the worn rope of false hope. 

Why IMF Is Hesitant About Egypt’s Loan?

Egypt is patiently waiting for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to approve a new emergency loan. Yet, the IMF staff asked for more structural and economic reforms before approving the loan. After seven months of negotiations, the loan’s amount and release date are still unclear. 

Egypt is shooting for a loan as big as US$6 billion, urgently needed to handle the consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war on the domestic economy. However, experts say that the IMF’s new loan to Egypt, if eventually approved, may not exceed 3 or 4 billion dollars. This is the fourth loan request submitted by Egypt during the past seven years. 

Egypt is the second-largest debtor by amount from the IMF, after Argentina. Previous Egypt deals with the IMF, under the current political leadership of President El-Sisi, are US$12 billion over four years, released in 2016, and two separate deals of US$2.72 billion and US$5.2 billion, released in 2020, to counter the consequences of the pandemic. 

Tunisia and Egypt, among 28 countries, have been knocking on the doors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for an emergency loan to bail their economies out of the consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war. Last week, senior officials from both countries held separate meetings with the IMF and the World Bank work teams in Washington to discuss their proposed macroeconomic reform policies that justify the release of the IMF loans. 

After the meetings, the Tunisian government successfully secured a loan of 1.9 billion dollars over 48 months from the IMF. Meanwhile, the Egyptian officials returned home empty-handed. The IMF staff said further work needs to be completed by Egypt to “reach a Staff-Level Agreement very soon.” The Staff-Level Agreement is a necessary first step wherein the loan amount and the attached macroeconomic reform policies are decided. 

This scene is very reminiscent of what happened in the Spring of 2013 when the IMF approved a loan of 1.7 billion dollars for Tunisia and postponed Egypt’s loan request for further discussions. Experts justified the IMF decision, at that time, by referring to Egypt’s low foreign currency reserves and the state of political instability caused by people's rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood rule. 

Ironically, this can also be said about the case inside Tunisia today. Tunisia has been shaking for more than a year under severe political turmoil caused by President Saied’s forced grab of power. The existing Egyptian state is way more stable than the Tunisian state.

The Egyptian government has been trying for months to convince the IMF of Egypt’s readiness to receive the loan. The governmental efforts, in that regard, have extended from lobbying at the IMF and World Bank decision-making bureaus to adopting new economic and political policies. That includes, for example, the new government plan to withdraw the state from market competition and avail bigger space for private sector businesses. 

A few months ago, the Egyptian Prime Minister announced an ambitious plan of macroeconomic reform that will open the Egyptian market to private investors and startup entrepreneurs. The government aims, through this program, to secure a total of US$40 billion in direct investments over the coming four years. 

In addition, an urgent cabinet reshuffle was made in August, followed by a sudden change in the leadership of the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE). However, the unexpected change in the CBE leadership has, probably, contributed to the delay in the IMF decision on the loan. One lesson learnt from political history and experience is that the change in negotiators’ faces usually impacts the course of negotiations. IMF Managing Director, Kristalina Georgieva, hinted at the issue by saying that the new CBE governor needs to “feel comfortable with where we are headed with the policy.” 

“Additional fiscal and related structural policies that would further expand the social safety net for the most vulnerable, improve the budget composition, and enhance fiscal transparency;” explained the IMF in a press statement following meetings with Egyptian officials, who are leading the state economic portfolio. “Monetary and exchange rate policies that would anchor inflation expectations, improve monetary policy transmission, improve the functioning of the foreign exchange market, and bolster Egypt’s external resilience.” 

The IMF is concerned about Egypt’s ability to sustain foreign reserves. Egypt relies on Arab Gulf countries feeding the CBE with medium to long-term deposits in US dollars. That is in addition to the remittances of the Egyptians living and working abroad. However, the high expenses on importation make it difficult for Egypt to keep foreign reserves at a stable high. 

Nevertheless, the most important policy reform that the IMF is looking for is improving market competitiveness. The IMF statement mentioned very clearly that “the implementation of the authorities’ comprehensive structural reform agenda would gradually enhance the competitiveness of the economy, reduce the role of the state in the economy, level the playing field for the private sector, improve the business climate, and foster transition towards a greener economy.” 

Later this month, the cabinet will hold an economic conference that is expected to stir productive discussions between the government and the business community about the future of Egyptian market competitiveness after state withdrawal. Let’s hope that the outcomes of this conference will lead to a better understanding between the Egyptian government and the IMF staff. 

Iran Protests: The View from Egypt

Iran and Egypt are geographically distant, diplomatically aloof, and economically detached. Despite decades of animosity founded on political and ideological differences, neither of them has ever attempted, directly or indirectly, to inflict harm of any kind on the other. Yet, that does not necessarily mean that Egypt will not be affected by the ongoing protests in Iran and their outcomes, especially if they succeed in toppling the regime.

The Egyptian people and leadership are watching the popular uprising in Iran with a sense of hope and dread. The hope is embedded in the potential of ridding the Middle East of the Iran-sponsored proxies and militias that have been wreaking havoc all over the region for decades. The fear, however, stems from the predictable political and security chaos that may result from the inevitable collapse of the Islamic Republic in Iran, under the pressure of the ongoing highly disciplined protests that are growing in size and effect every day.

Iran exploited the power vacuums created by the Arab Spring revolutions, in 2010-2011, to infiltrate the security structures of countries with critical geo-strategic locations around the Arabian Peninsula. Iran empowered Shiite armed groups in Yemen and equipped them with missiles and UAV drones to attack civilian homes and economic facilities in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. That renewed the Arab armament race that reached a peak point in the past five years.  

