Egypt 2023: Economic Pains and Political Hopes

Egypt is heading into the new year (2023) with a load of economic uncertainties. Yet, there are a few threads of hope that we should cling to throughout the process of recovery that Egypt is believed to experience during the coming months. 

It is not about fooling myself and my fellow Egyptians into unrealistic optimism. It is about believing that there are always hidden opportunities in every crisis. One of these opportunities could be accelerating the process of establishing a modern macroeconomic system in place of the old and barren structure that kept the Egyptian economy struggling for seven decades. The success of the economic reform plan led by President El-Sisi, between 2016-2020, should make us optimistic about Egypt’s potential in that regard.

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in February, the Egyptian economy has been weathering significant pressures, blowing away the hard-earned gains of the national economic reform program that the government launched seven years ago. As the year comes to an end, the pain of the economic crisis is deeply felt by Egyptian citizens from all social and professional backgrounds. The wealthy, the poor, and the middle class are struggling, with variant degrees and for distinct reasons, to cope with the spiking inflation rates and dollar scarcity.

Over the year, the hot money investors withdrew from the Egyptian market causing a sharp decline in foreign investment rates. As a result, the dollar reserves in the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) started to deplete, especially that the tourism sector, too, has become unable to generate appropriate revenues because of the sharp fall in Russian and Eastern European tourist turnout. 

By the end of the year, between the end of November and early December, the dollar scarcity issue got more complicated as more people started to purchase dollars to hedge against inflation. In December, the CBE announced that official inflation rates reached slightly over 21%, adding huge pressure on the purchasing power of the Egyptian Pound. In the unofficial market, the dollar exchange rates spiked to 32-40 EGP compared to 24-25 in the banks supervised by CBE.

Nevertheless, the government is careful to keep the basic commodities, such as food and energy products, abundantly available in local markets. Since the beginning of the crisis in March, the Egyptian government has been exerting a huge effort to keep food products, especially bread and oil, available to most consumers at affordable prices. In the process, the government had to postpone its plans to remove the subsidies on bread, fuel consumption, and electricity subscriptions until the current crisis is resolved. 

However, many citizens are unable to benefit from this governmental support because merchants manipulate prices to cover up their losses. Most merchants and manufacturers have been struggling to cope with the restrictive policies imposed by CBE on importation. One of these restrictions complicates the procedures of releasing imported products at Egyptian ports, either by requesting additional documents or by banning the importation of certain products. The CBE’s main goal in applying such restrictions is to keep the dollar reserves for the longest period possible and encourage consumers to buy local products to strengthen the Egyptian pound. 

Unfortunately, the premature restrictions backfired by pushing merchants and manufacturers to get the dollars they need from the parallel market and thus increasing the exchange rate of the dollar and further depreciating the Egyptian pound. The CBE promised that these restrictions will be gradually removed over the coming few months thanks to the release of the long-awaited loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In mid-December, the IMF Executive Board approved the release of $3 billion over 48 months for Egypt. The amount is like a drop in the sea when compared to Egypt’s needs; it hardly covers Egypt’s annual budget for grain importation. In addition, the loan is tied with a number of provisions seeking to liberate the Egyptian market from the grip of the state and allow greater flexibility to the Egyptian pound against the dollar.  

Last week, the CBE’s Policy Committee decided in its last routine meeting of 2022 to raise the interest rate by 3% to control inflation and strengthen the Egyptian pound before allowing it to float per IMF instructions. Since March, the CBE gradually raised the interest by 8%. This policy succeeded in attracting massive investments from Egyptians, local and living abroad, in the high-profit Egyptian pound certificates at Egyptian banks. In the medium term, this policy seems to be able to control the inflation rates and bring the exchange rates to a reasonable range. However, until this happens, the government still needs to take other procedures to protect the citizens from the manipulations of the merchants.

Based on our former experience with the current political leadership in managing the previous economic crisis of 2016, I am optimistic that the Egyptian economy will survive the current crisis, too. That is even more possible thanks to the generous deposits and investments by the Arab Gulf countries and the continued support of the IMF. 

