Prospects of El-Sisi’s Comprehensive Political Dialogue

Last week, in a meeting with leading media figures, the Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, made a rare call for “a comprehensive political dialogue that is compatible with the concept of the New Republic;” which El-Sisi has been devoted to building up from the reigns of the Arab Spring aftermath, over the past seven years. 

If successfully accomplished, this dialogue will mark the beginning of a whole new era of political inclusiveness, that Egypt gravely needs. It is, also, a clear indicator on the fact that both the Egyptian citizens and leadership are entering a new level of political maturity that is crucial for strengthening and developing the nation-state.

One of the lessons learnt the hard way from the Arab Spring experience is that political diversity is key to ensuring the cohesiveness and strength of the nation-state on the long-term. The political system that lacks diversity, no matter how politically popular or militarily strong it is, makes the nation-state prone to polarization and failure. 

Plus, the success of the social and economic reform initiatives, which portray the features of El-Sisi’s new republic, is conditional to guaranteeing long-term stability, which is only possible through including, rather than excluding, all of the actors on the political stage. That is particularly true in times of global uncertainty, similar to what we are currently experiencing under the Russia-Ukraine war. 

Up till this moment, there is no clear agenda for how or when this urgently needed political dialogue is going to happen and who is going to participate in it. Yet, we can guess that political opposition groups, of all sizes and backgrounds, should be the most prominent and the most important part of the conversation. In that sense, the President’s initiative is renewing hope in realizing the dream of democratization, which many Egyptians, especially the youth, have been yearning to, since the Arab Spring revolution of 2011. 

When El-Sisi took power in mid-2014, political reform and democratization had to be pushed to the back burner. El-Sisi gave the priority to restoring security and stability through neutralizing the power of the Islamists and political opposition activists on the grassroots citizens, so he can ensure the stability needed to launch a wide scale of the social and economic reform projects, in 2016.

At that time, Egypt was struggling with an infinite number of security and economic challenges. Following the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power, an extreme state of political polarization accompanied by wide scale acts of violence was dominating the domestic scene. In addition, terrorist groups, ranging from lone wolves and self-organized factions up to foreign terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic State (ISIS), had leaked into Sinai and started to launch operations against civilians and military personnel. 

For clear reasons, it was impossible to rush into building a liberal democratic state, in a country that suffers from strong political divisions, severe economic depression, and lack of security. Nigeria is one example of many states that failed, simply because it rushed into applying democratic reform before laying the proper foundation for a stable democratic state, by first stabilizing economy and improving the state of security and social development.

Nevertheless, as President El-Sisi’s social and economic reform projects have started to bear fruit and the new republic started to take shape, time has come for the political leadership to consider taking actual steps towards realizing the liberal democratic dream that had inspired a popular revolution, a decade ago. That is a state, wherein the political power is dependent on a strong multiparty system that encourages peaceful exchange of power and honors political and civil freedoms as integral to basic human rights.

Explaining the Chronic Crisis of the Egyptian Economy

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in February, the Egyptian economy has been weathering a significant amount of pressure, that poses a serious threat to the hard-earned gains of the economic reform program, that was launched seven years ago. The sharp decline in eastern European tourists turnout to the Red Sea resorts, the disruption of food supply chain, especially in relation to wheat imports, the soaring energy prices as a result of the western economic sanctions on Russia, and the spike in the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound against the U.S. dollar after international policies were made to contain unprecedented inflation rates; are some of the features defining the current economic crisis that Egypt has fallen into because of a war happening in a far-off geography.

Over the past few weeks, urgent changes to monetary policy by the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), crucial government interventions to suppress surging prices of basic commodities, and generous investments poured into the Egyptian market by the Arab Gulf countries, have effectively participated in protecting the Egyptian economy against the shockwaves of the ongoing global standoff. But they are not enough! Such temporary actions are crucial for mitigating the influence of the crisis on the microeconomic level, on the short-term. However, they are not doing any good to the advancement of the macroeconomic system, on the long-term. Rather than pushing the Egyptian economy outside of the bottle’s neck, where it has been stuck for seven decades, they are keeping it comfortably stable in its miserable shape and context. 

ROOTS OF THE CHRONIC ECONOMIC CRISIS

Economic crises are not new to Egypt. In fact, we could comfortably claim that Egypt has been living in a prolonged economic crisis that started with the fall of the monarchy and the establishment of the republic, in early 1950s. To be honest, the Free Officers coup (July 1952) was unavoidable. Egyptians had been suffering under the corruption of the latest royals of the Muhammad Ali dynasty (1805-1952) and the British occupation. That, perhaps, explains why the Free Officers movement was widely supported by the vast majority of the grassroots citizens, especially the youth, at that time. 

However, the lack of planning to the day after removing the king made the new republic start on the wrong foot, in both political and economic terms. The core theme of the 1952 coup’s propaganda was to empower the poor against the capitalist rich, who had enslaved them to magnify their own wealth. In doing so, a “revolution leadership committee” was formed to seize the finances and the properties of the wealthy and reallocate them into state budget to serve the poor. 

Four years later, when Gamal Abdel Nasser became a president, he took the country several steps further away from capitalism towards his dearly embraced ideology of socialism/communism. He started by distributing the farms seized earlier from the capitalists on the poor farmers, who used to work in them under the capitalistic era. In parallel, he started a campaign to nationalize major industries and services that defined the pillars of the Egyptian economy at that time; starting from food and beverages factories, and cinema production companies, up to international trade corporations, and the multinational authority that was responsible for managing the Suez Canal. 

Sadly, neither the farmers were able to appropriately manage the farms given to them, nor the state was successful in running the nationalized facilities and businesses. Eventually, that led to a severe economic regression, that magnified after the Egyptian military found itself involved in a cluster of wars against the western super powers of that time, either in defense of its own territory or in defense of other Arab countries under the umbrella of Arab nationalism, which was, also, another ideology dearly embraced by Nasser and his counterparts in most Arab states.

When former President, Anwar Al-Sadat, took power after Nasser’s death, in 1970, Egypt was already going through severe political and societal transformations, that had a negative impact on his ambitious project to substitute Nasser’s failing socialist system with a liberal open market economy. As a result, a hybrid economic system that constitutes an odd combination of the distorted socialist project of Nasser and the incomplete liberalist project of Al-Sadat, had to be born. Such a flawed system kept the Egyptian economy running, but dramatically hindered its potential to grow and prosper, or even adapt to constant changes in the international economy, over the years.

When Mubarak came in power after Sadat’s assassination, in 1981, he did not make an effort to reform the economy or change the system as long as it was working for his advantage. Mubarak made the best use of this hybrid economic system to hypnotize the citizens against the ordeal of his rule, and thus kept himself in power for thirty years. 

Mubarak depended mainly on the high revenues of tourism and the Suez Canal, as well as the annual military aid from the United States (US$ 1.3 billion), and the under-the-table inducements by corrupt businessmen, to feed the state budget. Meanwhile, he avoided applying taxation on a wide scale or firming tax collection policies in a way that may stir the anger of the middle class and make himself accountable to them. At the same time, he exaggerated in subsidizing basic food commodities, especially the bread, and made regular annual raises, labeled as “almenha” (the president’s give away), to blue-collar labor and civil servants who resemble the majority of grassroots citizens. 

However, as the flawed economic system became the norm, under Mubarak, corruption found its way to both public and private sectors. That further complicated Egypt’s chronic economic crisis, which got even worse after a popular revolution, supported by the military, overthrew Mubarak in 2011, followed by another uprising in 2013 against the short rule of the Muslim Brotherhood regime, and a state of unbearable instability and lack of security that lasted until the end of 2015.

Nevertheless, the economic reform program (2016-2020) that was launched by the current President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, with the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), brought hope that the chronic problems of the Egyptian economy could be fixed, before it got thwarted, once again, by unexpected global troubles.

THE UNPAVED PATH TO ECONOMIC REFORM 

In January 2022, the majority of the Egyptian citizens started to report tangible improvements in their living conditions, and greater flexibility in their microeconomic decision-making in general. That was the first sign that finally Egypt started to harvest the fruit of the tough, but successful, economic reform program, which the government launched in 2016 with a loan and technical support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Around the same dates, Egypt was reaffirmed by the three Credit Rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, and S&P Global) at B and B+ with a stable outlook. 

In December 2021, an IMF report expected that Egypt, by the end of 2022, will become the second largest economy in Africa, after Nigeria, and the second largest economy in all Arab countries, after Saudi Arabia, with a record Growth Domestic Product (GDP) that exceeds US$438 billion. A great part of this success has to do with how the government handled the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on its emerging market. 

Even during the hard hit of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, Egypt was able to make progress on the economic reform program. By the beginning of 2021, Egypt was among a handful number of countries, worldwide, to see a growth rate in their economy. According to data made available by the World Bank and IMF, Egypt as an emerging market achieved a growth rate of 3.6% during the fiscal year 2019/2020. Compare this to developed countries with advanced economies, which suffered sharp contractions under the stress of the pandemic. 

One reason for the Egyptian economy’s resilience during the COVID-19 crisis, and the relative affluence that Egyptians enjoyed in the year after, is the unprecedented success of the government’s macroeconomic policies in targeting poverty and unemployment rates, on a wide scale. National programs, like “Hayah Karima” (A Decent Life), participated effectively in giving the poor access to better housing conditions and health services. Meanwhile, the national infrastructure development program, which targets the urban as well as the long-ignored rural cities, has successfully created tens of thousands of jobs that eventually lowered unemployment rate to 7.4% compared to 13.05% in 2015, before the comprehensive economic reform program had started. 