In addition, Iran sponsored Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq to fight the Kurds inhabiting the northern territories of the levant, control the decision-making process in these countries, and even hinder the Turkish military operations against terrorist groups there. Needless to mention Iran’s decades-long political and military sponsorship of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah, established on the premise of fighting Israel, contributed a big deal to destroying Lebanon from within. Hezbollah dragged Lebanon to a geopolitical conflict that is way bigger than its size and capabilities. It, also, played a clear role in enlarging the existing political and economic miseries of the Lebanese people, to serve the interests of Iran.

Ironically, Hezbollah used to be highly respected by many Egyptians, especially on the back of its brief war with Israel, in 2006. I still remember scenes of the Egyptian media proudly celebrating Hassan Nasrallah, the founding leader of Hezbollah, as an Arab and Islamic hero. This changed a couple of years later when the mask of ‘fighting Israel’ fell off, and the public saw the true face of Nasrallah and his group.

The same media outlets fried Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood leader who became the president of Egypt following the fall of Mubarak, on the background of traveling to Tehran and meeting with his Iranian counterpart. After the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood regime, in 2013, Morsi was taken to an espionage trial and charged with “passing state secrets to Iran's Revolutionary Guard.” 

In the past year, news has been circulating about secret talks between the Iranian and the Egyptian leaderships that may pave the way for reconciliation. The Baghdad Summit in August 2021, which brought Arab, Turkish, and Persian leaders into the same room for the first time since the 1980s, heightened the speculations about a potential rapprochement between Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries. But the Negev summit, held in March of this year, killed such buzzes as the leaders of Israel, Egypt, UAE, Morocco, and Bahrain held hands to send a clear message of Arab-Israel solidarity against the regional provocations of Iran. 

The current Egyptian state believes in the viability of ‘working with the devil that you know.’ While the Iranian top diplomates told the media that the talks with Egypt have been promising, the Egyptian side indirectly hinted that the discussions are only limited to security considerations. Egypt is justifiably concerned that its growing relationship with Israel may inflame an Iranian offensive on Israeli targets in Egypt, specifically the natural gas facilities that the two neighbors operate in the eastern Mediterranean. 

In the long term, the fall of the Iranian regime could be a relief for the Egyptian state, as well as most Middle East countries. But this comes with a price that has to be paid in advance. The collapse of the Mullah regime will eventually contribute to the disappearance of armed militias and proxies and allow a healthy space for restoring relationships between the Arabs, the Turks, and Israel. In the meantime, a power vacuum in Iran will expose the eastern gates of the Arab Gulf region to distressing security threats that will ultimately echo in the Egyptian domestic economy and political stability. 

Such a development will intensify Egypt’s economic and security uncertainties. Therefore, it is wise for the Egyptian state to prepare itself for the worst-case scenario while watching the developments in Iran. 

أصداء إقليمية للانتفاضة الإيرانية: أكراد الشام

ما زال المتظاهرون الإيرانيون صامدون بانضباط شديد، للأسبوع الرابع على التوالي، في مواجهة القمع المؤلم الذي يمارسه حراس نظام الملالي عليهم. لقد تحولت المظاهرات، التي انطلقت بقيادة نسائية احتجاجاً على مقتل مهسا (جينا) أميني، الشابة الإيرانية الكردية، التي قامت الشرطة بتعذيبها حتى الموت بسبب أنها لم ترتدي الحجاب بالشكل المناسب، إلى انتفاضة شعبية حاشدة تهز أواصر الجمهورية الإسلامية بأكملها.

إن كشف الوجه القبيح للدولة الثيوقراطية المتشددة في إيران هو أعظم مخرجات الاحتجاجات الإيرانية حتى الآن، إذ يؤكد الشباب الذين يحاربون ببسالة في داخل إيران اليوم من أجل استعادة حقهم الأصيل في التمتع بالحريات الفردية التي سرقها منهم النظام تحت شعارات دينية فارغة، أنه لا يوجد فرق بين نظام الحكم الذي يقوده الملالي في إيران وحكم حركة طالبان الإرهابي في أفغانستان المجاورة، باستثناء كون نظام الملالي شيعي ونظام طالبان سني. إلا أن كلاهما قد تأسس على أيديولوجية دينية متطرفة تستمد القوة والشرعية من التمييز الممنهج ضد الفئات الاجتماعية الهشة، خصوصاً النساء والأقليات العرقية والدينية.

يبدو أن تنوع هوية مهسا، من حيث كونها امرأة وأيضاً كردية العرق، قد مهد الطريق بشكل قدري تماماً لفضح عقود من التمييز الذي ظل النظام الإيراني يمارسه ضد الأقلية الكردية، سواء تلك التي تعيش داخل إيران، أو حتى شعوب الأكراد التي تسكن منطقة الشام. لقد أكد بعض نشطاء حقوق الإنسان المتابعين للشأن الكردي أن معاملة الشرطة القاسية تجاه جينا وعائلتها كان مقصوداً بسبب انتمائهم العرقي، وأنه لو كانت جينا مواطنة إيرانية عادية لربما كانت قد اكتفت الشرطة بالتوبيخ دون ممارسة الضرب والتعذيب الذي أدى لسقوطها في غيبوبة ثم موتها.

وهذا يفسر سبب تردد أصداء الاعتداء على مهسا بقوة بين مجتمعات الأكراد في سوريا والعراق. فقد نزلت مئات النساء إلى الشوارع، في سوريا، من أجل إشعال النار في الحجاب الذي يرتدونه وقص شعورهن بهدف إبداء الغضب تجاه النظام الإيراني والتضامن مع أخواتهن الإيرانيات. وفي إقليم كردستان العراق، تجمع عشرات النشطاء أمام مكتب الأمم المتحدة للاحتجاج على استبداد النظام الإيراني والمطالبة بالقصاص لمقتل مهسا. "المرأة، الحياة، الحرية" و "الموت للنظام" كانت هي أكثر الشعارات التي هتف بها المتظاهرون الإيرانيون والمتعاطفون معهم في الدول المجاورة وجميع أنحاء العالم. 