Despite the painful pressures on the daily spending power of most Egyptian citizens, there are some promising indicators on the state / governmental level. For example, Egypt’s GDP has grown by 4.4% at the end of 2022 compared to the 3.3% growth rate in 2021. Egypt's non-oil exports rose during the period extending from January to October by about 12% to reach $30.4 billion compared to $27.1 billion during a similar period last year. Meanwhile, the government has not given up on its mega national projects targeting to improve the infrastructure and protect the poor. 

That being said, we have to keep in mind that all the efforts exerted by the government to contain the current economic crisis are only going to provide a temporary fix to a chronic disease that has been dragging Egypt since the 1950s. In that sense, the question that the Egyptian government, and its regional and international supporters, should consider is: how to avoid the crisis after the current crisis. Or, even better to ask: how to get the Egyptian economy liberated from the painful roller coaster of extreme stress followed by a short recovery that has not stopped for seventy years.

Taliban Quest to Bury Women Alive

It did not take long for Taliban to show their ugly face, proving wrong those who were optimistic about their rule.

In December, Taliban leaders instructed school directors and local community leaders that women can no longer attend or work at schools and universities. The decision of the extremist group is the latest item on a long list of similar policies targeting to bury women and girls alive under the claim of “protecting society against vice.” Banning women from participating in public life is at the core of the extremist ideology adopted by Islamist extremist organizations, including Taliban.

Forcing women to cover from head to toe, stoning women in public, and preventing women from participating in public life through work or education were daily practices under the rule of the former Taliban. Sadly, the new Taliban is gradually heading in that direction by first banning women from working at certain occupations, now preventing women from education, and very soon preventing women from going to markets or appearing in public. 

In response to Taliban’s appalling move, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Sheikh Ahmed El-Tayib, issued a statement harshly condemning the systemic discrimination against women in Afghanistan. “Preventing the Afghan girls from university-level education is a shocking procedure that contradicts Islamic Shariah;” El-Tayib stated. “Shariah explicitly urges men and women to continue to seek education from cradle to grave. Several women have proven their scientific and political genius over the long history of Islam. Women’s education should be a source of pride and admiration for every Muslim devoted to Allah, His Messenger, and His Shariah.”

Taliban took power in August 2021, following the hasty and chaotic withdrawal of the United States and allied forces from Afghanistan and the inevitable surrender of the Afghan army and the government. At the beginning of their shockingly effortless ascendance to power, the extremist group’s spokesperson told the media that they would not practice discrimination against women similar to their founding fathers who dominated the country in the 1990s and 2000s. They even claimed that the new Taliban is more “open-minded.”

Some western politicians and observers had fallen easy prey to Taliban’s false claims, perhaps out of ignorance of the nature of their ideology. The U.S. Administration of President Biden urged the international community to give Taliban a chance under the assumption that “the new Taliban is different from the old Taliban” and that Taliban’s rule is what the Afghan people want. The hundreds of thousands of Afghans who fled the country, during the past year since Taliban took power, offer living proof of the falseness of these relaxed claims by international community leaders.   

Among all the shocking statements made by world leaders, such as the European Union and UNICEF, about their optimism toward Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan, one particular statement stood out. In an interview with Sky News TV, a few days following the U.S. and allied forces' withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Chief of Staff of the British Army, Nick Carter, described Taliban fighters as “country boys” that the world needs to be patient on and give them a chance to prove that they are “more reasonable” than the old Taliban. 

Taliban’s unapologetic discrimination against women is proving wrong the claims of officials and media personnel who were so optimistic that the current Taliban is different from the former Taliban, which in the 1990s turned Afghanistan into a safe haven for Al-Qaeda, one of the most dangerous Islamist terrorist organizations known in history. Sooner or later, the new Taliban will follow the steps of their ancestors and grow as a threat to the security of other countries in the east and the west. It all starts by suppressing women under the passive watch of the free world.