In addition, the successful foreign policy, adopted by the Egyptian leadership, towards Egypt’s immediate neighbors in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, has opened new doors of resourcefulness to enhance the Egyptian economy. Egypt is not one of the lucky countries when it comes to natural resources. Therefore, exploring untrodden areas was the only option for the current leadership to create new sources of income. Between 2015-2017, the Egyptian President, El-Sisi, worked extensively on signing maritime treaties with Egypt’s neighbors in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea to clearly identify Egypt’s exclusive economic zones (EEZ), so Egypt can use the wealth of seabed resources. 

Thanks to this effort, by the year 2018, Egypt has emerged as a hub for Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) in the Mediterranean. Since the last quarter of 2021, Egypt started to export regular shipments of LNG to Turkey and southern Europe. In January 2022, for the first time ever, Egypt started shipping LNG to countries as far as Netherlands, in northwestern Europe. Meanwhile, in the Red Sea, Egypt partnered with giant European and Gulf companies on managing its newly established fields of crude oil. 

In June 2021, the Egyptian government announced that the Egyptian oil trade balance achieved a surplus estimated at US$174.9 million, during the first half of the fiscal year 2020/2021, compared to a deficit of US$773.3 million during the same period of the fiscal year 2019/2020. That is in addition to the fact that the hydrocarbon resources from the sea have been used to increase Egypt’s production of electricity to 54 Giga Watts creating a surplus after decades of domestic consumption suffering severe deficit in electric power.

In February, only one week before the eruption of the Russia-Ukraine war, the Egyptian Minister of Planning celebrated, in a press conference, the news that Egypt successfully achieved a growth rate of 8.3% during the second quarter of the current fiscal year 2021/2022, compared to a growth rate of only 2% during the second quarter of last year. Meanwhile, the foreign reserves in the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) exceeded the benchmark of US$40 billion and the inflation rate remained stable roughly between 5% and 7%. Yet, unfortunately, the burdens of the Russia-Ukraine war on the Egyptian economy are quickly swallowing this hard-won progress.

BENDING IN THE WIND OF WAR

Despite being geographically distant, the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine is leveling a huge pressure on the Egyptian economy, especially with the looming uncertainty about when this war is expected to end. The so-called “military operation,” which the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, unjustifiably launched in Ukraine, on February 24th, with the hope to seize Kiev over one or two nights, is now extending to weeks of field combat that invited unprecedent global standoff between the western superpowers and Russia. The defining component of this standoff is using the weapon of economic sanctions, that ultimately forced the whole world to share the cost of the war, including the countries that applied the sanctions on Russia.

Hence, the fragile Egyptian economy, which is hardly trying to stand tall, found itself obliged to bend in the wind of the war happening in another continent. The Russia-Ukraine war is directly hitting two of the most important economic sectors in Egypt; food and tourism. Some western analysts expected that the stress of the Russia-Ukraine war on the Egyptian economy may re-invent the Arab Spring revolutions or lead to public riots and outrage similar to what happened during the last years of Mubarak’s rule. In 2008, Egyptians went to streets in massive rallies to protest the shortage in bread production. The event was a shock for the Mubarak regime which had to seek help from the military, which autonomously runs a parallel economy to the civilian government, to fill in the gap.

Egypt has been among the top three importers of wheat, in the past few years. The Egyptian population of more than one-hundred million citizens consumes average four million tons of wheat per year. In 2021, Egypt produced only 20% of its needs and had to import the remaining 80% from Russia (50%) and Ukraine (30%). According to government statements, current reserves of wheat can only cover the demand of the market for the coming three months. Therefore, the government is allocating 36 billion Egyptian pounds (about US$ 2 billion) to purchase six million tons of the local harvest, this Summer. Meanwhile, the General Authority for Supply Commodities (GASC) is reaching out to European suppliers, such as France, Germany, Lithuania, and Bulgaria, to secure purchases from their future wheat harvests. In early March, the Egyptian Minister of Finance said that Egypt will need about fifteen billion dollars above its stipulated annual budget to handle this quick surge in prices. 

In parallel, the Egyptian tourism sector, which is barely recovering from the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Arab Spring aftermath, is also terribly affected. A Large percentage of the tourists pouring into Egypt, every year, comes from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus during the winter season. When the flights between Russia and Egypt were suspended in the period between 2015 and 2021, the Red Sea resorts had been suffering to keep their business. The Egyptian economy also suffered, as tourism accounts for 9% of Egypt’s GDP and is the only resource for foreign currency besides the bank transfers by Egyptians living abroad. Given the uncertainty of when and how this war is expected to end, the Egyptian tourism sector is doomed to go through a similar period of sluggishness, that will eventually echo in other sectors of the Egyptian economy.

Towards the end of March, after the United States Federal Reserve had to raise the interest rates to help the central bank deal with the soaring inflation rates, the inflation rates inside Egypt jumped above 10%, all of a sudden. As a result, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) had to make some urgent monetary policies to mitigate the effects of such quick change. CBE decisions included floating the currency, allowing the Egyptian pound (EGP) to retreat by 15% against the dollar, and raising interest rates by 1% (100 points). At the same time, the CBE allowed national banks to sell medium-term investment certificates in EGP with annual interest rate of 18%. 

Magically, the three parallel decisions effectively controlled the inflation and preserved the value of the Egyptian pound by stabilizing its exchange rate against the US dollar; as most citizens became logically more inclined to investing in the high-rate EGP certificates, rather than buying and saving US dollars.

Beside the brave financial decisions taken by the CBE, the Egyptian government took unprecedented measures to control potential mishaps on the microeconomic level. The Egyptian government continued to sell wheat to bakeries with the pre-war prices, in order to prevent them from raising the prices of the subsidized and the non-subsidized bread on the final consumer. In parallel, the government allowed the Armed Forces to open temporary food shopping marquees at central locations in several governorates, where citizens can buy basic food products for fair prices, especially during the holy month of Ramadan.

Nevertheless, it seems that the Egyptian government is having difficulty controlling the consequences of the crisis on foreign trade. In early April, Egypt's Ministry of Finance, Investment Authority, and the Union of the Chambers of Commerce announced that they are considering the feasibility of forcing local and foreign shipping agencies to deal in Egyptian pound (rather than US dollar) for all transactions related to shipping and customs inside Egypt. The goal is to keep the US dollar reserves in the Egyptian banks for as long as possible, and also to raise the value of the Egyptian pound by increasing the demand on it. 

Meanwhile, the Chairman of the Egyptian Businessmen Association (EBA) said that the Egyptian exporters who trade with Russia are keen to keep their business running, despite the western sanctions on the Russian economy. Therefore, they are asking the Egyptian government to allow them to open bank accounts in Ruble (the Russian currency) to receive payments for their goods. In order not to affect the Egyptian economy further, the EBA Chairman suggested using the earned Rubles to pay for importing from Russia. Although such a proposal sounds unrealistic and inapplicable at the time being, the Egyptian government might be obliged to look into it if the Russia-Ukraine war, and the global standoff around it, prolong.

On the bright side, the current standoff between Europe and Russia may enhance Egypt’s gas industry in impressive ways. There is a catch, though. For Egypt to hunt this ripe opportunity, it has to cooperate with its North Africa neighbors, Libya and Algeria, on liquifying and selling their hydrocarbon extracts in the Egyptian offshore plants, the same way it is currently cooperating with Israel. Yet, that is almost impossible in light of the ongoing conflicts and the security situation in both countries. In Libya, the extreme divisions among the political are delaying the government funds needed to operate natural gas facilities and keep reserves and production at stable levels. In Algeria, the renewed conflict with its neighbor Morocco over the Western Sahara led to the abrupt termination, in November 2021, of the contracts governing their use of the Maghreb-Europe pipeline, and thus affected the volumes of gas flow from Algeria to Europe. 

FOREIGN PILLARS OF DOMESTIC SUCCESS

The success of the Egyptian government, over the past seven years, in applying the comprehensive economic reform program (2016-2020), and then in managing the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2021) were strictly dependent on two foreign pillars of support. One of them is the support of the west, including individual countries and international organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The other more important pillar of support is the generous long-term investments in the Egyptian market and US dollar deposits in the Central Bank by the Arab Gulf countries.

In 2016, Egypt received an IMF loan of US$12 billion, over three years, through the IMF's Extended Fund Facility (EFF). The loan and the technical support attached to it, provided a tremendous buffer for the Egyptian economy against the challenges of the reform program, especially those related to the first shocks of inflation and currency floating. When the COVID-19 pandemic outbroke, in 2020, the IMF intervened with two financial support instruments to support the Egyptian economy against the consequences of the pandemic. In May 2020, Egypt received US$2.8 billion in emergency financial assistance through the IMF’s Rapid Financing Instrument (IRF). Then, in June 2020, the IMF’s Standby Arrangement (SBA) availed US$5.4 billion for Egypt to withdraw over 12 months. 

The initial loan and the subsequent interventions by the IMF participated effectively in ensuring the success of the comprehensive reform program, as well as keeping the economy resilient to the shockwaves of the pandemic. Therefore, when the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war started to reflect on the Egyptian economy, the first instinct of the Egyptian government was to knock the doors of the IMF once more. Some financial experts said that Egypt has already exhausted all the loans and financial assistance opportunities it could get from the IMF, over the past five years. However, a press statement by the IMF, on March 23rd, showed that the IMF is willing to help Egypt this get out of the current crisis, too. 