يشكل الأكراد في إيران، على الرغم من كونهم أقلية، حوالي ١٥ مليون مواطن، أي ١٧٪ من نسبة السكان. أكثر من ٤٥٪ من أكراد إيران هم في عمر الشباب، ويتمتعون بدرجة جيدة من التعليم رغم الظروف البائسة التي يعيشون فيها، في مدن فقيرة محرومة من أغلب الخدمات الحكومية، في شمال غرب إيران وعلى الحدود الإيرانية مع العراق فضلاً على الأوضاع الأمنية الصعبة هناك. 

تفضل الثقافة الكردية أسلوب العيش العلماني وليس الديني. الأكراد هم من بين أكثر الجماعات نشاطًا سياسيًا في إيران، حيث كانوا من بين أوائل الجماعات العرقية التي استطاعت تشكيل أحزاب سياسية ناجحة في فترة الخمسينيات والستينيات، وكانت أغلب هذه الأحزاب تتبنى الفكر الماركسي الذي كان له حضور كبير في العالم كله آنذاك. لهذا السبب، اعتبرهم الملالي تهديدًا وجوديًا من الناحيتين السياسية والأيديولوجية. حيث أنه منذ تأسيس الجمهورية الإسلامية، عام ١٩٧٩، تزايدت قوة الأكراد كمعارضين سياسيين للحكم الديني، حتى أن روح الله الخميني، المرشد الأعلى الأول للجمهورية الإسلامية الإيرانية، كان قد حرض علناً على القضاء على الأكراد بدعوى أنهم يتبنون معتقدات ماركسية / شيوعية، والتي اعتبرها الخميني وأنصاره تهديد لدين الإسلام يستوجب محاربته. 

بينما فشلت طهران في قمع الاحتجاجات الداخلية، التي تكبر يوماً بعد يوم كما كرة الثلج، قررت طهران استهداف الأكراد المتعاطفين في العراق بالصواريخ والطائرات المسيرة. في ١٩ سبتمبر، بالتوازي مع دخول المظاهرات في اليوم الثاني عشر، شن الحرس الثوري الإيراني هجوماً صاروخيا بالقرب من أربيل في كردستان العراق، وأسفر الهجوم الإيراني غير المبرر عن مقتل سبعة عشر شخصاً، بينهم امرأة حامل، وإصابة ٥٨ مدنياً. 

بررت قيادة الحرس الثوري الإيراني الهجوم بادعاء أنها كانت تطارد الانفصاليين الأكراد الذين دخلوا إلى إيران بشكل غير شرعي للمشاركة في الاحتجاجات، وحذر الحرس الثوري من أن الهجمات الصاروخية على شمال العراق " سوف تستمر بتصميم كامل حتى يتم صد التهديد بشكل فعال". الهجوم الإيراني على إقليم كردستان العراق ليس الأول من نوعه، فقد شنت طهران هجمات عديدة على المناطق الكردية في سوريا وشمال العراق، منذ عام ٢٠١٦، بدعوى مطاردة الإرهابيين، بينما في كل مرة تصيب أهداف مدنية وتقتل مواطنين أبرياء.

بعد أيام قليلة من الهجوم الإيراني على شمال العراق، ادعى آية الله خامنئي، المرشد الأعلى الحالي، في خطاب جماهيري، أن الاحتجاجات جزء من مؤامرة غربية ضد إيران، واتهم الولايات المتحدة بدعمها وتأجيج المشكلات في داخل إيران. في اليوم التالي، اتهم قائد القوات البرية التابعة للحرس الثوري الإيراني إسرائيل بـ "استخدام القواعد المناهضة للحرس الثوري في المنطقة الشمالية من العراق لصالحها". وقال إنه على الرغم من مناشدات إيران المتكررة للحكومة المركزية العراقية، لم يتم اتخاذ أي إجراء، ولم يترك لطهران خيارًا سوى قصف اقليم كردستان بشكل مباشر لمقاومة النفوذ الإسرائيلي المتزايد هناك، وادعى أيضاً أن الهجمات الإيرانية الأخيرة أصابت أربعين هدفًا يديرها إسرائيل والجماعات الانفصالية الكردية.

إن إلقاء اللوم على الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل والأكراد في الدول المجاورة هو إحدى الحيل القديمة التي يمارسها الملالي كلما واجهوا احتجاجات غاضبة في الداخل. زعم وجود تدخلات أجنبية في الشأن الإيراني، بهذه الطريقة، قد نجح من قبل في شيطنة المعارضة السياسية، وتبرير قمع النظام للمتظاهرين، وإبقاء المواطنين العاديين في حالة ذعر مستمر من عدو خارجي وهمي أسمه الغرب، بما يخدم النظام الحاكم ويثبت قواعده في السلطة بشكل كبير. لكن لا يُتوقع أن تنجح هذه الخدعة السامة في إنقاذ نظام الملالي هذه المرة، وسط هذا الكم غير المسبوق من الاحتجاجات التي تجتاح كل شوارع إيران، والتي امتد تأثيرها المكاني والسياسي إلى خارج حدود إيران وتصورات الإيرانيين أنفسهم. 

قد تكون هذه اللحظة هي نهاية الجمهورية الإسلامية في إيران، وقد تكون كذلك نهاية الشام الذي نعرفه، وميلاداً جديداً لواقع أفضل في أكثر المناطق اضطراباً في جغرافيا الشرق الأوسط.  