Chat: Egypt, Turkey, Muslim Brotherhood, and Women's Rights

Dalia Ziada and Hediye Levent chat about Egypt, Turkey, Muslim Brotherhood, and Women's Rights

Watch the original video (live stream) in Turkish on Hediye Levent's YouTube channel here 

The United States Scramble for Africa

The United States Administration of President Biden is assertively pushing the reset button on its foreign policy in Africa. However, its potential to outpace other regional and international competitors over the resources of the most fertile continent is still pretty limited.  

In mid-December, Washington hosted a three-day summit under the title US-Africa Leaders Summit, calling in forty-nine political leaders from Sub-Sahara and North Africa and the Commissioner of the African Union to discuss ways to revive and enhance America’s socio-economic partnerships with the continent. A senior U.S. official told the press that “the summit is rooted in the recognition that Africa is a key geopolitical player and one that is shaping our present and will shape our future.” Indeed, Africa is a fertile continent with an unparalleled wealth of minerals and fuels. It is also home to 1.3 billion people, most of whom are youth, offering an enormous market of lucrative business opportunities to foreign investors. 

The overdue summit is the second episode of a historic meeting that former U.S. President Barak Obama held eight years ago, in August 2014, under the same title. The theme of the two summits and the agenda items are almost identical, but America’s geo-strategic standing and the surrounding global context are quite different. While the 2014 summit had prioritized discussions on civil society, good governance, and democratization, the current summit pushed these critical topics down the list after strategic economic partnerships, food security, and response to the climate crisis.

The Business Forum is the star of the show in this year’s US-Africa Summit. The summit organizers dedicated a physical “Prosper Africa Deal Room” for American and African business tycoons, investors, and government officials to meet, discuss, and announce future business agreements. The goal of the Deal Room is to “advance mutually beneficial partnerships that create jobs and drive inclusive and sustainable growth on both sides of the Atlantic,” according to the description of the summit organizers. Yet, the real purpose of such a room, which has been live-streamed by top media outlets all day, is perhaps to show off, in real-time, the progress of US-Africa relations with America’s superpower competitors, especially China.

The Economic Question

In the African domain, the United States is entering a new level of competition with several international and regional actors that already have sturdier economic and security partnerships in the fertile continent. On the top of this competitors’ list are China, Russia, Turkey, and two of the wealthiest countries in the Arab Gulf region, namely Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Their collective power as pragmatic allies outweighs the power of the United States and Europe.

In the past few years, the UAE, as one example, emerged as a primary logistics hub for China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Middle East and North Africa region and a host of more than six-thousand Chinese companies. In addition, China, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have been running joint and parallel infrastructure and tourism projects in east Africa. 

Last week, the first-ever Arab-China Summit was held in Riyadh. The Chinese President, Xi Jinping, and a dozen of Arab leaders returned home after the summit with several economic and security agreements that some of them described as a milestone for “high-quality” cooperation. 

Unlike the United States, eastern superpowers do not tie security and economic cooperation with Arabs to improving human rights and governance conditions, which most Arab countries view as interference in domestic affairs. Likewise, most African countries, including those who yearn to establish solid alliances with the United States, find working with China much easier because it does not load agreements with political change provisions. 

The fierce economic standoff between the west and Russia since the latter’s invasion of Ukraine in the Spring is believed to be one of the key motivators behind convening the US-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington this week. After losing several of its best Arab allies to Russia and China, mainly because of inconsistent foreign policy moves in the past two years, the Biden Administration is keen on winning over Africa to compensate for this massive loss. 

That raises the question about what the U.S. Administration can realistically offer to Africa to win this competition, especially in the lack of a collective African perception of what Africa needs from Washington that the other powerful competitors have not already introduced.