“[IMF] Staff is working closely with the [Egyptian] authorities to prepare for program discussions with a view to supporting our shared goals of economic stability and sustainable, job-rich, and inclusive medium-term growth for Egypt;” the IMF Press Statement noted. Knowing that this is going to be a long process that comes with a load of conditions that the domestic political system and the monetary policymaker would need to adapt to first, the Egyptian leadership gave priority to activating the second pillar of support; the Arab Gulf countries. 

Since President El-Sisi took power in 2014, the wealthy countries of the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which believe that Egypt’s political stability is central to preserving regional security and stability, have been generously supporting the Egyptian economy, either through direct investments in the market or by keeping long-term and medium-term deposits in the Central Bank (CBE). 

In 2021, the UAE was declared as world’s largest foreign investor in Egypt, with direct investments exceeding US$15 billion. In 2019, the Sovereign Fund of Egypt and the Abu Dhabi Sovereign Fund (ADQ) signed a strategic cooperation agreement to use joint investments of US$20 billion to enhance crucial sectors and assets of the Egyptian economy. Currently, there are more than one thousand UAE companies working in Egypt, including in vital sectors of food industry, energy (oil and gas), and logistical services of the Suez Canal. Also, at that time, the UAE was the holder of the largest deposit by a Gulf country in the Central Bank of Egypt, amounting to US$ 5.7 billion.

According to the latest periodic External Position Report, released by CBE, in November 2021, the total of long-term deposits by Arab Gulf countries reached US$15 billion in June 2021, including US$5.7 billion by the UAE, US$4 billion by Kuwait, and US$2.2 billion by Saudi Arabia. However, in early April of this year, these figures dramatically increased as Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar decided to pour tens of billions of dollars in the Egyptian economy in the form of long-term deposits and direct investments. 

On the last week of March, after a visit by the Egyptian President to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia decided to push the maturity of its deposits in the CBE to 2026. In addition, Saudi Arabia announced making a new deposit of US$5 billion at the CBE to support the Egyptian economy during the current crisis. Then, on March 30th, the Saudi Public Investment Fund (PIF) signed an agreement with the Sovereign Fund of Egypt to invest US$10 billion in the Egyptian market and in governmental health and educational services.

One day before that, on March 29th, senior officials from the Qatari government met with the Egyptian Prime Minister in Cairo, wherein they agreed that Qatar will invest US$ 5 billion in the Egyptian market in the next period. It is important to mention, here, that Qatar has already been one of the largest foreign investors in Egypt’s energy sector, especially after the two countries reconciled in early 2021. In December 2021, the state-owned Qatar Energy purchased 17% of Shell’s project rights for oil and gas exploration in the Egyptian exclusive economic zone in the Red Sea. 

Last week, on April 12th, the Abu Dhabi Wealth Fund (ADQ) acted on a deal, that was discussed earlier with the Egyptian government, to acquire state-owned shares of five Egyptian companies. ADQ invested US$1.8 billion in buying the stakes of the Egyptian state in the following companies: Abu Kir Fertilizers and Chemical Industries (21.5%), Misr Fertilizers Production Company - MOPCO (20%), Alexandria Container and Cargo Holding Company (32%), Commercial International Bank Egypt SAE (17%), and Fawry for Banking and Payment Technology Services (12.6%). The national banks; Banque Misr (BM) and the National Bank of Egypt (NBE) acted as the sellers of these stakes.

EYEING THE CRISIS AFTER THE CRISIS

The former experience of the current Egyptian leadership in managing various types of economic crises, in a relatively short period of time, will definitely help the Egyptian economy survive the current crisis. That is even more possible thanks to the generous deposits and investments by the Arab Gulf countries, and the continued support of the International Monetary Fund. Yet, we have to keep in mind that all these efforts are only going to provide a temporary fix to a pressing issue. They will not provide a real solution to Egypt’s chronic economic crisis. 

In that sense, the question that the Egyptian government and its safety network of regional and international supporters should focus on, is about how to avoid the crisis after the current crisis. In other words, how to get the Egyptian economy liberated from the painful roller coaster of extreme stress followed by short recovery that has not stopped for seventy years. The continuity of the comprehensive macroeconomic reform program, that was launched in 2016, is only one step in the direction to achieve this goal, but it cannot be seen as a goal in itself. 

Rather, the end goal should be to ditch the existing outdated economic system, which in its essence is a distorted hybrid of Nasser’s failed socialism and Sadat’s incomplete liberalism; in order to establish a modern economic system, that is in perfect harmony with the changing nature and priorities of the global economic system. Malaysia and Singapore are two interesting case studies to examine for that purpose. It is not going to be an easy mission, neither for the government nor for the citizens, but its prospected fruit is worth the pain.

Time to Break Egypt-Turkey Stalemate

Last week, some interesting news was widely spread about Ankara appointing a new ambassador to Cairo. Some Turkish resources on social media noted that Salih Mutlu Şen, who served as the Turkish Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Turkey representative in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), is the candidate for the position. Although the news is not officially confirmed by Ankara or Cairo, neither side denied it is happening. 

Turkey and Egypt withdrew their ambassadors in 2013, as soon as the diplomatic standoff between them over the legitimacy of the Muslim Brotherhood, erupted. Yet, the embassies and affiliated cultural centers continued operations as usual. Also, the trade and economic relations between the two countries never stopped, but rather grew and improved. 

One year ago, the Arab Gulf countries decided to resolve their own conflicts, in preparation for the expected regional transformations that may result from the change in the United States Administration from Trump to Biden. Under the effect of this peace trend, Turkey and Egypt, which used to take confronting sides in the Arab Gulf conflict, started to consider fixing their own broken ties. Since then, only two reconciliation meetings were held, in Cairo and Ankara respectively, between diplomatic bureaucrats. But they led to no tangible progress on the ground. 

Since the last round of bilateral meetings in Ankara, in September 2021, the talks have not been upgraded beyond the level of deputy foreign ministers, as expected. That gave the impression that the long-waited rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey has fallen into another gap of hopelessness. 

The irony here is that although the Egypt-Turkey reconciliation is still stumbling on a muddy road, each of Turkey and Egypt were separately able to reconcile with their rivals in the Arab Gulf region, in a record time. In less than one year, Qatar and Egypt, on one hand, compared to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the other hand, have converted from worst rivals to best allies. Yet, Turkey and Egypt are unable to reconcile with each other. There are two ways to explain that. 

On one hand, neither Egypt nor Turkey has the “money power” that the Gulf countries (namely Qatar and UAE) usually use to convert old rivals or allure new allies. The money poured by Gulf countries in the Egyptian and Turkish economies, during the past few months, offered a quick fix that literally saved both economies from failure under the pressure of the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 

However, Cairo and Ankara need to understand that, whether they like it or not, they are codependent neighbors in a very complicated geography. Through positive pragmatic cooperation, especially in the economic and military sectors, they can grow rich and powerful in a miraculous way. Europe’s starvation for the Mediterranean gas, during the Russia-Ukraine war, and the increasing demand on military armament in the Middle East after the United States withdrawal, are two areas where Turkey and Egypt can perfectly use to their own benefit.

On the other hand, the personal prejudices of the Turkish and the Egyptian leaderships are making reconciliation between the two states almost impossible. None of them wants to appear weak in the eyes of their public citizens, who had been dragged into the state-level conflict through the pitiless media wars that continued to boil between the two countries for more than seven years. A large sector of the Egyptian and Turkish citizens, who are obviously dominated by their emotions not their brains, are watching the reconciliation process as if they are watching a football match; waiting for the loser team to bow and cry on the feet of the winning team. The political leaders of Cairo and Ankara need to free themselves from their citizens’ emotionally-blinded expectations so they can get the reconciliation accomplished on realistic and pragmatic basis. 

That being said, there are a few signs that we may see positive developments in the relationship between Turkey and Egypt, in the next few months. Some of the media outlets working from Cairo, and funded by Abu Dhabi, to attack Ankara, have been notified, in March, to stop attacking the Turkish state leadership. Some of them had to close their businesses, as a result. Last year, Turkey took similar action towards the news outlets working from Istanbul, and funded by Qatar, to attack the Egyptian state leadership.

Moreover, last week, the Tactical Report website mentioned that Egypt is interested in domestically producing Turkey’s surface-to-air missile system “HISAR.” Around the same time this news came out, a number of Egyptian Military personnel were in Ankara, attending a promotion event for the Turkish arms manufacturers by the Defense Industry and Technology Training Center. Rebuilding the military-to-military relations between the Turkish and the Egyptian militaries could be a critical first to maneuver the complications on the political level. 

In any case, it is refreshing to see the news about Egypt-Turkey rapprochement making the headlines once again. It is about time for Egypt and Turkey to break their decade-long diplomatic impasse, and start cooperating for the good of their people. Both countries are among the most affected by the heat of regional and international conflicts that erupted over the past two years. Yet, they can together mitigate most of the negative consequences of these conflicts on themselves and on their regional milieu, only if they choose to drop down a decade of useless diplomatic disputes and effectively collaborate on a deeper strategic level. 