Regional Echoes of the Iranian Uprising: The Kurds

The resilience of the highly disciplined Iranian protesters has not worn, for the fourth week in a row, despite the deadly repression applied by the guards of the Mullah regime. The women-led rallies, which have been sparked by the killing of Mahsa (Jina) Amini, a young Iranian Kurdish woman, at the hands of the morality police for not appropriately donning her headscarf, are now turning into a popular uprising that is rocking the entire Islamic Republic. 

Exposing the ugly face of the theocratic hardliners is, presumably, the greatest achievement of the ongoing Iranian protests. The youth stand up for restoring their stolen individual freedoms underlines that there is no difference between the Mullah-led regime in Iran and the Taliban regime in neighboring Afghanistan, except the former being a Shiite and the latter being a Sunni. Both regimes are founded on a religious extremist ideology that derives power and legitimacy from systematic discrimination against fragile social groups, particularly women and ethnic and religious minorities.

The diverse layers of Mahsa Amini’s identity as a woman and a Kurd instigated unprecedented regional solidarity with the Iranian protesters, especially in the Levant countries. Kurdish Human rights activists emphasized that Jina and her family were subjected to cruel police treatment mainly because of their ethnicity. The Iranian regime is notorious for practicing systematic targeting of the Kurdish minority in Iran, as well as in Syria and Iraq. 

That explains why the assault on Jina echoed loudly in the Kurdish-controlled regions in Syria and Iraq. In northern Syria, hundreds of women took to the streets to protest by setting their headscarves on fire and cutting their hair to show solidarity with the suppressed Iranian sisters. In Iraq’s Kurdistan region, dozens of activists gathered outside the United Nations office to protest the tyranny of the Iranian regime and call for justice. ‘Women, life, freedom’ and ‘death to the regime’ are the slogans chanted the most by Iranian protesters and sympathizers in the levant and worldwide.

Despite being a minority, the Kurds in Iran are a large population of 15 million citizens, about 17% of the Iranian population. More than 45% of the Iranian Kurds are young people. Most of them are well-educated despite their miserable living circumstances, with limited access to governmental services, in purposefully impoverished cities in northwestern territories close to Iran’s borders with Iraq.

The Kurdish culture favors a secular, rather than a religious, way of living. The Iranian Kurds are among the most politically active groups in Iran. They were among the first social groups to form communist political parties in the 1950s and 1960s. For that reason, the Iranian Mullah-led regime saw in them an existential threat to their rule, in both political and ideological terms. Since the foundation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, the Kurds have been growing as steadfast political opposition to the religious state. Ruhollah Khomeini, the first Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, had publicly encouraged the ‘elimination’ of the Kurds because of their Marxist / communist beliefs, which he labeled as a threat to Islam.

While failing to repress the internal protests, which have been growing by a snowball effect, Tehran decided to target the sympathizing Kurds in neighboring Iraq with missiles and drones. On September 29th, as Mahsa Amini demonstrations entered the twelfth day, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) launched a missile attack on the Kurdish cities of Koya and Qala in northern Iraq, about 60 km eastern Erbil. The inexcusable Iranian offensive killed seventeen people, including a pregnant woman, and injured other 58 civilians. 

The IRGC leadership justified the attack by chasing the Kurdish separatists, who have been leaking into Iran to participate in the protests. The IRGC leadership, then, warned that the missile attacks on northern Iraq “will continue with full determination until the threat is effectively repelled.” The Iranian offensive on the Iraqi Kurdistan region is not the first and will not be the last. Tehran has been regularly attacking Kurdish communities in northern Iraq, since 2016, under the cliché claim of hunting terrorists. 

A few days later, Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader, made a speech to accentuate that the ongoing protests against his regime are part of a western conspiracy against Iran. The next day, the commander of IRGC’s Land Forces claimed that the recent Iranian attacks on northern Iraq struck 40 targets run by Israel and Kurdish separatist groups. He accused Israel of using anti-Revolutionary Guard bases in the northern region of Iraq to its advantage. He, even, argued that despite Iran's repeated pleas to the Iraqi central government, no action was taken, leaving Tehran with little choice but to directly shell the Kurdistan area to push against Israel’s alleged presence there.

Blaming the United States, Israel, and the Kurds in neighboring countries is one of the old tricks the Mullahs use whenever they face angry protests at home. Alleging foreign interference in Iranian affairs has previously succeeded, more than once, in demonizing the political opposition, justifying the regime’s suppression of the demonstrators, and keeping ordinary apolitical citizens in a state of constant fear from an imaginary enemy called the West, in a way that significantly served the interests of the regime and strengthened its grasp on power. However, this deceitful technique is not expected to save the Mullahs, this time, amid this unprecedented street rage. 

The current protests are expanding, spatially and politically, beyond the borders of Iran and the perceptions of the Iranians. This special momentum may be the end of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and it may also be the end of the Levant as we know it. It could also mark the rebirth of hope and a better future in the most turbulent area in the geography of the Middle East.

Individual Freedom Fuels Women Uprising in Iran

For more than three weeks, Iran's Mullah regime has been struggling to control nationwide protests led by young women, who have had enough of the religion-based tyranny that stripped them of basic individual freedoms. The uncontrollable popular anger against the hardliner theocratic regime, inside and outside Iran’s borders, is creating a situation that does not only shake Khamenei's throne, but also threatens to demolish Iran’s regional power, particularly in the Levant. 

Arabs and Turks should seize this rare geopolitical momentum to pursue security goals that have been repeatedly thwarted by the Iranian regime and its proxies and militias, which have spread throughout the Middle East region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

Decade of Rage

In Iran, youth-led rebellions are not uncommon. The current theocratic regime was founded in 1979 on the back of a revolution that was labeled later as Islamic. However, in the past fifteen years, in particular, several upheavals have erupted to protest government corruption, economic failures, and social injustice. The most notable of these protests are the Green Revolution in 2009, which erupted in response to presidential election fraud, and the Bloody November protests in 2019, which erupted in response to an increase in fuel prices and the practice of corruption.

