How Should Egypt React to Escalating Crisis in Libya?

Armed clashes in Tripoli have been renewed, threatening the eruption of a second civil war between the Libyan adversaries, in eastern and western territories. Egypt is one of the main countries expected to share the consequences of the deteriorating security situation in Libya. Egypt is, also, one of the few regional actors that can play an effective role in cooling down the Libyan conflict and putting Libya back on the political solution track. For this to happen, certain outdated policies that the Egyptian state is adopting towards Libya need to be urgently reviewed and altered according to the changing status quo inside Libya. 

A fierce battle between the Tripoli-based militias erupted, on August 27th, killed 32 and injured 159 people, including innocent civilians, according to official statistics of the Libyan Ministry of Health. That is the deadliest clash in Tripoli, since the brief outbreak that took place on July 22nd, slaying 13 people killed and 27 injured. The episodes of friction between militiamen, in and around the capital city of Tripoli, have not stopped since May, as Fathi Bashagha and Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh have been mobilizing armed groups against each other, as part of the debate over the legitimacy of their parallel governments. 

Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh leads the Government of National Unity (GNU) from Tripoli, since March 2021. GNU was elected by representatives of Libyan political factions under the supervision of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), in Geneva, to act as an interim government with the goal to reconcile the eastern and western rivals and hold presidential and parliamentary elections before a deadline set on June 2022. 

As soon as Dbeibeh took the job, the Egyptian state reached out to him and offered help and support in his mission and also in reconstructing the war-torn Libya. The chief of the Egyptian intelligence visited Tripoli several times. In return, Dbeibeh visited Cairo and met with the Egyptian president, El-Sisi, more than once. Meanwhile, Egypt had not completely dropped its communications with the eastern flank, including Warlord Khalifa Haftar, and Parliament Speaker Aguila Saleh. This created a perfect balance that greatly protected Egypt’s national security interests.  

Nevertheless, for no clear reasons, the Egyptian state broke this perfect balance in Libya by rushing to support the Libyan parliament’s appointment of Fathi Bashagha, in March, as a prime minister to a government parallel to the Tripoli-based GNU. That is despite the fact that the parliament’s move was meant to delay elections and keep the old political elite in power for as long as possible. Egypt’s return to align with the eastern faction against Tripoli created a situation that is hurting its interests, as Egypt is now seen as part of the war inside Libya, rather than a powerful neighbor that can effectively participate in solving the Libyan crisis.

In reaction to the latest clashes in Tripoli, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that appeared to be too weak to the event and to the role of Egypt in the Libyan crisis. Similar to other regional and international statements, the Egyptian statement called for ending violence and restarting dialogue, and stressed the need to protect civilians, and emphasizing “Egypt's keenness for the Libyan brothers to reach a consensual Libyan-Libyan solution.” Yet, the Egyptian statement failed to blame the mobilization of armed groups by Bashagha at the gates of Tripoli, and the purposeful delay of elections by the Tobruk-based parliament.

One of the reasons why Egypt has been successful in mediating between Israel and Hamas for ceasefire in Gaza, last year, is that the Egyptian state keeps the perfect balance in relationships between all the sides of the conflict. That brought a lot of benefit to Egypt’s profile in the eyes of the international community and restored its lost role as a regional leader. 

If Egypt wants to succeed in Libya, it has to position itself as a leader, not as part of the war. That can happen by adopting a policy similar to its policy in Gaza. In practice, that means to immediately stop taking sides in the Libyan conflict and push for holding the elections as soon as possible. Libya will not calm until a permanent government is installed, via free and fair elections. Otherwise, Egypt’s national security and interests in the region will remain threatened.  

Can Economic Interdependency Fix Political Rift Between Egypt and Turkey?

The political reconciliation process between Egypt and Turkey is still stumbling on a muddy road of swollen egos. The prejudices severely hurt by seven years of media wars and diplomatic standoff does not seem to be ready to heal, any time soon. That is, at least, true on the side of the Egyptian state which has been purposefully ignoring the positive gestures and statements of the Turkish leadership, regarding rapprochement.  

In complete contrast, the commercial trading between Turkey and Egypt is steadily expanding. This year marked unprecedented increase of 32.6% in the volume of trade between the two countries, compared to last year, according to the estimates of the Egyptian Chamber of Commerce. The exchanged products range from manufactured clothes and furniture to strategic products like natural gas and mineral oils. Since the last quarter of 2021, Turkey started to receive, for the first time, cargos of liquified natural gas (LNG) from Egypt’s Idku and Demietta offshore plants in the eastern Mediterranean. 

The geographic proximity between the two countries made the transfer of liquified gas a breath, in terms of speed and shipping costs. That should encourage the two countries to seriously consider colliding forces to combat the global energy crisis. Turkey is literally situated at the southern gates of Europe, and very close to the North African countries that produce massive amounts of oil and gas, such as Libya and Algeria. Also, Turkey represents the closest entry point for the liquified natural gas coming out of natural plants to be exported to Europe. If the two countries agree to work together in that regard, they will not only solve the global energy crises, but will dramatically lift their struggling economies.

According to latest statistics by the Egyptian government, during the first quarter of 2022, Egyptian exports to Turkey grew by 178.9% (960.6 million dollars) from 537.1 million dollars at the beginning of 2021 to 1.4 billion dollars, at the beginning of this year. In comparison, the volume of Turkey’s exports to Egypt increased from 3.31 billion dollars in 2020 to 3.94 billion dollars in the first quarter of 2022. Over the past 25 years, Egypt’s exports to Turkey have been steadily increasing by 9.63% each year, compared to 10.2% of annual increase in Turkey’s exports to Egypt.

The trade balance between the two Mediterranean neighbors is clearly favoring Turkey. Yet, the comparative advantage of natural gas production in Egypt makes Turkey equally tied. Moreover, the accumulating economic burdens of the global pandemic and the war in eastern Europe, created a situation where the two countries, whether they like it or not, has grown economically dependent on each other. 

Last week, a delegation of Turkish businessmen visited Egypt to meet with their Egyptian counterparts and discuss means of increasing their investments. Roughly, there are more than 350 Turkish companies and factories operating on the Egyptian land in various sectors; ranging from tailoring and manufacturing household machines to tourism, information technology, agriculture, and providing services.

The scene of depreciating currencies and spiking inflation rates, in Egypt and Turkey, is not entirely gloomy. There is a bright side to this picture represented by the expansion of the two countries’ abilities to increase their exports to Europe, Asia, and Africa. For this to happen, they have to effectively use the advantages of their geostrategic locations at the center of the three continents. For this to happen, the economic will of Turkish and Egyptian businessmen is not enough. The political will of the two states’ leaderships has to be involved. 

In that sense, should we optimistic that the growing interdependency between Turkey and Egypt can actually put an end to the political standoff between the two powerful neighbors of the eastern Mediterranean? Let’s hope for the best. 

The Untold Intentions of Arab Leaders Meeting in Alamein

Much confusion and controversy have been surrounding the meeting of a number of Arab leaders, in Egypt’s Mediterranean city of Alamein, last week. Although this is not the first gathering of leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), most observers found difficulty in explaining its motives. The lack of a joint concluding statement, the vagueness of the agenda items, and the generalizing language of the official media statements of each state, about the meeting, amplified the mystery. However, a deeper look with an expert eye can give a clue about the untold intentions of this specific assembly by these particular leaders. 

The New Alamein, the city that hosted the meeting of the five Arab leaders on August 23rd, is slowly but surely becoming Egypt’s summer Capital City. Earlier this month, New Alamein hosted the swearing in of new ministers by the Egyptian president. In parallel to their traditional offices in Cairo, all senior officials in Egypt, starting from the president of the state and the ministerial cabinet, have got parallel offices in New Alamein. That is perhaps why it was selected as the venue for the Arab leaders’ meeting, rather than the traditional meeting spots in Cairo or even the Red Sea city of Sharm Elsheikh. 

The United Arab Emirates is the largest foreign investor in real-estate projects at the New Alamein city, which the Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, started building in 2018. In the past few years, the city has been marketed to investors as being the new version of Dubai on the shores of the Mediterranean. That prompted some Arab opposition media to claim that it is the choice of the UAE president, Mohammed Bin Zayed, to host the meeting there. This claim is supported by the fact that Bin Zayed arrived to the summit venue, two days earlier, and joined El-Sisi in receiving and welcoming the other three leaders. The protocol-defying scene made the situation appear as an event hosted by the UAE president – rather than the Egyptian president.

In this regard, it is important to notice that this is the first time Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed participates in a regional summit in his capacity as the new UAE president. By leading this consultative meeting, Bin Zayed emphasized his country’s influential role in the region that extends beyond the Gulf towards Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. After the meeting, UAE president tweeted that he found the meeting “productive” and pledged that his country will “continue to coordinate with its Arab neighbors to promote stability, development and prosperity in the region.” Before he takes presidency, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed has always been an active participant in the economic talks between Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, in the past years. The three countries have been working together on two ambitious projects – the New Levant trading road, and the electric connection project that is meant to supply Egyptian electricity surplus to Iraq via Jordan. 