Egypt in the Israel vs. Iran Formula

The Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sameh Shoukry, is currently in Israel, to participate in the historic Negev Summit, which is mainly focused on deterring the many Iran-made security threats all over the Middle East region. Among all the major shifts in the regional geopolitical structure, which this particular summit highlights, the fact that Egypt is now actively involved in regional action against Iran, stands out. It is important to figure out what incited this crucial change in Egypt’s lenient policy towards Iran.

On March 27th-28th, in Sde Boker, Negev, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Yaer Lapid, hosted his counterparts from Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in a historic summit to discuss the future of the Middle East in light of the escalating regional and global threats. The United States Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, participated in the summit, as well, carrying a message from the White House confirming that the United States will always work with its strategic partners, in the Middle East, to push away the nuclear threat of Iran.

Despite the decades-long frozen diplomatic relations with Iran, Egypt has always been careful not to stir up Iran’s hostility. That included when showing solidarity, mostly via the Arab League’s collective statements, with Saudi Arabia and UAE, against the attacks of the Iran-sponsored Houthi militia. Ironically, in the war between Hezbollah and Israel, in 2006, the Egyptian media showed an exaggerated bias to Hezbollah against Israel, when covering the news of the war. Most of them went as far as portraying Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, as a popular regional hero.

However, since the Egypt President El-Sisi came in power, in 2014, the relationship between Egypt and Israel has been expanding to unprecedented levels of security and economic partnership. When Hamas-affiliated terrorists stormed into Sinai, killing Egyptian soldiers and civilians, in the chaotic years following the Arab Spring, Israel provided unprecedented security and military support for Egypt to defend itself against the terrorists. 

Moreover, in the past three years, the two eastern Mediterranean neighbors have grown together as key players in the world energy market, due to their fruitful cooperation in extracting and liquifying the natural gas wealth of the eastern Mediterranean, within their maritime zones. This created a new bond of healthy economic and security codependency between neighbors, which is now making Egypt care for preserving the national security of Israel as much as it cares for its own national security.

In parallel, the Abraham Accords helped Israel in building deeper connections with Gulf countries, especially the UAE, which is heavily invested in Egypt’s economy and security, too. The main security threat on Egypt’s top two allies in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and UAE, is coming from Iran and its sponsored Houthi militia in Yemen. One of the staple mottos of the Egyptian president, El-Sisi, is that “the security of the Arab Gulf is integral to the security of Egypt.” Undeniably, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been very supportive to Egypt, over the past decade, especially in terms with ensuring Egypt’s economic stability, which is critical of preserving Egypt’s political stability and security. 

Above all that, after the hasty withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan, in August last year, there is a growing desire in the Middle East region, on both official and social levels, that the region should be led by its own leaders, not by whoever rules the White House. For this to happen, cooperation between all parties, including Israel, has become inevitable, especially that the internal or the external threats facing the region does not differentiate between the Arab or the non-Arab. 

In that sense, it is not a surprise that Egypt, right now, is taking a sharper position in siding with Israel and the Arab Gulf countries against Iran, this time. By actively participating in the Negev summit, and previously hosting senior Israeli officials, either from the political, security, or intelligence bureaus, is definitely “giving Iran something to fear,” as Israel’s Foreign Minister boldly articulated.

مصر بين إسرائيل وإيران

 

في ظل التحولات الجيوسياسية الكثيرة والكبيرة التي تعيد تشكيل منطقة الشرق الأوسط منذ فترة، تتبنى مصر سياسة خارجية هادئة تهدف إلى تحقيق التوازن في كافة علاقاتها الدولية والإقليمية، معتمدة مبدأ السلام مع الجميع بلا استثناء، وعدم الحاجة لتحميل الحاضر والمستقبل فاتورة الصراعات التي مضت. لكن عندما يأتي الأمر لملف إيران، وتهديدها المباشر لمصالح الدول الشقيقة لمصر في منطقة الخليج، وكذلك لإسرائيل التي أصبحت في السنوات الأخيرة من أهم الحلفاء الإقليميين بالنسبة لمصر، على المستوى الاقتصادي والأمني، تصبح مسألة إمساك العصا من المنتصف معقدة بعض الشيء.

شاركت مصر في قمة النقب التاريخية، التي استضافتها إسرائيل في الأسبوع الأخير من شهر مارس، وركزت بشكل أساسي على ردع التهديدات الإيرانية على الأمن الإقليمي لمنطقة الشرق الأوسط. من بين جميع التحولات الرئيسية في البناء الجيوسياسي والأمني في الإقليم، والتي تعتبر هذه القمة أحد دلائلها، تبرز حقيقة أن مصر أصبحت تشارك بشكل فعال وحاسم في العمل الإقليمي ضد إيران، على عكس موقفها المحايد أو المتساهل تجاه إيران في الماضي، وهو ما يستدعي التوقف لحظات لفهم أسبابه ودوافعه وتأثيره على المستقبل بالنسبة لمصر أو بالنسبة للمنطقة ككل.

استضاف وزير الخارجية الإسرائيلي، يائير لابيد، في الفترة من ٢٧ إلى ٢٨ مارس، نظرائه من مصر والمغرب والبحرين والإمارات، في قمة تاريخية لمناقشة مستقبل الشرق الأوسط، في ظل تصاعد التهديدات الإقليمية والعالمية. اختارت إسرائيل أن تعقد القمة في مستوطنة سديه بوكير الواقعة في صحراء النقب التي ترتبط جغرافياً وتاريخياً بشبه جزيرة سيناء في مصر. فسر البعض اختيار الموقع على أنه كان لزاماً اختيار مكان بعيد عن المدن الرئيسية المتنازع عليها مع الفلسطينيين، مثل مدينة القدس. 

لكن يبدو أن إسرائيل كان لديها رسالة تريد إيصالها من خلال اختيار هذا الموقع تحديداً، حيث أنه يبعد عن مقبرة ديفيد بن جوريون، مؤسس الدولة في إسرائيل، بضع كيلومترات، وهو ما يؤكد بشكل غير مباشر الهدف العام من القمة، وهو استعراض قوة إسرائيل في مواجهة إيران، لا سيما وسط قبول عربي واسع لها، بل احتضان، يحل محل تاريخ طويل من الصراعات بينها وبين جيرانها العرب.  

ربما تكون كلمة وزير الخارجية الإماراتي، عبد الله بن زايد، في ختام قمة النقب هي أكبر تجسيد على التوجه العربي مؤخراً على احتضان إسرائيل كجزء من الشرق الأوسط، حيث قال: "مع الأسف أضعنا الأعوام الثلاثة والأربعين (أي منذ توقيع معاهدة السلام بين مصر وإسرائيل في السبعينات). خسرنا على مدار هذه الأعوام فرصة التعرف على بعضنا البعض بشكل أفضل والعمل معاً، وتغيير السردية التي نشأت عليها أجيال من الإسرائيليين والعرب. ما نحاول بلوغه اليوم هو تغيير هذه السردية وخلق مستقبل مختلف. إسرائيل جزء من هذه المنطقة منذ وقت طويل لكننا لم نتعرف على بعضنا البعض لذلك حان الوقت لتدارك ما فاتنا".

شارك في القمة، وزير خارجية الولايات المتحدة، أنتوني بلينكين، حاملاً رسالة من البيت الأبيض تؤكد أن الولايات المتحدة ستعمل دائمًا مع شركائها الاستراتيجيين في الشرق الأوسط، من أجل إبعاد التهديد النووي المتمثل في إيران، حتى على الرغم من مجهودات الإدارة الأمريكية للرئيس بايدن المتواصلة في التودد إلى إيران من أجل توقيع الاتفاق النووي التي تعتبره إسرائيل ودول الخليج العربي تهديد لأمنها القومي. قبل قمة النقب، حاول وزير الخارجية الأمريكي بلينكن طمأنة رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي، نفتالي بينيت، أن الصفقة مع إيران لن تؤثر على التزام الولايات المتحدة بحماية الأمن القومي لإسرائيل أو الحلفاء الإقليميين الآخرين، حيث قال بلينكين "سواء تم الاتفاق أو لم يتم، سنواصل العمل سوياً ومع شركائنا الآخرين لمواجهة سلوك إيران المزعزع للاستقرار في المنطقة". 

لكن، في واقع الأمر، فإن تصرفات الولايات المتحدة تعطي رسالة متناقضة تماماً مع ما قاله بلينكن، لا سيما فيما يتعلق بإصرار إدارة بايدن على إزالة الحرس الثوري الإيراني من قائمة المنظمات الإرهابية الأجنبية، وقبل ذلك إعفاء مليشيا الحوثي في اليمن من نفس القائمة. وهو الأمر الذي دفع أغلب دول المنطقة، بما في ذلك إسرائيل، للتخلي عن الصراعات المباشرة أو الإقليمية الشاملة فيما بينهم والبحث عن السلام والتعاون الذي من شأنه تقوية موقفهم في مواجهة العدو المشترك، إيران، بأنفسهم دون الاعتماد على الولايات المتحدة للتدخل كما جرت العادة في الماضي. وبالتأكيد، مصر ليست استثناء من ذلك الحراك العام نحو التآزر بين دول المنطقة. 