Both uprisings drew a large number of young people from across Iran, who quickly escalated their demands to call for the overthrow of the Iranian regime. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) used cutting internet and phone connections as well as excessive use of force against protesters to control the two iconic upheavals and all the other rallies that occurred in between. At least 70 civilians were killed in 2009, and over 1500 people were killed in the Bloody November of 2019.

Out of all the prior instances of Iranian crowd fury, the angry protests that haven't subsided since mid-September over the unlawful torture and murder of a young Iranian Kurdish woman stand out. When determining the effect of the upheaval on the domestic and regional powers of the Mullah regime, it is crucial to take into account the cause of the protests, the demographic makeup of the participating activists and political groups, and the associated geopolitical dynamics.

The protests have been sparked by the killing of Mahsa Amini, 22 years old, by the Islamic Guidance Patrol on the 16th of September. Amini was beaten to death by the morality police, under the eyes of her family, after being arrested at a metro station in Tehran. Her offense was not donning her hijab per the Islamic Republic's dress regulations. In Iran, it is legally required for all women, even non-Muslim women, to dress in long, baggy clothing and wear the hijab.

Women Leadership 

The unjustifiable assault and murder of Amini was the mirror that reflected to the Iranian youth, especially young women, the miserable reality that they have been living through, under a religious regime that feeds on systematically violating their basic human rights and individual freedoms. Unlike all the previous protests that swept across the Iranian streets in the past decade, this protest is not motivated by political or economic factors. Instead, it is fueled by the strong desire of youth to live a normal life free from fear of political repression or divine punishment. 

Since mid-September, Iranian women of all ages and social backgrounds have been burning their headscarves and cutting their hair in public gatherings to celebrate their liberation from the grip of the theocratic state. They are breaking the barriers of fear that kept them suffering for their entire lives between the natural desire to express their individuality through their clothes and appearance versus being obliged to adhere to social and religious norms enforced by the iron fist of the state. Even teenage girls in secondary schools decided to join the movement by taking off the hijab that is enforced on them by authoritarian figures at family, school, and state levels. 

Human rights groups reported that more than one hundred people have been killed during clashes with the security forces in 45 Iranian cities, so far. The official statements of the Iranian government downsize this number to 60 people, claiming that security forces personnel have also been killed. Despite the harsh crackdown, the protests are still growing in size and impact. 

The IRGC’s playbook needs an update to face the highly disciplined protesters. Cutting the internet and applying brute force, which has been successful in controlling previous protests, has failed in deterring the protesters this time. One reason is that the Iranian protesters do not fear dying in their fight for a normal existence since they have nothing more to lose than the personal freedom that has already been taken from them. Due to Amini's ethnic identification as a Kurdish, the fury has spread to places outside of Iran, which is another significant boost to the protestors' stamina.

The Kurdish Factor 

Mahsa Amini is a member of a Kurdish family that resides in the northwest Iranian city of Saqqez. The demonstrators that gathered in the Kurdish cities in northern Syria and Iraq after her death are chanting "women, life, freedom," which is taken from her Kurdish name Jina, which means life. Human rights advocates for Kurds contend that Jina and her family were subjected to cruel police treatment mostly because of their ethnicity.

The Iranian regime is notorious for practicing systematic discrimination against the Kurdish minority in Iran, as well as in northern Syria and Iraq. The Kurds represent 17% (about 15 million citizens) of the Iranian population. Most of them live in purposefully impoverished cities, that are deprived of basic governmental services, and close to the western borders. More than 45% of the Iranian Kurds are young people, and most of them are well-educated despite their tough living circumstances.

The Kurds are more inclined to secular rather than religious values. Thus, they have always been perceived by the Islamic republic as an existential threat. The Kurds form the strongest political opposition blocs in Iran, since the 1980s. Ayatollah Khomeini, the first supreme leader and one of the founders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, publicly instructed the elimination of the Kurds because of their Marxist beliefs, which he considered a threat to Islamic belief.     

Jina’s cousin, as revealed in an AFP interview last week, is a member of the communist Komalah Party, and he currently lives in Sulaymaniyah Iraq as he got involved in rebellious activities against Tehran, in the past. Komalah is an Iranian Kurdish party that has been fighting against the Mullah regime for decades. One main objective of Komalah is to establish autonomous rule for Iranian Kurds in the northwestern territories of Iran.

The assault on Jina and her family echoed loudly in the Kurdish-controlled regions in Syria and Iraq. In northern Syria, hundreds of women took to the streets to set their headscarves on fire and cut their hair to show solidarity for struggling sisters in Iran. In Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region, dozens of activists gathered outside the United Nations headquarters to protest the tyranny of the Iranian regime and call for justice for Mahsa Amini. Sympathizers from all over the world led similar rallies in western capitals.

Geopolitical Balance 

While failing to repress the internal protests that are growing by a snowball effect, Tehran decided to target the sympathizing Kurds in neighboring territories with missiles and drones. On September 29th, as demonstrations entered their twelfth day, the IRGC launched a missile attack on the Kurdish cities of Koya and Qala in northern Iraq, which are located roughly 60 kilometers to the east of Erbil. At least seventeen people, including a pregnant woman, were killed and 58 civilians were injured under the Iranian offensive. 

The IRGC justified the attack by claiming that they were only targeting Iranian Kurdish separatist groups, whom the Iranian regime labels as terrorists, because they participated in the protests happening inside Iran. The IRGC released a media statement, on that day, promising that the missile attacks on northern Iraq will continue “with full determination until the threat is effectively repelled.” The Iranian offensive on the Iraqi Kurdistan region is not the first. Tehran has been regularly attacking Kurdish communities in northern Iraq, since 2016, under the claim of combating terrorism. 