Although the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, had to quit the meeting before it even starts, to deal with an emergency political turmoil in Baghdad, his participation gave an assuring message that his country’s joint projects with Egypt and Jordan are still on course. The same perspective could be applied to the goals of the leaders of Jordan and Egypt from Alamein meeting. The presence of the wealthy Gulf countries of UAE and Bahrain in this meeting is an assuring message to the Egyptian and the Jordanian people that the Gulf countries will continue to support their states’ leaderships throughout the grinding economic crisis. UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have already provided tens of billions of dollars, in the past few months, to enhance the Egyptian economy.

The absence of Saudi Arabia from attending the meeting in Alamein has surprisingly raised question marks in western media. That is, perhaps, because Arab media initially described the gathering as an “Arab Summit,” while the official statements of the participating states described it as a “brotherly consultative meeting, aiming to enhance joint Arab action.” In fact, this is not the first time the five Arab leaders of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, UAE, and Bahrain hold a meeting without including Saudi Arabia. That was the case when the mentioned leaders met in the spring of 2021 to launch the New Levant trade road, and once again in May of this year to announce the Industrial Partnership Initiative between Egypt, Jordan, UAE, and Bahrain. 

Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia is a genuine partner to all the mentioned five countries on a myriad of political initiatives and economic projects that have changed the face of the Middle East in the past decade. A few kilometers away from Alamein meeting, at Egypt’s Mohamed Naguib military base, the special forces personnel from Saudi Arabia’s army were participating in the joint military exercise, “Hercules 2022,” alongside troops from Egypt, UAE, Greece, Cyprus, and the United States.

Given the many uncertainties that are defining the world we are living in today, regional coordination between Arab leaders, on all levels, is more important than ever.  

الدوافع غير المعلنة لاجتماع قيادات عربية في العملين

أثيرت حالة من الارتباك والجدل حول اجتماع عدد من القادة العرب في مدينة العلمين المصرية الأسبوع الماضي. على الرغم من أن هذه ليست المرة الأولى التي يجتمع فيها زعماء مصر والأردن والعراق والبحرين والإمارات، إلا أن أغلب المراقبين قد وجدوا صعوبة في شرح دوافع هذا اللقاء. وقد ضاعف الأمر غموضاً عدم إصدار بيان ختامي مشترك في نهاية القمة، وغياب قائمة واضحة ببنود جدول الأعمال والموضوعات التي تم مناقشتها، والتي تُركَت جميعاً لتكهنات الصحفيين، فضلاً على لغة التعميم في التصريحات الإعلامية الرسمية التي صدرت عن كل من الدول المشاركة في الاجتماع. رغم ذلك، فإن إلقاء نظرة أعمق بعيون خبيرة يمكن أن يساعدنا على فهم الدوافع غير المعلنة لهذا الاجتماع الهام، في هذا التوقيت.

تعد مدينة العلمين الجديدة، التي استضافت اجتماع القادة العرب الخمسة في ٢٣ أغسطس، هي العاصمة الصيفية لمصر. في وقت سابق من هذا الشهر، استضافت العلمين الجديدة مراسم تنصيب الوزراء الجدد من قبل رئيس الجمهورية. تقريباً جميع كبار المسؤولين في مصر، بدءًا من رئيس الدولة ومجلس الوزراء، أصبح لديهم مكاتب في العلمين الجديدة، بالتوازي مع مكاتبهم التقليدية في القاهرة. ربما لهذا السبب تم اختيارها لعقد اجتماع القادة العرب الأخير، بدلاً من أماكن الاجتماع التقليدية في القاهرة أو حتى مدينة شرم الشيخ المطلة على البحر الأحمر.

تعتبر الإمارات هي أكبر مستثمر أجنبي في المشاريع العقارية بمدينة العلمين الجديدة، والتي بدأ الرئيس المصري، عبد الفتاح السيسي، في تشيدها على مساحات شاسعة من الصحراء، في عام ٢٠١٨، وقد تم تسويق المدينة للمستثمرين على أنها النسخة الجديدة من مدينة دبي الإماراتية على شواطئ البحر المتوسط. دفع ذلك بعض وسائل الإعلام العربية المعارضة إلى الادعاء بأن رئيس الإمارات، محمد بن زايد، هو من اختار العملين الجديدة لاستضافة اجتماع الخماسي العربي. يدعم هذا الادعاء حقيقة أن بن زايد وصل إلى مكان انعقاد القمة قبل يومين من موعدها، ثم انضم إلى السيسي في استقبال القادة الثلاثة الآخرين والترحيب بهم. المشهد الذي يتناقض مع البروتوكول المتوقع في مثل هذه الاجتماعات، جعل الوضع يبدو كحدث استضافه رئيس الإمارات - وليس الرئيس المصري.

في هذا الصدد، من المهم أن نلاحظ أن هذه هي المرة الأولى التي يشارك فيها الشيخ محمد بن زايد في قمة إقليمية بصفته رئيس دولة الإمارات الجديد، حيث أكد بن زايد من خلال مشاركته في هذا الاجتماع التشاوري دور بلاده المؤثر في المنطقة الذي يمتد إلى ما وراء الخليج باتجاه مصر والأردن والعراق. بعد الاجتماع، غرد رئيس الإمارات بأنه وجد الاجتماع "مثمرًا" وتعهد بأن بلاده "ستواصل التنسيق مع الأشقاء العرب لتعزيز الاستقرار والتنمية والازدهار في المنطقة". قبل توليه الرئاسة، كان الشيخ محمد بن زايد دائمًا مشاركًا نشطًا في المحادثات الاقتصادية بين مصر والأردن والعراق، في السنوات الماضية، حيث تعمل الدول الثلاث معًا على مشروعين طموحين، هما: طريق الشام الجديد، وهو عبارة عن طريق ربط تجاري بين شمال أفريقيا ومنطقتي الشام والخليج، ومشروع الربط الكهربائي الذي يهدف إلى إمداد العراق بفائض الكهرباء المصري عبر شبكات تمتد داخل الأردن.

رغم أن رئيس الوزراء العراقي، مصطفى الكاظمي، اضطر إلى ترك الاجتماع حتى قبل أن يبدأ، للتعامل مع الاضطرابات السياسية الطارئة في بغداد، إلا أن مشاركته أعطت رسالة مطمئنة للشارع العراقي والعربي بأن مشاريع بلاده المشتركة مع مصر والأردن لا تزال قائمة وجادة رغم كل التوترات السياسية الداخلية التي يمر بها العراق. من نفس المنظور، كانت أهداف قادة الأردن ومصر من لقاء العلمين، إذ يشكل حضور دول الخليج الثرية، الإمارات والبحرين، في هذا الاجتماع يحمل رسالة مطمئنة للشعبين المصري والأردني بأن دول الخليج ستستمر في دعم قيادات دولهما لعبور الأزمة الاقتصادية الطاحنة حالياً. جدير بالذكر أن الإمارات والبحرين والسعودية وقطر قد قدموا بالفعل عشرات المليارات من الدولارات، في الأشهر القليلة الماضية، لتعزيز الاقتصاد المصري.

أثار غياب السعودية عن حضور الاجتماع في العلمين بشكل مفاجئ علامات استفهام في وسائل الإعلام الغربية. وربما يرجع ذلك إلى أن وسائل الإعلام العربية وصفت اللقاء في البداية بأنه "قمة عربية"، مما يجعل غياب دولة عربية قائدة مثل السعودية مدعى للاستغراب، لكن البيانات الرسمية الصادرة عن الخمس دول المشاركة اكتفت بوصفه "لقاء تشاوري أخوي يهدف إلى تعزيز العمل العربي المشترك". في الحقيقة، هذه ليست المرة الأولى التي يعقد فيها القادة العرب الخمسة اجتماعاً دون مشاركة السعودية. كان هذا هو الحال، مثلاً، عندما اجتمع القادة المذكورين في ربيع عام ٢٠٢١ لمناقشة مشروع طريق الشام الجديد، ومرة أخرى في شهر مايو من العام الجاري للإعلان عن مبادرة الشراكة الصناعية بين مصر والأردن والإمارات والبحرين.

فوق كل ذلك، لا يمكن لأحد أن يتجاهل حقيقة أن المملكة العربية السعودية شريك أصيل للدول الخمس المذكورة في عدد لا يحصى من المبادرات السياسية والمشاريع الاقتصادية، التي كان لها الفضل في تغيير وجه الشرق الأوسط في العقد الماضي. على بعد كيلومترات قليلة من اللقاء الخماسي في العملين، تحديداً في قاعدة محمد نجيب العسكرية في شمال غرب مصر، كان أفراد القوات الخاصة من الجيش السعودي يشاركون في التمرين العسكري المشترك "هرقل ٢٠٢٢" إلى جانب القوات المسلحة المصرية والإماراتية واليونانية والقبرصية والأمريكية. 

نظرًا لحالة عدم اليقين التي يعيشها عالمنا اليوم، والتي لا يعرف أحد متى ستنتهي، فإن التنسيق الإقليمي بين القادة العرب، على جميع المستويات، أصبح أكثر أهمية من أي وقت مضى.