على الرغم من العلاقات الدبلوماسية المعلقة منذ عقود مع إيران، كانت مصر دائمًا حريصة على عدم الدخول في حالة عداء مباشر مع إيران، معتبرة أن التباعد الجغرافي فيما بينهما كافياً لتجنب شرور إيران التي ظلت لسنوات طويلة لا تستهدف سوى إسرائيل، وهو أمر كانت تشجعه الكثير من الدول العربية نظراً للصراع التاريخي بين العرب وإسرائيل. ولكن تغيرت الأمور كثيراً في مرحلة ما بعد الربيع العربي، وتوسع التواجد الإيراني، إما بشكل مباشر أو عبر وكلاء وميليشيات في منطقة الشام ثم في منطقة الخليج، ومع مرور الوقت أصبحت تشكل تهديد حقيقي على الأمن القومي لأهم الدول الحليفة لمصر في منطقة الخليج، السعودية والإمارات. 

من المبادئ التي يكررها الرئيس المصري، عبد الفتاح السيسي، باستمرار أن "أمن الخليج العربي جزء لا يتجزأ من أمن مصر"، إذ لا يمكن إنكار حقيقة أن السعودية والإمارات كانتا أكبر داعمتين لمصر، على مدى العقد الماضي في التعامل مع أثار الربيع العربي، لا سيما فيما يتعلق بضمان الاستقرار الاقتصادي لمصر الذي يعد أمر حاسم للحفاظ على الاستقرار السياسي والأمني في مصر. ونفس الموقف الكريم، خصوصاً من جانب السعودية، يتكرر الآن في ظل الأزمة الاقتصادية التي تمر بها مصر من جراء الغزو الروسي لأوكرانيا.

بالإضافة إلى ذلك، أصبحت إيران تشكل تهديد على أمن مصر واقتصادها، وإن كان بشكل غير مباشر، عن طريق استمرارها في تهديد أمن إسرائيل، التي أصبحت أحد أهم الحلفاء الاقتصاديين والأمنيين لمصر في السنوات القليلة الماضية، من خلال التعاون الكبير فيما بينهما في قطاع الطاقة في شرق المتوسط، وكذلك التعاون في القطاع الأمني في مواجهة التهديد الإرهابي في شبه جزيرة سيناء، وهو بالتأكيد ما استدعى وقوف مصر بشكل صريح في صف الخليج وإسرائيل في مواجهة إيران. 

وفوق كل ذلك، بعد انسحاب الولايات المتحدة من أفغانستان، بشكل متسرع وفوضوي، في أغسطس الماضي، أصبحت هناك رغبة متزايدة لدى دول الشرق الأوسط، على المستويين الرسمي والاجتماعي، في أن يتولى زعماء المنطقة قيادة مستقبلها، بغض النظر عن شخصية وتوجهات من يحكم البيت الأبيض في واشنطن. ولتحقيق ذلك، أصبح التعاون بين جميع الأطراف، بما في ذلك إسرائيل، أمر حتمي، خاصة وأن التهديدات الداخلية أو الخارجية التي تواجه المنطقة لا تفرق بين العربي أو غير العربي.

من هذا المنطلق، ليس من المستغرب أن تتخذ مصر، في الوقت الحالي، موقفاً أكثر صرامة ووضوح في الوقوف إلى جانب إسرائيل ودول الخليج العربي ضد إيران. من خلال المشاركة النشطة في قمة النقب، وأيضاً من خلال استضافة مسؤولين إسرائيليين كبار قبل القمة، بما في ذلك مسؤولين إسرائيليين من القطاعات الأمنية والمخابراتية، وهو ما يؤكد على حقيقة أن مصر أصبحت عنصر رئيسي في التكتل الإقليمي العازم على مواجهة إيران.

Arab-Israel Solidarity: Giving Iran Something to Fear

At the conclusion of the historic Negev Summit, held in Israel on March 27-28, with the participation of foreign ministers of Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United States, the Israeli Prime Minister, Yaer Lapid, boldly noted that this summit is giving Iran something to fear. 

“The shared capabilities we are building intimidates and deters our common enemies, first and foremost Iran and its proxies;” Lapid emphasized. Indeed, the unprecedented showcasing of solidarity between Arabs and Israelis, a few kilometers away from the grave of David Ben Gurion, the founding father of Israel, is something that should make the hearts of the Iranian regime shiver in panic. 

If nothing else, the Negev Summit has, forever, undermined the basis of the extremist ideological rhetoric of “eliminating Israel,” which Iran and its sponsored militia and proxies, as well as all the terrorist organizations in the region, have been employing to gain public sympathy, and legitimizing their unjustified military activities in the region, including the ongoing process of nuclear proliferating.

Since the Islamic Revolution took over Iran, Israel has remained the foremost target of the Iranian hate and military attacks. Sadly, this used to be widely tolerated by most Arab countries due to their sympathy with the Palestinians. For a long time, the Israel-Palestinian conflict used to be labeled an “Arab-Israel” conflict. In 2006, when the war erupted between Israel and Hezbollah, in southern Lebanon, the Arab media showed an exaggerated bias to Hezbollah against Israel. Many of them went as far as portraying Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, as a “super hero” of Muslims and Arabs. 

However, things have changed a lot since the eruption of the Arab Spring revolutions, in 2010/2011. The crucial change in Arab countries’ positions on Israel and Iran is not a sudden shift, but it has been brewing for at least ten years, due to two main factors. One of them is the fact that the Arab Spring revolutions threw out the long-established dictators, who used to magnify the Israel-Palestinian conflict to distract their citizens from protesting the failure and corruption of their regimes. Egypt is one of the most apparent examples on this shift in government and public attitudes towards Israel after the Arab Spring. 

The other factor has to do with the deterioration of the relationship between Iran and its Arab neighbors in the Gulf region, after the rise of the Iran-sponsored Houthi militia to power in northern Yemen. Since 2015, the Houthi has been showering Saudi Arabia and the UAE with Iran-made missiles and drone attacks.

On a larger scale, Iran sponsored militia and proxies are wreaking havoc all over the Levant region, starting from Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, up to Iran proxies in Iraq. Today, the Iranian mullah regime, via their sponsored militias, are literally dictating the course of politics and decision-making in Iraq. Two years ago, these militia assassinated, with cold blood, young Iraqi political activists, who dared to oppose Iran’s intervention in their domestic politics. Last year, these Iran-sponsored militia attempted to assassinate the Iraqi Prime Minister, using Iran-made armed drones, after the elections. 

Despite that, the U.S. Administration of President Biden is proceeding with appeasing Iran to sign a nuclear deal that most the concerned countries in the region view as a direct threat to their national security. Before the Negev Summit, U.S. Secretary Blinken tried to assure the Israel Prime Minister, Naftali Bennett, that the deal with Iran will not stop the United States from protecting the national security of Israel or other regional allies. 

“Deal or no deal, we will continue to work together and with other partners to counter Iran’s destabilizing behavior in the region,” Blinken said. However, the actions of the United States give a different message, especially Biden Administration’s persistence on removing the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from the list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTO), and before that removing the Houthi militia in Yemen, from the FTO list.

Now, it seems that the many escalating regional and global threats around and within the Middle East region are literary pushing the countries of the region to stand together as one front, and in the process pressing the finest juices of peace out of the Middle Eastern body, to replace decades of deep-rooted political and ideological animosity.

التضامن العربي الإسرائيلي يرهب إيران

في ختام قمة النقب التاريخية، التي عقدت في إسرائيل يومي ٢٧ و٢٨ مارس، بحضور وزراء خارجية مصر، المغرب، الإمارات، البحرين، والولايات المتحدة؛ أشار رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي، يائير لبيد، بجرأة إلى أن هذه القمة ترهب إيران، حيث قال "إن القدرات المشتركة التي نبنيها ترهب وتردع أعداءنا المشتركين، وفي مقدمتهم إيران ووكلائها". 

مصداقاً لكلمات لابيد الحادة، فإن استعراض هذه الصورة من التضامن غير المسبوق بين العرب والإسرائيليين، على بّعد بضع كيلومترات قليلة من قبر ديفيد بن غوريون، الأب المؤسس لإسرائيل، هو أمر يجب أن يجعل قلوب النظام الإيراني ترتجف. إذا لم يكن لأي سبب آخر، يكفي أن قمة النقب، قد نسفت تماماً الأساس العقائدي القائم على "محاربة إسرائيل ونفيها من الوجود" الذي يعتمده النظام الإيراني والمليشيات التابعة له، وكذلك جميع التنظيمات الإرهابية والجماعات المتطرفة في المنطقة، في الترويج لأنفسهم بين العوام، وكسب التعاطف الشعبي، وإضفاء الشرعية الزائفة على أنشطتهم العسكرية غير المبررة في كافة أرجاء المنطقة، بما في ذلك حيازة وتصنيع الأسلحة النووية.

منذ أن استولت الثورة الإسلامية على إيران، ظلت إسرائيل الهدف الأول لهجمات إيران الإعلامية والعسكرية. مع الأسف، معظم الدول العربية كانت تشجع هذا الموقف الإيراني تجاه إسرائيل، نظراً لتعاطفهم مع القضية الفلسطينية، حتى أنه لسنوات طويلة، كان يُطلق على الصراع الإسرائيلي الفلسطيني في الإعلام مصطلح الصراع "العربي الإسرائيلي". في عام ٢٠٠٦، عندما اندلعت الحرب بين إسرائيل وحزب الله في جنوب لبنان، أظهرت وسائل الإعلام العربية تحيزًا مبالغًا فيه تجاه حزب الله ضد إسرائيل، حتى ذهب الكثير منهم إلى حد تصوير حسن نصر الله، زعيم حزب الله، على أنه "بطل خارق" يعتز به المسلمين والعرب. 