The United States has been the second top investor in Africa, after China, over the past decade (2010-2019), according to data from the “Swiss-African Business Relations Status Quo 2021” report. The distance between China and the United States' positions on the index compared to other countries on the top ten list, such as France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, is as wide as eleven-thousand newly created jobs. Yet, the gap between China as the top investor and the United States in the second position is as large as six-thousand newly created jobs. China poured in Africa at least 27% of its foreign investments in that period.

On the regional level, the report shows that the UAE is the only Arab country that made it to the top ten investors in Africa in the past ten years. UAE holds the 9th position on the index with 2,968 newly created jobs. That puts UAE above wealthy western investors like Switzerland, Spain, and Canada. The UAE is determined to continue expanding its investments in Africa, especially in the countries of eastern and southern Africa, in the coming decades. According to a white paper issued in October 2021 by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and commissioned by Dubai Chamber, the UAE held 88% (US$1.2 billion) of total investments by all Arab Gulf countries in Sub-Sahara Africa in the period between January 2016 and July 2021.

It's Turkey, Not China! 

Turkey is another remarkable competitor that the United States should watch out for its growing influence on Africa. Turkey is the fourth largest investor in Africa, after China, the United States, and France. The difference between Turkey’s investment power in Sub-Sahara African countries, compared to the power of European investors, such as France and Germany, is slightly a few hundred newly created jobs over the past ten years. 

In 2020, the total trade volume between Turkey and Africa reached as high as US$25.3 billion, compared to a trading volume of US$20 billion between Africa and the entire continent of Europe. Most African imports from Turkey are textiles, furniture, electronics, steel, and cement. Meanwhile, Turkey made a direct investment of US$6.5 billion in the construction sector in Africa over that period.

Nevertheless, Turkey’s political influence on Africa is much thicker than any other competitor, even China’s. That is basically due to the clever employment of the military diplomacy tool by the leadership of the Turkish Armed Forces to win over allies in a continent boiling above a myriad of security threats, ranging from terrorism, border conflicts, and civil wars. This week, while the United States is hosting a summit for Africa, African military leaders have visited the Turkish Minister of National Defense, Hulusi Akar, in Ankara to discuss cooperation and review military deals.

Turkey’s military diplomacy pattern is designed to create a double-layered bond of economic and security co-dependency with targeted countries that can hardly be broken once tied. This pattern was successfully applied in the long-term partnerships that Turkey established with pivotal countries in Asia, such as Pakistan and Azerbaijan, in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Turkey’s indigenous defense industry is about to hit a self-sufficiency rate of 80% by the end of 2022. The starving market of arms and ammunition in Africa is one of the ideal destinations for Turkish military products. Today, Turkey is already exporting weapons to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, and the list is expanding by the day. The African countries are particularly interested in the Turkish drones and helicopters, as well as technologically advanced electronic war systems that they can procure from Turkey for a relatively lower cost than the price of similar equipment from the United States, Russia, or even China. 

The Flaw in Western Perception

In general, western powers are usually unlucky when it comes to competing against the eastern superpowers, or even regional actors, in the African continent. Europe’s vain quest to revive ties with Africa is an example that the United States should study and learn from. At least since 2020, Europe has been trying to redefine its relationship with Africa as a strategic partnership rather than a “donor-recipient” affair. The highlight of this effort was creating a new EU-Africa Strategy that encompasses a huge budget of thirty billion Euros for social development projects in North Africa.

In early 2021, the European Council approved a proposal by the European Commission to establish the “New Agenda for The Mediterranean” to “relaunch and strengthen the strategic partnership between the European Union and its southern neighborhood partners.” Consequently, a new instrument titled “Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument - (NDICI)” was issued to guide Europe’s policy in the Mediterranean. The NDICI set an investment recovery plan in targeted African countries with a budget of seven billion Euros for the period 2021-2027, with a promise to mobilize up to thirty billion Euros in private and public investments over the next ten years.