Stronger Turkey Challenging Status Quo in Mediterranean

Turkey is hopping back into the serene waters of the Mediterranean, ambitiously looking for natural gas resources that it can extract to cover its enormous demand for energy. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and senior officials from his government, including the Minister of Defense, Hulusi Akar, saw off the Abdul Hamid Han drilling vessel on August 9th as it started a research mission that will last for three months in an area of 55 sq. km (about 34 sq. miles) off the shores of Antalya.

The Abdul Hamid Han, which will navigate the area extending from Turkey’s continental shelf down halfway into the area claimed by Cyprus as its own maritime zone, is a state-of-art hydrocarbon research vessel. It is equipped with a team of 200 engineers and the most advanced tools of seismic research and drilling machines that can go as deep as 12 thousand kilometers under the seabed. Yet, it is quite unlikely that the vessel can find something worthy of celebration before the deadline of its mission on October 4th. That is perhaps why President Erdogan said that the mission could be renewed in the same area or transferred to another spot in the sea after that date. 

“The survey and drilling work we are conducting in the Mediterranean are within our sovereign territory. We do not need to receive permission or consent from anyone for this,” Erdogan said at the Abdul Hamid Han launching ceremony. “Neither the puppets nor the ones who hold their strings will be able to prevent us from getting our rights in the Mediterranean,” he added.

Erdogan’s statements were received by concern in Greece and Cyprus, who fear the renewal of their military tensions with Turkey that had turned the quiet basin of the Mediterranean into a warlike zone in the summer of 2020.   

THE ECONOMIC BURDEN

To a great extent, the geological characteristics of the gulf of Antalya are similar to the areas where fossil fuels have been discovered in the waters of the southern Mediterranean and the Levantine basins, according to hydrocarbon engineers who were boarded on the Fatih mission in this area, three years ago. Turkey hopes to discover a reserve as big as the natural gas reserve that Egypt found at Zohr gas field in 2014. President Erdogan and his team assume that the gas to be extracted from the southern waters of Turkey could cover the energy needs of Turkey and its European neighbors, reiterating his ambition to turn Turkey into a hub for energy trade between Asia, Africa, and Europe.

The total cost of Turkey’s annual gas consumption is rapidly exceeding 55 billion dollars that are paid to exporters from the Middle East, Eurasia, and Russia, per long-term contracts that usually extend up to 25 years. Turkey’s average annual consumption of natural gas is between 47 to 50 billion cubic meters. That is a huge amount if compared to Turkey’s geographic size and population. However, Turkey depends on natural gas as a sole source of energy for a myriad of purposes, ranging from household heating and cooking, up to generating electricity and operating industrial facilities. In January, Turkey's daily natural gas consumption hit a record high of 280 million cubic meters, according to a report by the Turkish Ministry of Energy which had justified the increase as resulting from the forced lockdown during the early attack of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Rough estimates indicate that Turkey’s gas demand could increase to a record 60 billion cubic meters by the end of 2022.

This huge gas bill has always been a horrendous burden on the already struggling Turkish economy. The inflation rate in Turkey spiked to 79% in July, with no indication of a decline or any future cool down. The global energy and food crises, resulting from the ongoing war in Eastern Europe, are to be partly blamed for the economic crisis in Turkey and many other countries. However, the use of unorthodox monetary policies on which the Turkish state has been insisting, despite their proven failure, is the main reason for the outlandish depreciation of the Turkish Lira. Turkey had not been able to renew gas import contracts with Iran and Azerbaijan after they expired last autumn.

Turkey offered to partially pay for Russian gas imports in rubles, as part of several economic and political deals that the Turkish President and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, discussed at their summit, which was held in the Black Sea city of Sochi on August 5th. Russia covers 24% of Turkey’s imports of oil, and 45% of total gas imports. There is a network of pipelines that pours gas into the mainland of Turkey, and from there to Europe. The most famous of these is the TurkStream pipeline. In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February, the Europeans decided to halt gas imports from Russia, and thus supplies passing from Russia to Europe through the pipelines in the Baltic Sea had been stopped. The only pipeline that is still open up until this moment is the TurkStream. Apparently, Putin told his Turkish counterpart that “Europe should be grateful to Turkey for keeping the Russian gas supplies uninterrupted.”

THE GEOPOLITICAL OBSTRUCTION

Given the escalating strategic complications at the Black Sea and Eurasia fronts, Turkey – and the entire world – is now looking at the hydrocarbon wealth of the eastern Mediterranean as an alternative resource for natural gas imports. The geographic closeness of the eastern Mediterranean to Europe is a comparative advantage that promises profitable revenues to the countries of the region. In June, the European Union already signed a trilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Egypt and Israel for the exportation of liquefied natural gas to European countries. Italy, France, and even Qatar, which is the biggest gas exporter among all Arab countries, have started to pour generous investments into Egypt’s gas fields and plants, due to their strong potential.

Turkey, despite being the country with the longest border (1870 km) on the Mediterranean, cannot benefit from this lucrative opportunity because of the Lausanne Agreement that was signed in 1922 during the fog of war. The unfair agreement protected Turkey’s sovereignty on its land against the aggression of world superpowers at that time. Yet, it also stripped Turkey of almost all its maritime rights in the Mediterranean in favor of Greece and Cyprus. 

According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles (370 km) may be claimed by coastal countries. In case the distance between the shores of two neighbor countries is less than this space, then the maritime demarcation between them should be drawn exactly at the half-line distance. However, this is not the case for Turkey, which is literally cuffed to its own shores, either on the southern area towards Cyprus or the southwest zone towards Greece, because Lausanne Agreement gave all the small islands in the Aegean and Mediterranean to Greece. 

In a recent talk at the Conference of Ambassadors, in Ankara, the Turkish Minister of Defense, Hulusi Akar, who showed hell to Greece, in the Mediterranean, in 2020, made a joke about this weird situation. “Kastellorizo island is 600 kilometers away from Greece main land, while it is only 1950 meters (6938 feet) away from Turkey. A cadet at the military academy can swim to there.”

At least since early 2000s, Turkey has been trying to change the reality imposed by the Lausanne Agreement, sometimes by diplomatic negotiations with Greece, and other times through employing military provocations. Up to this day, 63 rounds of negotiations have been held between the two countries, and infinite number of meetings between senior military commanders and diplomats, but all ended in vain.

Even when Turkey tried to claim its rights in the Mediterranean by signing a maritime agreement with the transitional government in Libya in 2019, the situation backfired by prompting Greece to sign an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) agreement with Egypt in August 2020 that intersected with the demarcations sketched in the Turkey-Libya agreement. Then, one month after that, the East Med Gas Forum, which was formed by Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel in January 2020, was turned into a regional organization, purposefully excluding Turkey, and further frustrating its ambitions to benefit from the mineral fortunes of the Mediterranean.

THE SOUTH AXIS

Apparently, Egypt’s alliance with Greece was the alarm that opened Turkey’s eyes to the fact that it cannot succeed in the Mediterranean if political tensions with the main countries in the Middle East remained unresolved. Thus, in early 2021, Turkey started a diplomatic campaign to reconcile with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In a relatively short time, the diplomatic efforts started to bear fruit, in favor of Turkey’s interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

In spite of the EEZ agreements between Egypt and Turkey’s opponents Greece and Cyprus, Egypt has always been careful not to trespass into the areas which Turkey identifies as sovereign in the Mediterranean. In early March 2021, the Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum unexpectedly published an updated map of Egypt’s gas exploration activities in eastern Mediterranean. The new map reassigned the position of Egypt’s bid block “EGYMED-W18” so that it stops at point “meridian-28,” which Turkey identifies as a sovereign maritime zone, and labels it as the boundary line of the Turkish continental shelf.

Turkey’s Defense Minister, Hulusi Akar, immediately welcomed Egypt’s move. “Egypt’s respect for our continental shelf is important. We have many historical and cultural values in common with Egypt. The activation of these values could make a difference in relations in the coming days,” said Hulusi Akar, who also hinted that a maritime agreement between Turkey and Egypt could be created in the near future. Later that year, Egypt started to ship cargos of liquified natural gas to Turkey from its plants offshore the Delta province to cover its needs after the expiry of Turkey’s contracts with Asian exporters. 

NEW GEOPOLITICAL BALANCE

When Turkey deployed the seismic research vessel “Oruc Reis” to explore seabed resources in the eastern Mediterranean in August 2020, it basically wanted to make a statement against the members of East Med Gas Forum. The complicated geopolitics of the eastern Mediterranean, the historical dispute between Turkey and Greece over maritime zones, and the heated political and diplomatic tensions between almost all the countries in that region stirred up a conflict that quickly turned the quiet basin into a warlike zone, attracting military interventions by rivals in the Middle East and Europe under the guise of convening joint naval exercises. Eventually, Turkey had to withdraw its research and military ships in December of that year, when it was confirmed that Joe Biden was elected as the new U.S. president.