لكن تغيرت الأمور كثيرًا منذ اندلاع ثورات الربيع العربي في ٢٠١٠/٢٠١١. إن التحول الحاد في مواقف الدول العربية تجاه كل من إسرائيل وإيران ليس مفاجئاً، لكنه ناتج عن تراكم الكثير من الخبرات التي ظلت تختمر طيلة العشر سنوات الماضية. ويمكن إرجاع هذا التحول إلى عاملين رئيسيين. أحدها هو حقيقة أن ثورات الربيع العربي أطاحت بالأنظمة الديكتاتورية العربية التي اعتادت استخدام التعاطف الشعبي مع القضية الفلسطينية وتضخيم صورة إسرائيل العدو، من أجل إلهاء مواطنيهم عن الاحتجاج على فشل وفساد أنظمتهم. مصر هي أحد الأمثلة الأكثر وضوحا على هذا التحول في المواقف الحكومية والشعبية تجاه إسرائيل قبل وبعد تجربة الربيع العربي. أما العامل الآخر يتمثل في تدهور العلاقة بين إيران وجيرانها العرب في منطقة الخليج، بعد صعود ميليشيات الحوثي التي ترعاها إيران في شمال اليمن، ويكفي أنه منذ عام ٢٠١٥، ظل الحوثيون يمطرون كل من السعودية والإمارات بصواريخ وطائرات مسيرة إيرانية الصنع. 

على نطاق أوسع، فإن الميليشيات والوكلاء المدعومون من إيران لا زالت تعيث فساداً في جميع أرجاء الشام، حيث لبنان وسوريا، وكذلك في العراق، التي أصبحت الميلشيات الموالية لإيران فيها هي من يتحكم فعلياً في مسار السياسة وعملية صنع القرار. قبل عامين، اغتالت هذه الميليشيات بدم بارد نشطاء سياسيين عراقيين شباب تجرأوا على معارضة تدخل إيران في سياسات بلادهم الداخلية. وفي العام الماضي، حاولت هذه الميليشيات، مستخدمة طائرات مسيرة إيرانية، أن تغتال رئيس الوزراء العراقي، عن طريق استهداف منزله، بعد عقد الانتخابات. 

على الرغم من ذلك، تواصل إدارة الرئيس الأمريكي بايدن استرضاء إيران للتوقيع على اتفاق نووي تعتبره معظم الدول المعنية في المنطقة تهديدًا مباشرًا لأمنها القومي. قبل قمة النقب، حاول وزير الخارجية الأمريكي بلينكن طمأنة رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي، نفتالي بينيت، أن الصفقة مع إيران لن تؤثر على التزام الولايات المتحدة بحماية الأمن القومي لإسرائيل أو الحلفاء الإقليميين الآخرين، حيث قال بلينكين "سواء تم الاتفاق أو لم يتم، سنواصل العمل سويًا ومع شركاءنا الأخرين لمواجهة سلوك إيران المزعزع للاستقرار في المنطقة". لكن، في واقع الأمر، فإن تصرفات الولايات المتحدة تعطي رسالة متناقضة تماماً مع ما قاله بلينكن، لا سيما فيما يتعلق بإصرار إدارة بايدن على إزالة الحرس الثوري الإيراني من قائمة المنظمات الإرهابية الأجنبية، وقبل ذلك إعفاء مليشيا الحوثي في اليمن من نفس القائمة. 

إن التهديدات الإقليمية والعالمية المتصاعدة حول منطقة الشرق الأوسط وداخلها هي حرفياً تدفع دول المنطقة للوقوف معًا كجبهة واحدة، وتحت ضغط وقسوة هذه التهديدات، يبدو أنها ستجبر الشرق الأوسط أخيراً على اعتماد خطاب السلام والبحث عن سبل التعاون البراغماتي عوضاً عن خطابات الكراهية والعداءات المتجذرة التي نخرت عظامه طيلة العقود السبع الماضية. 

Dalia Ziada: Şu anda Ortadoğu'da olan şey tam bir panik diplomasisi

Below is an interview with our Executive Director, Dalia Ziada, on the Turkish DuvaR Gazete about the "panic diplomacy" that is for a while has been defining the interactions between the countries of the Middle East: 

Er ya da geç idrak etmemiz gerekiyor ki, ABD (bölgeden) çekiliyor ve Avrupa da zayıflıyor. Daha fazla bel bağlayabileceğimiz bir Batı olmayacak. Şimdi ya hep birlikte bu gemiyi yüzdüreceğiz ya da hep birlikte batacağız. Bütün bölge ülkeleri bu hissiyat dolayısıyla iyi ilişkilerini güçlendirip sorunlu ilişkilerini tamir etmeye çalışıyor.

Bütün dünyanın gözü, kulağı elbette Rusya-Ukrayna savaşında. Ancak Orta Doğu ve Arap ülkelerinde de çok çarpıcı bir dizi ziyaretler, liderler seviyesinde buluşmalar ve zirveler art arda gelmeye başladı.

Tarihi olarak değerlendirilebilecek bu gelişmeleri Doğu Akdeniz ve Orta Doğu Araştırmalar Merkezi başkanı Dalia Ziada ile konuştuk.

Ukrayna savaşının yansımaları ve etkileri ile birlikte Orta Doğu’da durum ne?

Aslında bölgede Ukrayna-Rusya savaşından bağımsız olarak, geçtiğimiz ağustos ayından beri bazı gelişmeler devam ediyor. Amerika’nın Afganistan’dan çekilmesinden beri Orta Doğu’da bir çeşit panik başladı. Herkes ‘doğru yolda mıyım?’, ‘kavgalı olduğum taraflarla ilişkilerimi onarabilir miyim?’ gibi sorular sormaya başladı.

Eğer bu sürece bir isim vermek gerekirse, şu anda bölgemizde olan şeyin tam olarak bir panik diplomasisi olduğunu söyleyebilirim.

Herkes bir telaşla bir yerlere koşturup ABD (Orta Doğu’dan çekildiğinde) sonrası yalnız kaldığımızda kaybolma endişesi ile hareket ediyor.

Açıkçası Ukrayna-Rusya savaşı bu sorunu daha da büyütüp daha büyük bir baskı yarattı. Ayrıca bazı bölge ülkelerinin omuzlarındaki yükü de arttırdı. Özellikle, Arap körfez ülkelerinin. Çünkü bu ülkeler bölgenin doğu kapısı gibiler ve Afganistan meselesinden ilk etkilenen ülkeler oldular. Şu anda bölgenin özellikle ekonomik açıdan kalkındırılması gibi bir sorumlulukları da var.

Mesela Mısır’da Rusya-Ukrayna savaşının doğrudan sonuçlarından biri ekonomik kriz oldu.

Evet, bölge ülkeleri arasında gelecek tehlikelere karşı bir çeşit dayanışma var. Ancak bu dayanışma da organize ve sakinlik içinde değil panikle gerçekleşiyor.

Türkiye’de de inanılmaz tartışmalar var. Kimileri NATO’dan çıkmalıyız diyor, kimileri Rusya ile bütün bağları kesmeliyiz diyor. Herkes bir çıkış belirlemeye çalışıyor.

NATO üyesi ve Amerika’nın bölgedeki en güçlü müttefiklerinden olan Türkiye dahil bölgedeki birçok ülkenin sorunu aynı. Mesela Mısır, Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri, Suudi Arabistan ABD sebebiyle zorluklar yaşıyor. En önemli şey Beyaz Saray’ı kimin yönettiği… ‘Bizim için iyi biri mi, kötü biri mi?’… Ne yazık ki, kendi geleceğimizi kontrol edemiyoruz, sorun da bu.

Rusya-Ukrayna savaşı Mısır’da ve bölgede günlük hayatı nasıl etkiliyor?

2021’in Aralık ayında IMF Mısır ile ilgili bir rapor yayınladı ve Mısır’ın doğru yolda olduğunu ve ekonomik kalkınma hedefleri çerçevesinde ilerlediğini, 2022 sonunda Mısır’ın bölgede Suudi Arabistan’dan sonra ikinci büyük ekonomi olmasını beklediklerini belirttiler.

Aniden savaş geldi, bu rapordan sadece 2 ay sonra bir kez daha ekonomik krize geri döndük. Fiyatlar çıldırmış gibi artıyor. Dün 10 Mısır lirası olan şey bugün 15-16 lira. Enflasyon oranı yüzde 10 ile 15 arasında değişiyor. Bu belirsizlik nedeniyle insanlar ne yapacaklarını bilmiyor, bazıları dolar almaya çalışıyor ve bütün bunlar yeni bir kriz hissiyatı yaratıyor.

Mısır açısından en önemli mesele buğday ki, ekmek her zaman masada vardır, ekmeği seviyoruz. Şimdi diyorlar ki, ‘savaşın ne kadar süreceğini bilmiyoruz, bu nedenle çok fazla ekmek yiyemezsiniz.’

Şimdi Mısır hükümeti buğdayı başka yerlerden temin etmek için Fransa gibi buğday üreticisi başka ülkelerle konuşuyor. Ancak nihayetinde Mısır, (buğday ve tahıl) ihtiyacının yüzde 80’ini Rusya’dan ve Ukrayna’dan ithal ediyor.