The central government of Iraq, the regional government of Kurdistan, and the Arab League condemned the recent Iranian armed attacks on northern Iraq. In the past five years, the Arab League has been repeatedly condemning the Iranian intervention in northern Syria and Iraq, but no unified Arab action was taken on the ground to deter Iran. The Iraqi government considered the Iranian assault as a “provocative unilateral action that complicates the security scene and cast a shadow over the region and will only contribute to more tension.” The Iraqi government also asserted that it rejects any military logic that could be used to justify these attacks and warned that it “will use the highest diplomatic instruments to prevent it from happening again in the future.” 

A few days after the attack on northern Iraq, Khamenei made a speech to highlight the protests as a western conspiracy, led by the United States, against his country. The next day, the commander of IRGC’s Land Forces blamed Israel for the attacks that his forces launched on northern Iraq. He accused Israel of "using anti-Revolutionary Guard bases in the northern region of Iraq to its advantage.” He, also, argued that despite Iran's repeated pleas to the Iraqi central government, no action was taken, leaving Tehran with little choice but to directly shell the Kurdistan area to fight Israeli influence. He claimed that the Iranian attacks successfully struck 40 targets run by Israel and Kurdish separatist groups in northern Iraq.

On the flip side, Israel, Turkey, and the Arab Gulf countries are closely monitoring the developments in Iran and the Levant region, without directly commenting or intervening. The current protests may not topple the hardliners of the Islamic Republic. However, they are already creating a new geo-political reality that will work in favor of Turkey, Iran’s staunch frenemy, in terms of security objectives and military targets at its southern and eastern borders in the Levant and Caucasia. Meanwhile, Arab Gulf countries that have been suffering from Iran’s political and ideological hostility for decades, should also benefit from this geopolitical rebalancing, especially in light of their newly refurbished relationship with Turkey.

Religion Factor in Egypt’s Population Crisis

Religion is the most important and the most ignored factor hindering the Egyptian state's quest to control the overpopulation crisis.

The government's inability to control the population explosion is responsible for a large portion of Egypt's chronic social and economic problems. Large populations are usually valuable assets to their countries because they provide human capital with a young workforce capable of effectively elevating the economy in a short period of time. Several Asian countries, including China, reaped significant benefits and profits from their large population. However, in Egypt, where citizens' productivity is significantly lower than the global average and the state's natural and financial resources are noticeably limited, the large population is a burden rather than an asset.

According to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) official statistics, a new child is born every 19 seconds. That equates to approximately three people per minute, 188 newborns per hour, and 4525 new citizens added to the registrar at the end of each day. In just seven months, from February to September of this year, the number of Egyptian citizens increased by one million, bringing the total population to 104 million. About 102 million of them live in Egypt, predominantly on the shores of the Nile River.

The current generation's high fertility rates are the primary cause of this rapid population growth. Most Egyptians (approximately 65%) are young people under the age of 35. The Egyptian culture encourages marriage at a young age for both men and women, particularly in rural cities, which comprise the major part of Egyptian land.

Marriage is illegal for minors under the age of 18. However, in most rural cities, most families allow their girls to marry between the ages of 14 and 16 and boys between the ages of 17 and 19. Then, later, they register their marriage when they reach the legal marriage age. Even in better-educated families living in urban cities, most marriages are convened when the couple is in their twenties.

Per human nature, when young and fertile people marry early in life, they have children. Until the early 2000s, the majority of Egyptian families had 5-8 children. In rural cultures, having more children means having free labor to farm the land and bring in more money for the family. In urban culture, larger families were perceived to have higher social status than smaller ones. 

The former first lady, Suzan Mubarak, spearheaded a nationwide birth control initiative in the 1990s to urge families to have no more than two kids. The initiative pursued concurrent campaigns of public education via mainstream media, women's economic empowerment through availing literacy classes, and medical programs that provided free birth control supplies and other contraceptive methods to residents of rural areas. The initiative was effective since it reduced the fertility rate per woman from an average of 5.6 to 3.2 in the 2010s.

Nevertheless, after the fall of the Mubarak regime in 2011, Islamists gained control over the presidency and the parliament. That encouraged most families, who were highly influenced by the Islamist rhetoric, to stop practicing birth control. Mubarak’s state-led birth control initiatives received harsh criticism from Islamists, particularly the Salafists. They view birth control as interference with Allah's will and have consistently warned the common public that Allah would punish them if they used contraception. Up until the government initiated a push to replace them with moderate imams from Al-Azhar University in 2015, Salafist sheiks had a significant influence on the largely illiterate and pious populace in rural cities.

The typical family today has four kids. More than five children are present in rural families as the population rises. Since 2017, the current political leadership of President El-Sisi has attempted to start a countrywide birth control effort akin to Suzan Mubarak's. As expected, the Salafists were the only group that has been opposing the government initiatives, which they label as “haram” (i.e., prohibited by a divine order), through their talking heads in the media and affiliated Members of Parliament. 

The undue Salafist rhetoric against contraception must be reined in, and imams from Al-Azhar should be assigned to inform the public citizens, particularly in rural cities, about the advantages of birth control, if the Egyptian government is to succeed in containing the population crisis. Yet, it is still unclear if Al-Azhar would be willing and prepared to participate in such a campaign.

How to Sustain the Abraham Accords Momentum?

The scene in the Middle East, these days, is remarkably tragic. That is not because of the armed conflicts, terrorist groups, and economic crises that have been stable features of the region, but mainly because of the political inconsistencies that are cruelly engraving the face of the new Middle East.