After a two year hiatus, Turkey decided to quietly return to pursuing its rights lost in the Mediterranean. However, this time, the recent geopolitical balance in this region had apparently altered the situation in the Mediterranean in favor of Turkey. Turkey has been able to fix its relationship with Arab Gulf countries, to balance their growing relationships with other Mediterranean countries. The East Med Gas Forum has been idle for more than a year, proving Turkey’s point that no such organization can succeed if it excludes a key Mediterranean country like Turkey. Israel and Egypt, two key members of the East Med organization, are reviving their economic ties with Turkey. Likewise, the Mediterranean gas pipeline and electricity network projects that were initiated by Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, have been thwarted since last year when the United States announced them to be economically unfeasible.

Meanwhile, Turkey has been playing a tremendous role on the economic, diplomatic, and military levels, in mitigating the influence of the war in Eastern Europe on the rest of the world. Turkey has mediated talks between the Russians and Ukrainians, safeguarded the Black Sea against the consequences of the ongoing war, and is now leading an impressive effort to keep the cargos of wheat traveling from Ukraine to other countries. That is an effort that will greatly contribute to rescuing many countries in the world from famine or total economic collapse.

Turkey’s strategic importance has been steadily growing, especially since the withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan and the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Turkey is the only country, worldwide, that can keep a perfect balance between the competing alliances that it deals with, extending from the United States and Europe, NATO, Russia, Eurasia, to the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Turkey has become a key strategic player that none of these power coalitions can do without. That could further strengthen Turkey’s position in the near future regarding its struggle for economic rights in the eastern Mediterranean, and thus enable the current Turkish leadership to reverse the disadvantageous reality that it had to accept at a moment of feebleness, a century ago.

Motives and Implications of Egypt’s Urgent Cabinet Reshuffle

Observers of Egypt are having difficult time understanding the motives behind the unforeseen cabinet reshuffle, that forced the members of parliament to cut their annual vacation to pass, in an emergency session on Saturday. A deeper look at the number of removed ministers, and the backgrounds of the new holders of their portfolios, could fairly explain the urgency of refreshing the government with some new faces.

Egyptians learnt about the cabinet reshuffle from a post by the Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, on his Facebook page, where he noted that he summoned the lower house of parliament to urgently convene to “discuss amending a number of ministerial portfolios that has been replaced in consultation with the Prime Minister.” El-Sisi explained that the purpose of the change is to improve the performance of the government, and thus “protect state’s interests and competence in face of internal and external issues.” 

The government of Prime Minister, Moustafa Madbouly, seems to be efficiently working with a steady rhythm, despite the obvious struggle to keep the boat afloat amidst the wind of the international economic crisis. The government of 33 ministers is dealing with a myriad of local, regional, and global crises that are simultaneously threatening Egypt’s national security and political stability. They range from the global food and energy crises that nobody can tell when they are going to end, up to the Nile River conflict with Ethiopia, that is posing a serious threat to Egypt’s water security and geographic consistency. 

The generous backup support provided by the autonomous military-owned economic enterprises is keeping the street calm, while the civil government is focusing on pivoting the country out of these pressing crises. However, this inflexible mechanism of managing state economy cannot last for a long time. Sooner than later, the government is ought to secure stable and sustainable resources of income that enable the state to recover from the current crisis and harden its economic core against future punches by expected or unexpected domestic or foreign factors. 

A few months ago, the Prime Minister announced an ambitious plan of macroeconomic reform that will open the Egyptian market to private investors and startup entrepreneurs, in an unprecedented way. The government aims to secure a total of 40 billion dollar in investments over the coming four years, through this program. However, this process is going to take time and a lot of work until it bears fruit. Patiently waiting for the fruit seems like a luxury that the Egyptian state cannot afford, right now. 

The fastest, and perhaps the easiest, way for the Egyptian government to secure urgent money, at the time being, is to knock the doors of wealthy neighbors in the Arab Gulf region, and seeking a new loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Egyptian leadership followed a similar plan in 2016, which greatly contributed to getting Egypt out of a severe economic crisis at the time, and paved the way for the launch of many major national projects that the Egyptian leadership is now proud of. Egypt’s current fundraising campaign has been successful on the regional level, but relatively slow on the international level. 

Over the past three months, Egypt has been aggressively signing investment agreements and memoranda with Arab Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain have pledged to pour tens of billions of dollars in short-term and medium-term investments that is believed to assure the Egyptian market, throughout the crisis. They have, also, credited generous deposits, in billions of dollars, at the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), in order to enhance the foreign currency reserves and prevent the Egyptian pound from drastically collapsing against the dollar.

Nevertheless, the IMF is still giving Egypt a hard time by lingering the negotiations on a new loan, that mainly targets mitigating the consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war on the Egyptian economy. According to the Egyptian Minister of Finance, who was not touched by the recent cabinet reshuffle, there is a conflict of visions between the IMF and the Egyptian government regarding the pace and methodology of the prerequisite reforms. The IMF board, in late July, released a country assessment on Egypt that clearly asked the Egyptian government to take “decisive progress on deeper structural reforms that are needed to boost the economy’s competitiveness, improve governance, and strengthen its resilience against shocks.” The IMF is tying the release of the loan, which will be the third loan given to Egypt in the past six years, with accomplishing all of these reforms, as soon as possible. 

That explains why Egypt had to conduct this urgent cabinet reshuffle that interchanged 40% (13 ministers) of Madbouly’s team, especially if we zoom in on the changes that happened – or did not – at the ministries with economic portfolios. The ministers of finance and planning remained in their positions, despite their obvious pitfalls. However, both of them are playing crucial roles in managing the ongoing talks with Gulf neighbors and the IMF regarding future financial aids and loans. Their removal, at this critical time, could have done more harm than good, by risking the loss of these important lenders and helpers, while having to restart the negotiations with new unfamiliar faces. 

Meanwhile, the three economic portfolio keepers that got changed are from the ministries that the IMF is most concerned about reforming their performance. They are: Ministry of Public Enterprises, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Military Production. Bringing fresh faces of technocrats, who have a strong economic expertise and mostly free from political biases, to lead these three ministries is an out loud message to the IMF that Egypt is keen on pursuing with structural and economic reforms as required.

It was also surprising to see that the Minister of Tourism was replaced by a prominent banker, who holds an executive position at one of the most successful private banks in Egypt, the Commercial International Bank of Egypt (CIB). Last month, the UAE paid 20 billion dollars for the acquisition of stakes in some successful Egyptian financial institutions, including the CIB. 

The other changes were either minor or expected. By minor I mean that the assistant or advisor of the removed minister was upgraded to become the new minister, implying no big changes in policy to be expected. For example, that was the case in the ministries of education, irrigation, culture, and municipal development. Meanwhile, the changes that affected the ministries of health and immigration have already been expected, as the two former ministers have been idle for months due to personal complications that affected their productivity and reputation.

Long story short, this urgent cabinet reshuffle was essential to accelerate the negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and thus help the Egyptian government navigate its way out of the current crises. Yet, we have to wait and see if the new ministers, especially those holding economic portfolios, can actually succeed in this mission. 

دوافع وانعكاسات التعديل الوزاري المفاجئ في مصر

يواجه مراقبو مصر صعوبة في فهم الدوافع وراء التعديل الوزاري المفاجئ، الذي أجبر أعضاء البرلمان على قطع عطلتهم السنوية للموافقة عليه في جلسة طارئة مطلع هذا الأسبوع. لكن ربما إلقاء نظرة أعمق على عدد الوزراء الذين تم استبدالهم، وخبرات حاملي الحقائب الوزارية الجدد، يمكن أن يفسر بشكل كبير الاسباب الملّحة التي دفعت الدولة المصرية للتعجيل بتحديث الحكومة ببعض الوجوه الجديدة على الرأي العام، وإن كانوا في أغلبهم هم جزء من المنظومة السياسية القائمة. 

علم المصريون بالتعديل الوزاري من منشور للرئيس المصري، عبد الفتاح السيسي، على صفحته في منصة فيسبوك، حيث كتب أنه استدعى مجلس النواب للانعقاد بشكل عاجل "لمناقشة تعديل عدد من الحقائب الوزارية" بعد التشاور مع رئيس الوزراء. وأوضح السيسي أن الهدف من التغيير هو تحسين أداء الحكومة، وبالتالي "حماية مصالح الدولة وكفاءتها في مواجهة القضايا الداخلية والخارجية".

تعمل حكومة رئيس الوزراء، مصطفى مدبولي، بكفاءة ووتيرة مستقرة على الرغم من معاناتها الواضحة لإبقاء المركب طافياً وسط رياح الأزمة الاقتصادية العالمية. تتعامل الحكومة المؤلفة من ٣٣ وزيراً مع عدد لا يحصى من الأزمات المحلية والإقليمية والعالمية التي تهدد الأمن القومي والاستقرار السياسي في مصر، والتي وقعت كلها فوق رأس مصر في وقت واحد تقريباً، والتي تمتد من أزمات الغذاء والطاقة العالمية التي لا يعرف أحد على وجه اليقين متى ستنتهي، إلى أزمة سد النهضة التي تجسد أوج النزاع الدائر منذ سنوات مع أثيوبيا حول حقوق مصر المائية في نهر النيل، والتي تشكل بدورها تهديدًا خطيرًا للأمن المائي والنسق الجغرافي في مصر.