Europe’s urgent interest in regaining its long-lost influence in Africa is not new. Leading voices of major European collegiate bodies have been calling to strengthen the bond with Africa, for years. However, the wide gap between Europe’s vision and Africa’s needs has blocked positive measures and tangible results. That is the core of the lesson that the United States needs to derive from the European failed endeavors in Africa. Despite its proven sincerity to renew and foster ties with Africa, the U.S. Administration may fail if it does not abandon its western perception of politics and business conduct for a while and try to look at Africa with African eyes.

Human Rights in the New World Order

This year, the world is observing Human Rights Day amidst a global mess of security and economic crises. That makes us wonder about the future of the international movement for defending and supporting human rights, and whether it will be able to survive this huge amount of political and economic uncertainties that have been overwhelming the world stage since 2020.    

Europe, where the concept of human rights started millennia ago, is struggling to secure hydrocarbon resources to warm homes this winter. Most of the countries in Africa and the Middle East are suffering from grinding economic crises that are putting a large number of them on the verge of famine. On a wider scale, the entire globe is facing serious security threats, ranging from Russian threats of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine to the unsettling conflicts in Syria and Libya, and the rise of Islamic extremists and terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and its surroundings.

The global standoff between western and eastern powers around the war in Eastern Europe is escalating by the day. Russia and China are taking strides in mobilizing Arab and African countries to their side, while the United States is losing its best allies in the Middle East. Sooner or later, this is going to change the balance of power in our modern-day world. 

If the eastern camp wins, which is highly likely given the unexplained confusing policies of the U.S. Administration of President Biden, human rights as a set of universal values are going to suffer. The leaders of the eastern powers, who mostly adopt negative views towards human rights as we know them today, may implicitly try to push the conversation around defending human rights to the back burner. Even worse, they may take measures to avert the gains achieved by the international human rights movement, especially on the set of rights related to individual freedoms. 

In a recent meeting with his national organization for human rights, the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, publicly attacked human rights doctrine and labeled it as a weapon the West used to mentally occupy the world. “The doctrine of international human rights is being used to justify Western ideological hegemony;” Putin stressed after blaming the international human rights organizations, which he describes as controlled by the west, for “not condemning Ukraine for bombing residential neighborhoods on the territory of Donbas.” 

Ironically, Donbas is originally a Ukrainian territory that was occupied by Russia. It is also appalling to see Putin who invaded Ukraine, in February, leading to horrible consequences inside Ukraine and worldwide, using the “human rights” terminology to blame Ukraine for defending itself against his invading troops.

In China, another leading power from the east, the human rights notion is no less hated than it is in Russia and other autocratic countries. In October, the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, whose state has been overseeing the ethnic cleansing of Uyghur Muslims for years, told the media that China has its own understanding of human rights that is different from the western concept. Quoting Karl Marx, the philosophical godfather of the communist movement, Xi said that his country adopts Marx’s perception that "right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby.” 

The COVID-19 pandemic offers a context that enhances this autocratic approach to human rights. Under the pandemic, the countries that had centralized – and even repressive – systems of governance were more successful in controlling the pandemic and its economic consequences than the free countries. Also, during this period, governments worldwide heavily suppressed individual freedoms to protect the collective. This strongly resonated with the eastern cultural perception of prioritizing the community over the individual, in comparison to the western culture which glorifies individual freedoms above all else. 

In her statement on the COVID-19 pandemic informal briefing to the UN Human Rights Council, Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, adopted a balanced, but rare, vision of how the UN and similar bodies should handle the pandemic crisis. She noted that “the pandemic is exposing the damaging impact of inequalities, in every society. In developed countries, fault lines in access to health care; in labor rights and social protections; in living space; and in dignity are suddenly very visible.” Then she emphasized the respect for civil and political rights during this crisis, as “difficult decisions are facing many governments. Emergency measures may well be needed to respond to this public health emergency. But an emergency situation is not a blank check to disregard human rights obligations.” 

This gloomy scene makes us worried about the future of human rights after the world recovers from the ongoing cluster of crises, regardless of who wins the west-east power competition. Will the people continue to believe in the importance of observing human rights values? Will governments continue to show commitment to protecting human rights? And, the most important question is about the future roles and credibility of international bodies, such as the United Nations, which are responsible for preserving and protecting human rights, worldwide.