Hükümetin buğday ve diğer konulardaki sorunlara ne kadar dayanabileceğini bilmiyoruz.

Elbette şu anda (Mısır için) körfez ülkelerinin oldukça cömert finansmanı çok önemli ancak nihayetinde bir krizdeyiz ve bu finansman 100 milyonun üzerinde bir nüfus için yeterli değil.

Bölgede son birkaç hafta içinde gerçekleşen ziyaretlere ve zirvelere gelmek istiyorum. Önce Suriye Devlet Başkanı Beşar Esad Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri’ne gitti. Sonra BAE Emiri Bin Zayed, Ürdün Kralı Abdullah, Mısır lideri Sisi ve Irak Başbakanı Kazımi Ürdün’de buluştu. Bin Zayed, Sisi ve İsrail Başbakanı Benett Mısır’ın Şarm El Şeyh kentinde görüştü. Ve son olarak İsrail’de ABD Dışişleri Bakanı Blinken ile İsrail, Mısır, Fas, Bahreyn ve BAE dışişleri bakanları 5’li zirve yaptı. Ne oluyor?

Öncelikle daha önce bahsettiğim panik diplomasisi ki, etrafımızda bir sürü şey oluyor ve liderler neler olduğunu, birbirlerine gerçekten güvenip güvenemeyeceklerini anlamaya çalışıyor. Bildiğin gibi, bu coğrafya çatışmalarla dolu ki buna bölge ülkelerinin birbirleri ve hatta her birinin kendi içindeki çatışmalar da dahil.

Mesela aynı aşiretlerin mensupları ve kuzenler arasında sürekli rekabet var; Katar ve BAE gibi. Aslında kuzenler…

Bölgemiz çatışma ile birlikte anılıyor. Ancak şimdi aşiretler arasındaki küçük ya da Arap-İsrail sorunu gibi büyük bütün çatışmaları, mücadeleleri bir kenara koymaya zorlandığımız şartlar var.

Er ya da geç idrak etmemiz gerekiyor ki, ABD (bölgeden) çekiliyor ve Avrupa da zayıflıyor. Daha fazla bel bağlayabileceğimiz bir Batı olmayacak.

Şimdi ya hep birlikte bu gemiyi yüzdüreceğiz ya da hep birlikte batacağız. Dolayısıyla bütün bölge ülkeleri bu hissiyat dolayısıyla iyi ilişkilerini güçlendirip sorunlu ilişkilerini tamir etmeye çalışıyor.

Açıkçası, uzun dönemli kalıcı barış sağlanması amaçları ile hareket ettiklerini de düşünmüyorum. Daha çok ‘şimdi birbirimize zarar vermeyeceğiz’ seviyesindeler…

Bölgedeki bu ‘barış akımının’ ortaya çıkmasını zorlayan sebepler neler?

Öncelikle herkes birbirinden ‘bir diğerine zarar vermeyeceği’ konusunda emin olmaya çalışıyor. Ayrıca kronikleşmiş sorunlara çözüm bulmak. Mesela, Irak ve Ürdün Mısır ile neden görüşüyor? Çünkü elektrik sorunları var ve Mısır’dan elektrik istiyorlar. Doğal gaz istiyorlar ki, Mısır’da gaz var.

Peki Mısır, Suudi Arabistan, BAE ve hatta Katar ile neden çalışıyor? (Katar, Mısır’da Müslüman Kardeşleri ve Mursi’yi açıktan destekledi. Mısır’ın şimdiki yönetimi Müslüman Kardeşler’i terörist olarak tanımlıyor) Çünkü Mısır’ın Körfez ülkelerinin parasına ihtiyacı var.

Körfez ülkeleri niye Mısır’a yardım ediyor? Çünkü herkes bölgede istikrar istiyor. Eğer ekonomik krizler devam ederse, işler kötüye giderse insanlar bir kez daha sokaklara iner, gösteriler başlar ve tekrar eskiye döneriz.

Ya da BAE neden Şam’a kapıları açıyor?

Bence amacı Suriye’deki Rus ve İran nüfuzu. İran Suriye’de ve özellikle Irak’ta politik kararların alınmasında ve milisler üzerinden çok etkili.

Bunun yanı sıra Rusya’nın Suriye’deki nüfuzu Arap Körfez ülkelerini ve bölgenin geri kalanını korkutacak kadar büyük. Bölge ülkelerinin Amerika ile sorunları olsa da bölge açısından mesela BAE, Amerika’nın favori müttefiklerinden.

(Bölge ülkeleri) Zaman zaman Rusya ile işbirliği yapıyor gibi görünseler de her zaman batı kampında oldular.

Bu nedenle BAE ve diğer ülkeler Esad’a ulaşmaya, Suriye’yi Arap Birliği’ne geri getirmeye çalışıyorlar.

İran nüfuzu neden bu kadar büyük korku yaratıyor?

İran İslam Devrimi’nden sonra İran Arap ülkelerini değil İsrail’i hedef almıştı. Ancak Arap Baharı döneminde İran destekli milisler güç boşluğundan faydalanabileceklerini düşünüp, ‘evet, artık bizim zamanımız geldi’ demeye başladılar. Irak’ta, Suriye’de, Lübnan’da, Yemen’de güçlendiler.

Bölge ülkelerinin İran’a karşı ile İsrail ile yakınlaşmasının sebebi de bu mu?

Arap Baharı döneminde İsrail’in bundan faydalanıp Sina bölgesini ele geçirmeye çalışacağını düşünenler vardı. Bunun aksine İran tarafından desteklenen HAMAS Sina’da bir bölgeyi almaya çalıştı.

Diğer taraftan bölgedeki bazı ülkeler mesela BAE, İsrail’in kuruluşundan çok sonra ortaya çıktı. “İsrail ile niye sorun yaşıyoruz? Filistinliler sebebiyle mi? Filistinliler umurumuzda değil” diye düşünmeye başladılar.

Daha sonra 2020’de İbrahim Anlaşmaları’nı yaptılar. Şunu fark ettiler; ‘günün sonunda İsrail bir devlet. Daha önce şeytan olarak tanımlamış olsak da uzlaşabileceğimiz bir şeytan.’

Ayrıca farklı gerekçeler de var. Mesela Mısır ve İsrail, Akdeniz’e komşuluk üzerinden bağlantılı. (Bölge ülkeleri ile İsrail arasında) Bir çeşit karşılıklı ekonomik çıkarlar ve ihtiyaçlar üzerinden ilişkiler başladı.

Bölge ülkelerini birbirlerine bağlayan yeni prensipler var mı? Arap milliyetçiliğinin yeniden yorumlanmış versiyonu gibi… Arap kimliği üzerinden yakınlaşma ama her bir ülkenin kendi ulusal çıkarlarını öncelik görmesi gibi bir yaklaşım var gibi görünüyor.

Evet, ancak ben bunu pragmatizm olarak adlandırırdım; bölgede pragmatizmin yükselişi.

Bizler duygusal toplumlarız. “Bütün Araplar birleşmelidir” gibi retoriklerle hareket etmemizin sebebi bu ki, Araplar asla birleşmedi.

Arap Baharı’ndan sonra birçok Arap ülkesi “biz birbirimizden farklıyız. Kuzey Afrika’daki bir ülke körfez ülkesinden farklı” diye düşünmeye başladı.

Mısır’a bakacak olursanız, Sisi yönetime geldiğinden beri yani 2014’ten beri Firavunlara uzanan geçmişimiz üzerinden bir milliyetçiliğin yükselişini görürsünüz.

Evet, bu oldukça sıra dışı bir durum. Hele de Müslüman kimliğinin yüz yıllarca ısrarla vurgulandığı bir ülkede…

Daha önce Müslüman olmakla Mısırlı olmak arasında bir denge vardı. Bugünlerde aksine bir eğilim var. Mesela sosyal medyada çok sayıda insan isimlerini hiyeroglif sembolleri ile yazıyor.

Mısır’daki Müslümanların, Hristiyanların, Yahudilerin, az sayıdaki Bahailer gibi azınlıkların ve hatta sosyo-ekonomik açıdan makasın iyice açıldığı toplumsal tabakaların tek ortak noktası bu sanırım; firavunlara uzanan ortak kök.

Özellikle Arap Baharı döneminde Mısır’da çok derin bir kutuplaşma ortaya çıktı. Sanırım buna karşı böyle bir şey yaptılar.

Diğer taraftan BAE yeni trendin en güzel örneği… 10 yıl önce düşünülemeyecek bir şekilde ticaret, yatırım, projeler, start up’lar için bir merkez haline geldi.

Bütün bölge ülkeleri ihtiyaçlarına, çıkarlarına göre hareket ediyor.

Son olarak Negev Çölü’nde yapılan zirveye Suudi Arabistan katılmadı. İsrail ile barışma konusunda kafası mı karışık? Hava sahasının İsrail tarafından kullanılmasına izin verdi.

Suudi Arabistan şu anda şöyle bir politika yürütüyor; süreçlerde hemen görünür olmamaya çalışıyor. Mesela petrol meselesinde (ABD’nin üretimi artırma çağrısı) gaz ve petrolü, ABD ve Batının bazı konularda Suudi Arabistan’ın çıkarları doğrultusunda adım atmasını sağlamak üzere baskı amaçlı kart olarak kullanıyor. İsrail’e de aynı şekilde bir kart olarak bakıyor. Uygun zamanı yani İsrail kartının ABD’den, Batıdan bir şey almasını sağlayacağı zamanı bekliyor. Zaten Suudi Arabistan’ın gazı, petrolü, parası var, İsrail Suudi Arabistan’a bir tehdit değil; İsrail ile acilen barışması, doğrudan ilişki kurması için bir gereklilik yok.