إلى حد ما، يلعب الدعم المقدم من المشروعات الاقتصادية المملوكة للجيش دوراً رئيسياً في الحفاظ على هدوء الشارع، بينما تركز الحكومة على إخراج البلد من هذه الأزمات الطاحنة. لكن رغم ذلك، فإن هذه الآلية غير المرنة لإدارة اقتصاد الدولة لا يمكن أن تستمر لفترة طويلة. عاجلاً وليس آجلاً، يتعين على الحكومة تأمين موارد دخل ثابتة ومستدامة تمكن الدولة من التعافي من الأزمة الحالية ثم تقوية عظامها الاقتصادية في مواجهة اللكمات المستقبلية التي قد تحدث لأسباب متوقعة أو غير متوقعة بفعل عوامل محلية أو عالمية.

قبل بضعة أشهر، أعلن رئيس الوزراء عن خطة طموحة لإصلاح الاقتصاد من شأنها أن تفتح السوق المصري أمام المستثمرين من القطاع الخاص وأصحاب المشروعات الناشئة، بطريقة غير مسبوقة. وتستهدف الحكومة من خلال هذا البرنامج تأمين ما مجموعه ٤٠ مليار دولار من الاستثمارات، يتم ضخها في السوق المصري بانتظام على مدار السنوات الأربع القادمة. لكن، بالطبع، ستستغرق هذه العملية وقتًا طويلاً ومجهودًا كبيرًا حتى تؤتي ثمارها، في الوقت الذي لا تملك فيه الدولة المصرية رفاهية الصبر على انتظار قطاف هذه الثمار. 

من ثم، تكون الوسيلة الأسرع، وربما الأسهل، بالنسبة للحكومة المصرية لتأمين ما تحتاجه من أموال بصورة عاجلة، في الوقت الحالي، هي طرق أبواب جيرانها الأثرياء في منطقة الخليج العربي، بالتوازي مع السعي للحصول على قرض جديد من صندوق النقد الدولي. لقد قامت مصر باتباع خطة مماثلة، عام ٢٠١٦، مما ساهم بشكل كبير في إخراج مصر من أزمة اقتصادية طاحنة وقتها، ومهدت الطريق لإطلاق العديد من المشروعات القومية الكبرى التي تتيه القيادة المصرية فخراً بها الآن. حالياً، نجحت حملة مصر لتأمين أموال عاجلة على المستوى الإقليمي فقط، في حين تعاني من بطء نسبي على المستوى الدولي. 

خلال الأشهر الثلاثة الماضية، نجحت مصر في توقيع عدد من الاتفاقيات ومذكرات التفاهم مع دول الخليج العربي بشأن استثمارات ضخمة في السوق المصري، حيث تعهدت السعودية، وقطر، والإمارات، والبحرين بضخ عشرات المليارات من الدولارات في استثمارات قصيرة ومتوسطة الأجل بهدف تأمين السوق المصرية طوال فترة الأزمة، كما قاموا بوضع ودائع سخية تقدر بمليارات الدولارات لدى البنك المركزي المصري لتعزيز احتياطيات النقد الأجنبي ومنع انهيار الجنيه أمام الدولار.

لكن في المقابل، لا يزال صندوق النقد الدولي يضغط على مصر في المفاوضات المتعلقة بحصولها على قرض جديد بغرض تخفيف آثار الحرب بين روسيا وأوكرانيا على الاقتصاد المصري. بحسب وزير المالية المصري، الذي لم يتم تغييره ضمن التعديل الوزاري الأخير، هناك تضارب في الرؤى بين صندوق النقد الدولي والحكومة المصرية بشأن وتيرة ومنهجية الإصلاحات الهيكلية والمالية المطلوبة. أصدر المجلس التنفيذي في صندوق النقد الدولي، في أواخر شهر يوليو، تقرير تقييمي بشأن أداء الدولة المصرية مع القروض السابقة، وطلب فيه بوضوح من الحكومة المصرية احراز "تقدم حاسم في الإصلاحات الهيكلية العميقة اللازمة لتعزيز القدرة التنافسية للاقتصاد، وتحسين الحوكمة، وتعزيز مرونة الاقتصاد ضد الصدمات". يربط صندوق النقد الدولي الإفراج عن القرض لصالح مصر، والذي سيكون القرض الثالث الممنوح لمصر في السنوات الست الماضية، بإنجاز كل هذه الإصلاحات في أسرع وقت ممكن.

وهذا يفسر سبب اضطرار القيادة المصرية لإجراء هذا التعديل الوزاري العاجل الذي استبدل ٤٠٪ (١٣ وزيرًا) من حكومة مدبولي، وربما يتضح الأمر أكثر لو نظرنا بشكل أعمق على التغييرات التي حدثت - أو لم تحدث - في الوزارات ذات الحقائب الاقتصادية. أولاً، فقد بقي وزيرا المالية والتخطيط في مناصبهما، رغم اخطائهم الواضحة، سيما وزير المالية، في الفترة الماضية. لكن يبدو أن القيادة السياسية قد فضلت الإبقاء عليهما نظراً للدور المحوري الذي يقوم به كل منهما في إدارة المحادثات والتواصل مع الممولين والمقرضين الأجانب، سواء كانوا من دول الخليج أو من صندوق النقد الدولي أو غيرها، وبالتالي قد يتسبب استبدالهم في التأثير على مجرى هذه المفاوضات أو يعطي انطباعاً سلبياً لدى الممولين الحاليين أو المستهدفين، أو على أقل تقدير المخاطرة بإعادة بدأ المحادثات ككل من جديد بواسطة وزير جديد لم يكن مرتبطاً بالملف طيلة السنوات الماضية.

في الوقت نفسه، تم تغيير ثلاثة من وزراء المجموعة الاقتصادية، وهم الوزارات التي يهتم صندوق النقد الدولي بإحداث إصلاحات فيهم بشكل خاص، وهم: وزارة قطاع الأعمال العام، وزارة التجارة والصناعة، وزارة الإنتاج الحربي. إن جلب وجوه جديدة من التكنوقراط، الذين يتمتعون بخبرة اقتصادية قوية وليس لديهم تحيزات سياسية حادة، لقيادة هذه الوزارات الثلاث هو رسالة موجهة لصندوق النقد الدولي مفادها أن مصر حريصة على متابعة الإصلاحات الهيكلية والاقتصادية على النحو المطلوب.

كما كان من الغريب والمحير أيضاً، تعيين خبير مصرفي كبير في منصب وزير السياحة فقد كان وزير السياحة الجديد يشغل منصبًا تنفيذيًا في أحد أكثر البنوك الخاصة نجاحًا في مصر، وهو البنك التجاري الدولي المصري (CIB). جدير بالذكر أن البنك التجاري الدولي كان أحد أبرز المؤسسات التي اختارها صندوق أبو ظبي السيادي للاستثمار فيها، ضمن عدد أخر من المؤسسات المالية المصرية، في صفقة الـ ٢٠ مليار دولار التي أبرمتها الإمارات مع مصر قبل شهرين. 

أما التغييرات التي تمت على الوزارات الأخرى، من خارج الحقائب الاقتصادية، فقد كانت إلى حد ما ثانوية أو سهل توقعها. أعني بوصفها ثانوية أنه بالكاد تم ترقية مساعد أو مستشار الوزير المُقال ليصبح وزيراً جديداً، مما يعني أنه لا يُتوقع حدوث تغييرات كبيرة في السياسة التي تنتهجها هذه الوزارات في المستقبل بالمقارنة بالسنوات السابقة، وقد حدث ذلك في وزارات التعليم والري والثقافة والتنمية المحلية. في حين كان من المتوقع بالفعل أن يتم تغيير وزراء الصحة والهجرة نظراً لتعطلهما عن العمل في الأشهر الماضية بسبب تعقيدات شخصية نالت إلى حد كبير من سمعتهما وإنتاجيتهما.

باختصار، كان هذا التعديل الوزاري العاجل ضروريًا لتسريع المفاوضات مع صندوق النقد الدولي وبالتالي مساعدة الحكومة المصرية على الخروج من الأزمات الحالية. مع ذلك، علينا أن ننتظر ونرى ما إذا كان الوزراء الجدد، خاصةً أولئك الذين تولوا حقائب اقتصادية، يمكنهم أن ينجحوا في إعانة الدولة على تحقيق هذا الهدف الصعب. 

Municipal Governance Reform is Key to Prevent Another Church Fire

 

Negligence, randomness, and corruption can be more fatal than a terrorist attack. The horrific accident of the burning church in Giza, yesterday, is a painful reminder on this fact. How to prevent another similar accident from killing innocent citizens, while practicing their normal routines, in worship houses, markets, or even in their homes, is the main question that the Egyptian state should work on figuring out, in the coming period.