At the eastern gates of the Middle East, the Iranian regime is mercilessly killing civil rights activists and chasing them with UAV drones in the mountains of the Kurdistan region in northern Iraq. Sadly, up to this moment, neither the regional leaders nor the international community has responded to the brutality of the Iranian regime. 

In the interim, Turkey is overwhelmed by mitigating the political and economic consequences of the conflicts happening in its surroundings, particularly in the Black Sea and Eurasia, in addition to handling its diplomatic clashes in the eastern Mediterranean and the declared war on terrorism in the levant region. 

Nevertheless, there is a glimpse of hope in this gloomy scene, presenting itself in the growing cooperation between Israel and its Middle East neighbors, including Arabs and Turkey. The Abraham Accords signed between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), two years ago, marked the beginning of this budding drive of normalization and reconciliation among Middle East countries. They took the Arab-Israel relationship from a state of cold peace to realistic coexistence and cooperation, even though it required pushing aside the unresolvable disputes that overwhelmed the region for too long, such as the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

For decades, the Israel-Palestinian conflict has been labeled as an Arab-Israel conflict. However, the crucial transformations that the region has gone through since the Arab spring have shown that the Arab-Israel relationship and the Israel-Palestinian relationship are two parallel, rather than intersecting, tracks. They are correlated but do not necessarily affect the progress of each other. This liberating concept, inspired by the Abraham Accords, has opened the door for positive regional transformations that are meant to last.

Although, the change in the Arab-Israel relationship from conflict to cooperation does not happen overnight. It has been brewing for at least ten years. The Arab Spring revolutions threw out the long-established dictators, who used to amplify the Israel-Palestinian conflict to distract their citizens from the failure and corruption of their regimes. Egypt is one of the most prominent examples of the drastic shift in government and public attitudes towards Israel after the fall of the Mubarak regime. 

On the flip side, Israel, disappointed by the flawed Middle East policy of the United States Administration of President Biden, has started to consider balancing its historical dependency on the United States with healthy security and economic codependency with its Arab neighbors. 

The momentous Negev Summit, in March, is one peak point of this regional transformation. The summit picture of Arab and Israeli leaders holding hands inside Israel showed that the Middle East is going through a phase of political maturity, wherein regional leaders are willing to cooperate on realistic and pragmatic terms. At the conclusion of the Negev Summit, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Lapid, boldly noted that this summit is giving Iran something to fear. “The shared capabilities we are building intimidates and deters our common enemies, first and foremost Iran and its proxies;” Lapid emphasized. 

Indeed, the growing cooperation between Arabs and Israel is mainly motivated by confronting the common security threat of Iran and its widely spread militia. The angry waves of popular revolutions that swept the Middle East region from Tunisia to Syria, a decade ago, created a security vacuum that got swiftly and cunningly exploited by Iran to infiltrate into the security structures of countries with critical geo-strategic locations around the Arabian Peninsula.

However, the current momentum of accord in the Middle East cannot be sustained for the long term only on the background of confronting the common threat of Iran. Instead, Middle East countries need to work together from a place of choice, not a place of necessity. The sustainability of the Abraham Accords momentum depends on creating a state of interdependent cooperation between Israel, Arab countries, and Turkey, beyond the temporary collaboration to face a common threat.

In the meantime, there has to be a way to use the current momentum of Arab-Israel cooperation to reach a workable solution for the Israel-Palestinian conflict, which can again pop up to the front causing severe damage to the hard-won regional peace. Sheikh Jarrah protests that quickly developed into a war in Gaza, last year, are one example. 

Finally, to guarantee the sustainable growth of the peace trend in the region, efforts should be exerted on a level deeper than state-to-state relations. Reaching the core of people-to-people understanding between the Arabs and the Israelis remains a big challenge, despite the Abraham Accords and the growing economic cooperation between Israel and Arab countries.

كيف نعظم أثر اتفاقيات إبراهيم؟

أصبح المشهد في الشرق الأوسط مأساوي بدرجة كبيرة، ليس بسبب النزاعات المسلحة وانتشار الجماعات الإرهابية والأزمات الاقتصادية الطاحنة التي أصبحت مع مرور الوقت جزء من ملامح المنطقة، ولكن بسبب التناقضات السياسية التي باتت تنقش بقسوة وجه الشرق الأوسط الجديد.

على البوابات الشرقية لمنطقة الخليج، يقتل النظام الإيراني بلا رحمة نشطاء الحقوق المدنية ويطاردهم بطائرات مسيرة في جبال إقليم كردستان شمال العراق، تحت أعين وأذان القادة الإقليميين والمجتمع الدولي الذين لم يرد أي منهم على وحشية النظام الإيراني، ولا حتى بمجرد إدانة إعلامية.

في غضون ذلك، تنشغل تركيا في تخفيف الآثار السياسية والاقتصادية للصراعات التي تحدث في محيطها، لا سيما في البحر الأسود وأوراسيا، بالإضافة إلى التعامل مع الاشتباكات الدبلوماسية في شرق البحر المتوسط والحرب التي تعد لها منذ فترة على الجماعات الإرهابية في الشام. 

لكن، هناك بصيص أمل في هذا المشهد الكئيب، يظهر بشكل واضح في التعاون المتزايد بين إسرائيل وجيرانها في الشرق الأوسط، بما في ذلك الدول العربية وتركيا. كانت اتفاقيات إبراهيم الموقعة بين إسرائيل والإمارات، في شهر سبتمبر قبل عامين، بمثابة بداية للتوجه السائد الآن نحو تطبيع العلاقات والمصالحة بين دول منطقة الشرق الأوسط. لقد ساهمت اتفاقيات إبراهيم في تحويل العلاقة بين العرب وإسرائيل من حالة سلام بارد أو مستتر إلى حالة تعايش وتعاون حقيقي، رغم أن ذلك تطلب تنحية الخلافات غير القابلة للحل، مثل الصراع الإسرائيلي الفلسطيني، الذي طغى لفترة طويلة على عملية تشكيل السياسات الإقليمية والمحلية. 