Suudi Arabistan bu diplomatik ilişkiler döngüsünün hep içinde ancak görünmez üye.

From Arab-Israel Conflict to Arab-Israel Solidarity

The geopolitical balances of the world are changing and so does the geopolitical balance of the Middle East region. One of the key indicators of this change is the rising profile of Israel as an active and influential actor in regional and international diplomacy, after decades of suffering contempt and marginalization by its own neighbors in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, mainly for reasons related to the deadlocked Israel-Palestinian conflict.

Over the past four months, the Israeli officials have been all over the news, for reasons that have nothing to do with their historical conflict with the Palestinians. Rather, they are roaming the world looking for peace. 

On the international level, Israeli Prime Minister, Naftali Bennett, was the first foreign leader to visit Ukraine, after the Russian invasion, in February, to announce the Israeli initiative to mediate for peace between Russia and Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Israeli President, Isaac Herzog, made a breakthrough visit to Ankara, and met with Turkish President, Erdogan, to put an end to a decade of diplomatic impasse, and discuss ways of cooperation on pumping natural gas from Israel into Europe. 

On the regional level, the Israeli Prime Minister, Naftali Bennett, and the alternate Prime Minister, Yaer Lapid, are doing an astonishing effort to cement and elevate political and economic ties with their immediate neighbors, Egypt and Jordan, as well as with the Abraham Accords countries in the Gulf and North Africa.

Arabs Embracing Israel  

The concurrent regional and global threats around and within the Middle East have been pitilessly pressuring the countries of the region, for several years. Going through the chaotic security aftermath of the Arab Spring, the socio-economic tortures of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the hasty withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan in 2021, created a sense of urgency among the countries of the region that the time has come for the Middle East to be commanded by its own leaders, not by whoever rules from the White House. 

That itching desire, which is clearly inspiring most of the regional policies, these days, is expanding yonder the Arabs to include Israel. Disappointed by the flawed Middle East policy of the United States Administration of President Biden, Israel, too, has started to consider balancing its historical dependency on the United States with a healthy security and economic codependency with its Arab neighbors. The historical Negev Summit, in March, is one peak point of this crucial shift. 

For a long time, the Israel-Palestinian conflict used to be labeled as an “Arab-Israel” conflict. In 2006, when the war erupted between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah, which is sponsored by Iran, the Arab media showed an exaggerated bias to Hezbollah against Israel. Many of them went as far as portraying Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, as a “super hero” of Muslims and Arabs. Fast forward ten years later, in 2016, the Arab League joined the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany in designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. 

For obvious reasons, the Middle East has changed a lot since the eruption of the Arab Spring revolutions, in 2010/2011. The crucial change in Arab countries’ positions on Israel is not a sudden shift, but it has been brewing for at least ten years. One reason is the fact that the Arab Spring revolutions threw out the long-established dictators, who used to magnify the Israel-Palestinian conflict to distract their citizens from protesting the failure and corruption of their regimes. Egypt is one of the most apparent examples on this shift in government and public attitudes towards Israel after the fall of Mubarak.

After twenty years of war and four decades of cold peace, the landmark transformation in Egypt-Israel affairs was polarized in the period between the revolution on Mubarak, in January 2011, and overthrowing the Muslim Brotherhood regime in June 2013. While Hamas was leaking weapons and food to affiliate terrorist organizations in Sinai (e.g., Beit al-Maqdes which became later “ISIS-Sinai”), Israel cooperated with Egypt on amending the 1979 peace treaty to allow military equipment and personnel to enter the military prohibited “Zone C” in northern Sinai to fight against terrorists leaking from Gaza. By 2015, the news about military cooperation between Egypt and Israel, in North Sinai, was making headlines. Then, fortunately, in 2018, the natural gas discoveries in the eastern Mediterranean provided a non-security common project for the two countries to cooperate on and further enhance their relationship.

On the public level, a survey by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, conducted in November 2020, showed that 25% of the Egyptian public supported normalizing ties with Israel. At that time, the ink of signing the Abraham Accords between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was still wet.

Singing the Abraham Accords between Israel and three of the Arab countries, during the past two years, was an important step in the right direction, but was not enough. However, the flawed Middle East policy of the current U.S. Administration is, apparently, creating a momentum that is encouraging Israel to proactively expanding its confidence in its Arab neighbors and thus seeking to become an integral part of the powerful regional coalitions that are currently being formed.

Giving Iran Something to Fear

On March 27-28, in Sde Boker, Negev, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Yaer Lapid, hosted his counterparts from Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain, and the UAE, in a historic two-day summit to discuss the future of the Middle East in light of the escalating regional and global threats. Of course, the threat of Iran, and its widely spread militia and proxies, was on the top list of the security threats that the summit discussed. At the conclusion of the Negev Summit, the Israeli Foreign Minister boldly noted that this summit is giving Iran something to fear. “The shared capabilities we are building intimidates and deters our common enemies, first and foremost Iran and its proxies;” Lapid emphasized. 

Indeed, the unprecedented showcasing of solidarity between Arabs and Israelis, a few kilometers away from the grave of David Ben Gurion, the founding father of Israel, is something that should prevent the Iranian officials from sleeping at night. That is mainly because the summit has undermined the ideological rhetoric of “eliminating Israel,” which Iran and its sponsored militia and proxies, as well as all the terrorist organizations in the region, have been using as a winning card to gain public sympathy and give legitimacy to their inexcusable military and militia interventions, and also for justifying the ongoing process of nuclear proliferation. 

The U.S. Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, who also joined the summit, carried an assuring message from the White House, confirming that the United States will always work with its regional partners to push away the security threats created by Iran. “Deal or no deal, we will continue to work together and with other partners to counter Iran’s destabilizing behavior in the region,” Blinken said in conclusion of his meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister before the summit started. 

However, the actions of the U.S. Administration, on the ground, give a different message, especially in relation to Biden’s insistence on appeasing Iran to sign the nuclear deal, and taking radical steps like removing the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from the list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTO), despite Israel’s pleas, and before that removing the Iran-sponsored Houthi militia in Yemen from the FTO list, despite Arab Gulf countries’ appeals.

Since the Islamic Revolution took over Iran, Israel has remained the foremost target of the Iranian hostility and military attacks. Sadly, this used to be widely tolerated by most Arab countries due to their sympathy with the Palestinians. However, in the past decade, Iran posed a serious threat to the national security of most Arab countries, particularly in the Gulf and the Levant regions. Since 2015, the Houthi militia in Yemen has been showering Saudi Arabia and the UAE with Iran-made missiles and drone attacks that targeted civilians as well as critical economic facilities. 

In Lebanon and Syria, the Iran-sponsored proxy, Hezbollah, is literally running political affairs and coordinating with other militia to block any opportunity for improving the political sphere. In Iraq, the Iran-sponsored proxies are dictating political decision-making in parliament. Two years ago, these militia assassinated, with cold blood, some of the famous young Iraqi activists, who dared to publicly oppose Iran’s intervention in their domestic politics. Last year, the same Iran-sponsored militia attempted to assassinate the Iraqi Prime Minister, using Iran-made drones, in protest of the election results. 

How Durable is the Arab-Israel Peace?

No doubt, we are living a historic moment in the Middle East region. The scene of Arab and Israeli leaders holding hands, in Israel, at the conclusion of the Negev Summit, is definitely momentous. If nothing else, it shows that the Middle East is going through a phase of political maturity, wherein the leaders of the region can effectively cooperate on realistic and pragmatic terms. It, also, indicates the beginning of a new phase of less Middle East dependency on the United States, which will have further implications on the international scene, in the near future. 

However, the euphoria created by human love replacing decades of political animosity should not blind us from the fact that the core of the disagreement that kept Arabs and Israelis in conflict for decades is still open. That is the Israel-Palestinian conflict. As long as this conflict continues to exist, any efforts for long-term peace between Arabs and Israelis will remain fragile. 

It is not enough for the regional leaders to push the Israel-Palestinian conflict to the back burner, while handling more pressing issues like the Iranian threat or the rapidly changing security structure of the region. At any moment, the Israel-Palestinian conflict can pop up to the front, once again, causing severe damage to the hard-won regional peace. Sheikh Jarrah protests that quickly developed into a war in Gaza, last year, is one apparent example.

Therefore, there has to be a way to use the current momentum of Arab-Israel solidarity to reach a workable solution for the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The positive attitude of the current Israeli government of Prime Minister Bennett, compared to Netanyahu’s government, on the issue of resolving this historical conflict is promising. At the conclusion of Negev Summit, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Lapid, said that Palestinians are welcome to join future regional summits of that kind. “We are today opening a door before all the peoples of the region, including the Palestinians, and offering them to replace the way of terror and destruction with a shared future of progress and success," Lapid said. 

In parallel, to guarantee the sustainable growth of the peace trend in the region, efforts should be exerted on a level deeper than the surface of state-to-state relations. Reaching the core of people-to people relations between the Arabs and the Israelis remains a big challenge, despite the Abraham Accords and the dazzling series of governmental activities reflecting official acceptance of Israel.