Unfortunately, the fires caused by electric circuit interruptions and poorly maintained electric devices, that are installed at an ill-designed buildings with almost no means of protection against accidents, are not a rare occurrence in Egypt. A month can hardly pass without reading about an electric fire, caused by an air conditioner, an electric heater or even a worn-out electric wire, that had sparked a massive fire at a private home, a restaurant, a workshop, a worship house, or even a governmental bureau. 

Most of the time, the loss of lives and damage of properties, in these accidents, is magnified by the lack of proper tools of protection or the random location and flawed design of the affected building that delays or completely hinders firemen and security forces from access. Sadly, Abu Seifin Church, that has been mercilessly eaten by an electric fire, yesterday, is one living example on that. 

No terrorist attack on an Egyptian church has ever been able to cause a damage as big as the damage caused by the electric short circuit that set on fire Abu Seifin Church in Giza, yesterday. The most horrific terrorist attacks, in that category, are the terrorist bombings that targeted St. Peter’s Church (Al-Potrosiya) in Cairo in 2016 and All Saints Church (Al-Kidiseen) in Alexandria in 2011. The former killed 25 Coptic Christian citizens, while the latter killed a total of 21 people.  

In comparison, the electric fire at Abu Seifin Church has swept at least 41 lives, half of them are children at an age range of 3 to 16 years old. That is in addition to dozens of injuries and severe damages in the residential building that is incubating the church. According to security forces and eye witnesses, a high-voltage electric currency that ran through a low-quality wire after a brief interruption in electricity supply blazed fire at the church, while dozens of Coptic Christians, living in that neighborhood, were gathering to preform Sunday prayers. 

The floor where the church exists, which also includes a nursery room for pre-school children, is not equipped by proper tools to extinguish fire. Also, the building has no emergency exits for the people stuck inside to escape the fire. As a result, most of the deaths and injuries were caused by panic rush of the people who witnessed the fire. Most of the children died as a result of being suffocated by the heavy smoke that fill in their closed, poorly ventilated, nursery room. 

The logical question that should be roaming your mind, after knowing how the Abu Seifin church fire erupted, is how a warship house visited by hundreds of people every week, and is also operating a nursery, lacks these basic tools of protection against accidents. 

The honest answer is because the employees at municipal councils are not making their job. They are no breaking a sweat to at least ensure that important buildings in the area under their governance are capable of operating appropriately and are properly protected against life-threatening situations of emergency. 

Why the municipal councils are not doing their job? Because they are infected with deep-rooted corruption, and most of the leading employees at these councils have been keeping their seats for decades, with almost no accountability on their uncaring performance. Since president El-Sisi took power, in 2014, the state made several promises to reform the municipal council system of governance through running elections. Yet, this has never happened. 

The agony of losing dozens of innocent lives, including children, in a friction of second, is a sounding alert to the Egyptian state to start with the long-delayed program of reforming municipal councils. The deep-rooted corruption at the local governance system is, to a great extent, responsible for the Abu Seifin church fire and other accidents that hurt hundreds of citizens every year.

Is Turkiye changing policy in Libya?

The Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, received two prominent figures from the Libyan political elite; Abdullah Al-Lafi, the vice chair of the Presidential Council, and Aguila Saleh, the speaker of the Libyan parliament, last week. Given the current heated situation in Libya as a result of the conflict between the UN-recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) and the parliament-endorsed government of Bashagha, the meeting in Ankara is raising questions about the future of Turkiye’s policy in Libya.  

In particular, hosting Saleh, who is a loyal comrade of warlord Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) in Benghazi, raises the question whether Turkiye has decided to drop its full-fledged support to GNU in Tripoli and yield to the eastern politicians. On the flip side, it may entail a change in eastern politicians’ resistance to Turkiye’s political and military intervention as a compromise to gain political power over Libya. The true purpose of the meeting, however, seems to be different from all that.

Some observers assume that Turkiye is shifting support from the western to the eastern bloc in Libya, to match its recent diplomatic rapprochement efforts with Arab Gulf countries that back the Libyan eastern camp. The recent visit of the Turkish minister of defense, Hulusi Akar, to Abu Dhabi and meeting with United Arab Emirates (UAE) president, Mohammed Bin Zayed, strongly enhances this assumption. For years, Turkiye and UAE have been standing against each other in Libya and Syria. Their rivalry reached the point of publicly threatening each other with military punishment. However, after the meeting between Akar and Bin Zayed, in May, UAE started to show greater tolerance to Turkiye’s ‘Pence Kilit’ operations in northern Syria and Iraq. Apparently, Turkiye is paying back in Libya by showing greater tolerance towards the eastern politicians. 

However, it would be a mistake to assume that Turkiye’s reaching out to the Libyan eastern bloc necessarily means abandoning the GNU in Tripoli. Turkiye cannot do that, for many reasons. At the very least, it will be jeopardizing the reputation of the Turkish military as a trustworthy ally, which is the premise of all Turkiye’s military diplomacy moves in the geographies of Eurasia, Middle East, and the Mediterranean. The Turkish troops, sizing as big as 1500 Turkish personnel and thousands of mercenaries, are still operating on the ground in Tripoli. In June, the Turkish president submitted a mandate to his parliament to accept extending the mission of the Turkish troops in Libya for another eighteen months. 

The Turkish troops arrived in Tripoli, in December 2019, to protect the Tripoli-based government against the invasion of Haftar’s LNA. Since then, they have been providing the official Libyan armed forces, based in Tripoli, with advanced training and consultations, based on the military cooperation agreement signed in 2019. Right now, a number of cadets affiliated to the Libyan armed forces are completing their education in military colleges in Turkiye. In that sense, the abandoning of the Tripoli-based government makes Turkiye’s interests in Libya and the Mediterranean region prone to crashing. That is something Turkiye cannot afford.  

At the same time, the Libyan eastern bloc still receives political and military support from Russia. The Russia-affiliated mercenaries and military corporations are still operating alongside Haftar’s militia. Haftar, himself, still refers to Turkiye as an enemy and calls the Turkish troops in Tripoli as occupiers. The Libyan parliament, under the chairmanship of Aguila Saleh, who shook hands with Erdogan, in Ankara last week, still labels as annulled the maritime and military memoranda signed between Turkiye and the Tripoli-based government, three years ago.  

In that sense, it is clear that Turkiye is not changing its policy in Libya. In other words, Turkiye will not – and cannot – abandon the GNU, at this critical time of heated conflicts over power between the eastern and the western camps. However, by reaching out to the eastern leaders, Turkiye is trying to create a balance that guarantees the protection of its interests, especially maritime interests in the Mediterranean, in case the GNU cracks under the political and military pressures leveled by the eastern bloc. A few weeks ago, the militia affiliated to Bashagha attempted to invade into Tripoli by force to sit him as the head of a new government, risking the eruption of a new civil war. 

Turkiye’s refusal to the formation of a new government in Libya and lengthening the transitional phase was clearly stated by the Turkish president in his meeting with Saleh and Al-Lafi, in Ankara, last week. All parties agreed that proceeding with the trajectory of the political solution and holding the presidential and parliamentary elections in the nearest possible future is the only way out of Libya’s crisis. Yet, whether Saleh and his camp are sincerely willing to follow on their word is still a matter of doubt.

هل تغير تركيا سياستها في ليبيا؟

استقبل الرئيس التركي، رجب طيب أردوغان، شخصيتين بارزتين من الطبقة السياسية الليبية، الأسبوع الماضي، هما: عبد الله اللافي نائب رئيس المجلس الرئاسي، وعقيلة صالح رئيس مجلس النواب. نظرًا للوضع السياسي المشتعل حالياً في ليبيا نتيجة للصراع بين حكومة الوحدة الوطنية المعترف بها من قبل الأمم المتحدة وحكومة باشأغا التي عينها البرلمان قبل أربعة أشهر، يثير اجتماع أنقرة تساؤلات حول مستقبل تدخلات تركيا السياسية والعسكرية في ليبيا. 

بشكل خاص، إن استضافة صالح، وهو الرفيق المخلص للجنرال خليفة حفتر، قائد القوات العسكرية المسماه "الجيش الوطني الليبي" في بنغازي، يثير التساؤل عما إذا كانت تركيا قد قررت التوقف عن دعم حكومة الوحدة الوطنية في طرابلس، إذعاناً لرغبة الساسة الشرقيون، والقوى الأجنبية التي تقف وراءهم. من زاوية أخرى، قد يشير هذا الاجتماع إلى بداية تغيير في موقف الكتلة الشرقية في ليبيا من مقاومة الوجود التركي، سيما العسكري، على الأراضي الليبية، كوسيلة للمساومة تسمح لهم بالاستحواذ الكامل على السلطة السياسية في ليبيا، وهو أحد الآمال الكبيرة لدى حفتر على وجه الخصوص. إلا أن الغرض الحقيقي من اجتماع أنقرة يبدو مختلفاً إلى حد ما عن كل ذلك.