لعقود طويلة، كان يُصنف الصراع الإسرائيلي الفلسطيني على أنه صراع عربي إسرائيلي. إلا أن التحولات السياسية التي مرت بها المنطقة منذ الربيع العربي قد أظهرت أن العلاقات العربية الإسرائيلية والعلاقة الإسرائيلية الفلسطينية هما مساران متوازيان، وليسا متقاطعين. هما يرتبطان ببعضهم بدرجة ما، لكن لا يجب بالضرورة أن يؤثر كل منهما على تطور الآخر، أو أن تطور أحدهما هو بالضرورة شرط لتطور الأخر. هذا المفهوم المتحرر، المستوحى من اتفاقيات إبراهيم، هو الذي فتح الباب لكل التحولات الإقليمية الإيجابية التي نراها اليوم، ونأمل أن تستمر. 

على الرغم من ذلك، فإن تطور العلاقة بين العرب وإسرائيل من حالة صراع وعداء عقائدي إلى تعاون سياسي واقتصادي وأمنى، لم يحدث بين عشية وضحاها. لقد ظل هذا التحول يختمر لمدة عشر سنوات على الأقل، منذ أن أطاحت ثورات الربيع العربي بالأنظمة الديكتاتورية العربية التي كانت تضخم الصراع الإسرائيلي الفلسطيني لصرف انتباه المواطنين في الداخل عن فشل وفساد أنظمتهم. تعد مصر من أبرز الأمثلة على التحول الجذري في الموقف الحكومي والجماهيري تجاه إسرائيل بعد سقوط نظام مبارك. 

على الجانب الآخر، بدأت إسرائيل التي شعرت بخيبة أمل تجاه السياسة الأمريكية في الشرق الأوسط، بعد وصول بايدن للحكم، في التفكير في أهمية تحقيق توازن بين اعتمادها التاريخي على الولايات المتحدة في مقابل بناء علاقات امنية واقتصادية قوية مع جيرانها العرب. 

تعد قمة النقب، التي عقدت في شهر مارس في إسرائيل، هي نقطة الذروة لهذا التحول التاريخي في العلاقات العربية الإسرائيلية، حيث أظهرت صورة ختام القمة، التي وقف فيها القادة العرب والإسرائيليين ممسكين بأيدي بعضهم البعض، أن الشرق الأوسط يمر بمرحلة نضج سياسي طال انتظارها، تتمثل في سعي قادة المنطقة للتعاون على أسس واقعية وعملية. في ختام قمة النقب، أشار وزير الخارجية الإسرائيلي، لبيد، بجرأة إلى أن هذه القمة تخيف إيران لأن "القدرات المشتركة التي نبنيها ترهب وتردع أعداءنا المشتركين، وفي مقدمتهم إيران ووكلائها".

في الواقع، إن الدافع الرئيسي للتعاون المتزايد بين العرب وإسرائيل هو مواجهة التهديد الأمني المشترك لإيران وميليشياتها المنتشرة على نطاق واسع. لقد خلقت الموجات الغاضبة للثورات الشعبية التي اجتاحت منطقة الشرق الأوسط من تونس إلى سوريا، قبل عقد من الزمن، فراغًا أمنيًا استغلته إيران بشكل سريع وماكر للتسلل إلى الهياكل الأمنية للبلدان ذات المواقع الجغرافية الاستراتيجية الحرجة حول شبه الجزيرة العربية، مثل اليمن، وتهديد أمن دول الخليج العربي من خلالها. 

إلا أن اللحظة التاريخية الحالية التي يشهدها الشرق الأوسط فيما يتعلق بإنهاء الصراعات والتوافق بين الدول الفاعلة، لا يمكن له أن يستمر على المدى الطويل اعتماداً فقط على فكرة مواجهة التهديد المشترك الذي تمثله إيران على أمن دول الخليج العربي وإسرائيل. بدلاً من ذلك، تحتاج دول الشرق الأوسط إلى العمل معًا من دافع اختيار وليس من دافع ضرورة. بمعنى أخر، تعتمد استدامة لحظة اتفاقات إبراهيم على خلق حالة من التعاون المتبادل بين إسرائيل والدول العربية وتركيا تجاه تحقيق رؤية وأهداف تنموية مشتركة، بما يتجاوز التعاون المحدود من أجل مواجهة تهديد مشترك. 

في غضون ذلك، يجب أن تكون هناك طريقة لاستخدام لحظة التعاون العربي الإسرائيلي للتوصل إلى حل عملي ومستدام للصراع الإسرائيلي الفلسطيني، والذي يعاود الظهور على السطح من وقت لأخر متسبباً في أضرار كبيرة على كل ما يتم إحرازه من تقدم في مسار تعزيز العلاقات العربية الإسرائيلية. لعل احتجاجات الشيخ جراح التي سرعان ما تطورت إلى حرب في غزة العام الماضي هي أوضح مثال على ذلك.

أخيراً، لضمان استدامة التوجه نحو السلام في المنطقة، يجب بذل الجهود على مستوى أعمق من العلاقات النخبوية بين الدول، حيث لا يزال الوصول إلى جوهر التفاهم الشعبي بين العرب والإسرائيليين يمثل تحديًا كبيرًا على الرغم من اتفاقيات إبراهيم والتعاون الاقتصادي المتنامي بين إسرائيل والدول العربية، في السنوات الأخيرة.