يفترض بعض المراقبين أن تركيا قد تتوقف عن دعم المعسكر الغربي في ليبيا، لمواكبة جهود التقارب الدبلوماسي الأخيرة مع دول الخليج العربي التي تدعم المعسكر الشرقي هناك. ربما أحد المشاهد التي تعزز هذه الفرضية بقوة هو الزيارة التي قام بها وزير الدفاع التركي، خلوصي أكار، مؤخراً إلى أبو ظبي ولقاءه مع رئيس دولة الإمارات، محمد بن زايد. تقف تركيا والإمارات مواقف متضادة ومتصارعة ضد بعضهما، منذ سنوات، في كل من ليبيا وسوريا على وجه التحديد. وصل التنافس بينهما إلى حد التهديد العلني لبعضهما بالانتقام العسكري. لكن تغيرت الأمور بشكل ملحوظ بعد اجتماع أكار وبن زايد، في شهر مايو، حيث بدأت الإمارات تغض الطرف عن عمليات تركيا العسكرية في شمال سوريا والعراق، وتوقفت عن التعليق الإعلامي عليها تماماً. على ما يبدو، ترد تركيا الموقف للإمارات في ليبيا من خلال إظهار قدر أكبر من التسامح تجاه المعسكر الشرقي هناك، وفتح قنوات جديدة للتحاور معه. 

على الرغم من ذلك، سيكون من المبالغة، أو الخطأ، افتراض أن تواصل تركيا مع الكتلة الشرقية في ليبيا يعني بالضرورة تخليها عن حكومة الوحدة الوطنية في طرابلس. في الواقع، لا تستطيع تركيا أن تفعل ذلك لأسباب عديدة. على أقل تقدير، سيمثل هذا التصرف مجازفة بسمعة الجيش التركي كحليف موثوق به، وهذه السمعة هى الأساس الذي تقوم عليه جميع تحركات تركيا الدبلوماسية والعسكرية في مناطق أوراسيا والشرق الأوسط والبحر المتوسط. فضلاً على هذا، لا تزال القوات التركية، التي يبلغ قوامها ١٥٠٠ عسكري تركي وآلاف المرتزقة السوريين، تعمل على الأرض في طرابلس حتى يومنا هذا. في شهر يونيو، قدم الرئيس التركي طلب إلى برلمان بلاده للموافقة على تمديد مهمة القوات التركية في ليبيا لمدة ثمانية عشر شهرًا أخرى.

دخلت القوات التركية إلى طرابلس، في ديسمبر ٢٠١٩، لحماية الحكومة السابقة في طرابلس من غزو قوات حفتر واستحواذه على السلطة. منذ ذلك الحين، يقدم الجيش التركي للقوات المسلحة الليبية الرسمية، المتمركزة في طرابلس، تدريبات واستشارات عسكرية، بناءً على اتفاقية التعاون العسكري الموقعة بين البلدين في نفس العام. في الوقت الحالي، يستكمل عدد من الطلاب المنتسبين إلى القوات المسلحة الليبية تعليمهم في الكليات العسكرية في تركيا. من هذا المنطلق، فإن التخلي عن الحكومة التي تتخذ من طرابلس مقراً لها يجعل مصالح تركيا في ليبيا، وبالتبعية في منطقة البحر المتوسط، عرضة للخطر. هذا أمر لا تستطيع تركيا تحمله أو احتواء تبعاته في الوقت الراهن.

في الوقت نفسه، لا تزال الكتلة الشرقية الليبية تتلقى دعمًا سياسيًا وعسكريًا من روسيا. لا يزال المرتزقة والشركات العسكرية التابعة لروسيا تعمل إلى جانب مليشيات حفتر. ولا يزال حفتر نفسه يشير إلى تركيا كعدو ويصف القوات التركية في طرابلس بالمحتلين. لا يزال البرلمان الليبي، برئاسة عقيلة صالح، الذي صافح أردوغان في أنقرة الأسبوع الماضي، يقر ببطلان المذكرات البحرية والعسكرية الموقعة بين تركيا والحكومة السابقة. 

بهذا المعنى، من الواضح أن تركيا لا ولن تغير سياستها في ليبيا. بعبارة أخرى، لن تتخلى تركيا - ولن تستطيع - التخلي عن حكومة الوحدة الوطنية، في هذا الوقت الحرج من الصراعات المحتدمة على السلطة بين المعسكرين الشرقي والغربي. لكن من وراء تواصلها مع القادة الشرقيين، تحاول تركيا خلق توازن يضمن حماية مصالحها، سيما في البحر المتوسط، في حالة تصدعت أو انهارت حكومة الوحدة الوطنية تحت الضغوط السياسية والعسكرية التي تفرضها الكتلة الشرقية عليها منذ أشهر. قبل بضعة أسابيع، حاولت الميليشيات التابعة لباشاغا غزو طرابلس بالقوة لتعيينه على رأس حكومة جديدة، مما جدد الخوف من خطر اندلاع حرب أهلية جديدة، في أي لحظة.

لقد تحدث الرئيس التركي بوضوح، في اجتماعه مع عقيلة صالح وعبد الله اللافي، عن رفض تركيا تشكيل حكومة جديدة في ليبيا وبالتالي إطالة المرحلة الانتقالية لأجل غير معلوم، وهو موقف يتفق عليه أغلب الأطراف الدوليين، بما في ذلك بعثة الأمم المتحدة في ليبيا. حتى الأطراف الليبية التي حضرت الاجتماع في أنقرة، هي أيضاً اتفقت مع أهمية المضي قدماً في مسار الحل السياسي وإجراء الانتخابات الرئاسية والبرلمانية في أقرب وقت ممكن، لكون ذلك هو السبيل الوحيد للخروج من الأزمة الليبية المتجددة. لكن لا يزال موضع شك كبير إذا كان صالح ومعسكره على استعداد لتفعيل كلماتهم هذه على أرض الواقع، وتنحية مصالحهم الشخصية الضيقة من أجل مستقبل أفضل للشعب الليبي، الذي ضج ألماً من الصراعات التي لا تنتهي بين أطراف الطبقة السياسية في شرق البلاد وغربها.

Why UAE is siding with Ethiopia against Egypt?

The United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) decline to support Egypt’s position in the dispute with Ethiopia over water rights in the Nile River is paining Egyptian viewers. The UAE is not only an Arab sister country, but one of Egypt’s largest economic and political allies in the Arab Gulf region.

In response to the diplomatic campaign that Egypt launched in 2020 to protest Ethiopia’s insistence on violating Egypt’s water rights, Arab countries issued statements of support to Egypt’s water security rights marking it as “an integral part of their own security.” The UAE was the only Arab country that declined to issue a statement of solidarity with Egypt at that time, which was so frustrating and unexplainable. Meanwhile, the UAE provided the Ethiopian government with financial aid and military equipment that further enhanced the power of Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, against the Tigrayan dissidents and enabled him to continue with the GERD project, against the interests of Egypt. 

Once again, last week, the UAE failed to defend Egypt’s case or, at least, support its efforts to mobilize the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to intervene in the Nile River conflict. That is despite the fact that the UAE is currently holding a non-permanent seat at the UNSC and thus has the power to mobilize the international community to stop Ethiopia from violating Egypt’s right to water security. The international community, including Egypt best allies – Russia, China, and the United States, has been turning a deaf ear to the long-term dispute, especially after the Ethiopians started filling the dam, two years ago. They have always argued that the issue is African and thus should be resolved by the mediation of the African Union. 

To the frustration of millions of Egyptians, the UAE recently adopted a similar insensible position to that of the western countries, regarding the Nile River conflict. On August 2nd, the UAE’s UN mission issued a statement that hard-heartedly ignored all Egypt’s concerns. The UAE’s statement is simply throwing the ball in the court of the African Union, and is calling upon the conflicting parties to sit together for negotiations. That is despite the fact that the African Union, which is based in the Ethiopian Capital, has already been failing for two decades to resolve the conflict. The diplomatic negotiations, which reached a deadlock in 2019, had been used by the Ethiopian diplomats as a maneuver to win more time until the engineers finish the dam.

The UAE’s statement came at a fatal moment for Egypt’s cause. On July 29th, Egypt submitted the third appeal at the UNSC to protest Ethiopia’s insistence on violating its water rights by unilaterally proceeding with filling the GERD. The two countries, along with Sudan, declined a declaration of principles, in 2015, stipulating that Ethiopia must consult with downstream countries before proceeding with filling the dam. As expected, Ethiopia has never adhered to the declaration and is purposefully harming the water security of Egypt and Sudan. That should have made the case ripe for consideration by the UNSC, if the UAE chooses to give it a push.   

It is hard to understand why the UAE is standing against Egypt’s interests in this particular dispute. UAE’s interests are tied to Egypt’s political and economic stability and security, which is now threatened by the Ethiopian moves. 

In 2021, the UAE was declared as world’s largest foreign investor in Egypt, with direct investments exceeding US$15 billion. In 2019, the Sovereign Fund of Egypt and the Abu Dhabi Sovereign Fund (ADQ) signed a strategic cooperation agreement to use joint investments of US$20 billion to enhance crucial sectors and assets of the Egyptian economy. Currently, there are more than one thousand UAE companies working in Egypt, including in vital sectors of food industry, energy (oil and gas), and logistical services of the Suez Canal. In March of this year, UAE announced new investments in Egypt’s financial market, amounting to two billion dollars. 

UAE’s generous investments in the Egyptian market are advertised as a means to support the Egyptian economy and ensure the stability and sustainability of the Egyptian state. Though, to a great extent, that contradicts with UAE’s position on the Nile River conflict. 

Where is Tunisia Heading?

Where is Tunisia heading? That is a tricky question. While it is still too early to suppose that Tunisia is returning to authoritarianism, it is also hard to ignore that the north African country that hosted the first spark of the Arab Spring, is falling off the track of democratization. The new republic that the Tunisian president, Kais Saied, has been trying to establish since his unforeseen power grab, last year, will be free from the Muslim Brotherhood. That is a progress worthy of celebration, on the condition that he will not open the political door wide open for the far-right Salafists to replace them, similar to the case of Egypt. Yet, at the same time, Saied’s new republic may austerely put brakes on the progress of civil and political rights, if not completely suppressing them, under the prerogative of prioritizing economic reform. That is a potential regress that is worthy of worry.  

The New Republic

The new constitution, which is perfectly tailored by the law professor, Saied, to enhance his presidential powers, warns that the general mood in Tunisia has become more tolerant to upholding the long and tedious process of political change, in hope that this may accelerate the process of economic reform. Tunisians have been bragging about being the only Arab Spring country that have had the longest streak on the trajectory of peaceful political transformation, after the overthrow of Ben Ali’s dictatorship. Though, apparently, the heightening economic crisis is pushing the socio-economic agenda to the forefront on the expense of continuing with the pursuit of democracy. That is creating a perfect atmosphere for Saied to proceed with building the new republic.

The term ‘new republic’ is originally Egyptian. It was first coined by the Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, to highlight the progress of social and economic developments under his first seven years in power. El-Sisi played a central role in ousting the Muslim Brotherhood out of political power in Egypt, in 2013, after which a new constitution was written and he got voted in as state president. Since the beginning of Saied’s power grab in Tunisia, his opponents could not help accusing him of copying El-Sisi’s scheme, especially that Saied’s war on the officials of his own regime started only three months after his return from Cairo and meeting with the Egyptian president.

When Kais Saied was in Cairo, in mid-April of last year, the Tunisian streets had been boiling with protests that called for holding the political elite accountable for practicing corruption and failure manage the economic crisis, that was magnified by the consequences of the pandemic. The protests did not stop until Saied decided, on the night of July 25th, to make use of the exceptional powers given to the president in Article 80 of the constitution, that he rewrote later. He dissolved the government and the parliament, which was dominated by the Islamist Ennahda party, to make himself the new center of power. 

Then, Saied recorded video statement assuring the people that he is not a dictator and that these arbitrary procedures were necessary to control the public outrage and put an end to economic suffering. "There is no withdrawal from respecting rights and freedoms, and there is no room for infringement or assault on them," confirmed Saied. He also confirmed that he willingly chose to stand by the people to “preserve the unity of the state and protect it from the corruption that is decaying its joints.” Saied concluded his video statement by saying: "Insha’Allah, we will win! It is a war, but without bullets or blood. It is a war based on the law. A war for justice and freedom. We will keep our oath and our responsibility, all the way.” 

Surprisingly, the angry masses applauded Saied’s power grab and believed his message. Basically, people wanted to take a break from the ‘three presidencies’ system of governance that was the main reason behind state failure in meeting people’s needs. Out of fear of sliding back into the web of the deep state, the post-revolution constitution in Tunisia tailored a system of governance that is neither presidential nor parliamentarian. Rather, it was a new system based on balancing the decision-making process between three authorities – or ‘presidencies;’ namely: the President of the State, the Prime Minister (the president of the government), and the Speaker of Parliament (the president of the legislative authority). 

While the three presidencies system kept all the competing parties in the political elite happy, it paralyzed the process of decision-making in the state. For three years, since Kais Saied got elected as president, Tunisia could not achieve any tangible progress under the three presidents, whose agendas and visions are not only inconsistent, but also contradicting. Eventually, that wobbled the faltering economy, and consequently stirred nation-wide protests calling for reform. Saied’s response to the people calls, at that time, was inevitable. He had to do something to break the state of political paralysis and bring hope back to the hurts of the people. 

Yet, soon after, Saied used the momentum to enhance his grip over political power in an alarming way. He started by removing state officials from government to parliament, judiciary, and even security forces, and replacing them by loyalists; up to rewriting and passing a new permanent constitution that puts all state powers exclusively in the hands of the president and makes him immune to accountability. 

The New Constitution 

On first anniversary of Saied’s power grab, last week, a minority of Tunisian voters approved the new constitution that Saied wrote with the help of some law specialists, in the past few months. Barely above 2.75 million voters (30.5%) out of 9.3 million registered voters showed up at the poll stations, on July 25th, to participate in the constitutional referendum. According to the official Electoral Commission, which all of its members are also hired by Saied, 94.6% of the participants voted for the new constitution. 

The voting on the new constitution was, more or less, a voting on Saied’s vision. Several political parties, either those genuinely supporting Saied’s agenda or those concerned about the return of Ennahda, applauded the results of the referendum and announced their approval to the new constitution. Meanwhile, the opponents of the Tunisian president, and civil society missions that observed the voting process are referring to acts of fraud and forgery that puts the legitimacy of the constitution and of Kais Saied, himself, in question. Currently, the Administrative Court is looking into the appeals submitted by some political parties and civil society organizations to protest the results of the referendum. 

In addition to civil society appeals, there are other factors that raises doubts about the authenticity and transparency of the constitutional referendum. One of them is the fact that the board of the Elections Commission, that took the responsibility of organizing the referendum, have recently been replaced by one of Saied’s decrees. That raises questions about the independence of the commission and thus the legitimacy of the whole voting process. 

Another factor of concern, here, is the exceptionally low voter turnout. How can the state adopt a constitution based on a voting by 2 million citizens, which is way less than the 50% threshold usually requested in similar referendums. It is an abnormal static for the Tunisian citizens, who are known to be pretty active when it comes to democratic practice. The state-run media and some pro-Saied commentators justify the absence of voters in the constitutional referendum by the hot weather and being people busy with handling economic problems. But, in fact, these issues have never prevented Tunisians from active political participation in past elections. The lowest voter turnout, in the past ten years, was 41.7% in the parliamentary elections of 2019.

Nevertheless, the new constitution is written under the direct supervision of president Saied, during a period of transition and political turmoil. If this new constitution is meant to be permanent, it should at least be written in a time of political stability and with the active participation of all political blocs and civil society representatives. Otherwise, it is a constitution that represents the president who wrote it, and his loyalists who approved it, but not the Tunisian people. Let aside the fact that the new constitution puts all state powers in the hands of the president and makes him the only decision-maker in the state, that is immune to accountability by the parliament, the government, the judicial authority, or even the military institution.

Per this new constitution, Kais Saied will have the power to hire or fire all state officials of all ranks and positions, including the prime minister and the speaker of the parliament. He will also act as the supreme commander of the armed forces and thus can keep himself immune to any attempt by the military to turn against him. In addition, Article 100 of Saied’s new constitution gives him the exclusive right to “set the public policy of the state and define its essential choices, and his legal projects have priority for consideration by the parliament.” This comes with a catch though. 

If the Administrative Court annuls or rejects the appeals submitted by some political parties and civil society organizations to protest the referendum process and results, the new constitution will officially go into effect on the 27th of August, after being ratified by the president. That makes Kais Saied, the one who writes the constitution and also ratifies it. However, as soon as the new constitution takes effect, he will find himself in a legal trouble. He was elected president based on the previous constitution. The change of the constitution necessitates the re-election of all the electable governing bodies and officials, including the state president, Kais Saied, whose legitimacy will be terminated as soon as the new constitution is being activated. For sure, the shrewd Saied, who worked as a professor of law for most of his life, will tailor another decree to protect himself against that scenario.

The Future 

The political scene in Tunisia is terribly muddled. President, Kais Saied, has been solely ruling the country for an entire year through public statements and presidential decrees. He promised not to turn the country into a dictatorship, but the new constitution he is trying to pass on the first anniversary of his power grab does exactly that. The Tunisian people are slowly burying their dream to live in a democratic state, while struggling with an economic crisis that seems to have no end. According to official statistics by the Tunisian government, unemployment rates exceeded 17%, and the economic contraction hit a record rate of 8.2%, in September 2020. According to a survey conducted by the World Bank, in cooperation with the governmental National Institute of Statistics, in 2020, poverty rate in Tunisia reached 15.2%. At least, 30% of the surveyed families, stated that they fear running out of food, as a result of the pandemic which added to their miseries of unemployment and deteriorating economy. In the past week, news has been circulating that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) may consider lending two billion euros in aid to the current Tunisian government. If true, that is unlikely to solve the economic crisis as much as it will further enhance Saied’s grip on power. On the gates of Saied’s new republic, the political Islamists are desperately trying to sneak their way back to political power, and the international community is deeply frustrated by the fall of the last hope for democratization in the Arab Spring countries. Where is Tunisia heading? Nobody knows where to exactly, but we may easily guess that it is not heading to a better future.