Islamists in Egypt, Turkey State Ideology

Islamists of the Middle East, omnium-gatherum, are the group mostly offended by the recent handshake between the Egyptian and Turkish presidents in Doha last month. Meanwhile, some regional propagandists, who feel threatened by the potential of rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt, are trying to portray this handshake as a victory for political Islamists. Remaining in this vicious cycle for too long is not productive and may get the wheel of reconciliation stuck, once again. 

The Muslim Brotherhood group has been one of the main factors that broke the rift between Qatar and Turkey on one side and Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain on the other side, following the Arab Spring revolutions. A decade ago, the Turkish state chose to support the then-populous political Islamist organization at the expense of having normal and stable relationships with the new Egyptian state and the Arab Gulf monarchies that took on themselves the mission to eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood from the region.

However, time and experience have proven to the Turkish leadership that they made the wrong bet, especially as the Muslim Brotherhood group smashed on the edge of internal divisions among the leaders and between the leadership and the bases.

At least, since November 2020, Turkish President Erdogan and his senior officials have been exceptionally active in correcting the course of Turkey’s foreign policy in the region. Over the past two years, Turkey successfully restored its relationship with Arab Gulf countries, including the UAE which had a fatal rivalry with Turkey in Libya. In parallel, Egypt’s relationship with Qatar has been progressing to unprecedented levels of understanding and coordination. This set the stage for the long-awaited reconciliation between the Turkish and Egyptian states.  

The historic handshake between President Erdogan and his Egyptian counterpart, El-Sisi, has not magically resolved the conflicting perceptions of both countries towards the political Islamists, in general, and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular. Yet, it showed evidence that both leaders are willing to ease their strong stances on this sensitive issue.

The issue of the Muslim Brotherhood is not as big and multifaceted as the issue of Libya or the conflicts over maritime zones in the Mediterranean, which Turkey and Egypt stand on opposite sides regarding them. Yet, the Muslim Brotherhood issue is somehow tied to the political ideologies that each of the two states embraces. 

In other words, President Erdogan’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood was initially motivated by his belief, as a successful Islamist politician himself, that the Egyptian Islamist organization was a copy of his own Justice and Development Party (AKP). Retreating from supporting the group, later, is making the Turkish president appear like he is abandoning the Islamist ideology as a whole, contrary to the truth. 

On the flip side, President El-Sisi’s fight against the Muslim Brotherhood was mainly motivated by his military ideology which encompasses the political ideology of prioritizing and protecting the nation-state at all other expenses. Approaching the Turkish and Qatari leadership in a friendly way, given their history of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, makes president El-Sisi appear like he is abandoning the military-dictated nation-state ideology altogether, contrary to the truth. 

Perceptions are everything in this game. Backstage, the Egyptian and Turkish presidents have been dealing with a strong backlash from their supporting citizens and parties. The Islamist sympathizers who represent the majority of Erdogan’s constituency in Turkey are angry at him for shaking hands with El-Sisi. Likewise, the Coptic Christians and women who represent the majority of El-Sisi’s electoral constituency are frowning at El-Sisi’s smiles and friendliness with Erdogan.

In that sense, for the reconciliation between Egypt and Turkey to succeed, the leaders in both countries need to re-adjust the public perception to accept the change. They need to draw a clear line between what each of the two states perceives as a strategy and what it embraces as part of its political ideology. That is particularly true when it comes to discussing the future positions of each of the two leaders regarding the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Egypt-Turkey Next Handshake

At the opening ceremony of the FIFA World Cup in Doha, Qatar’s Prince Tamim Bin Hamad scored one of his finest political goals by overseeing a historic handshake between the leaders of Turkey and Egypt. The friendly encounter between the Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in Doha earlier this month, cannot be seen as a standard act of courtesy that happened out of sheer coincidence. It was the climax of a year of backstage arrangements in both countries and months of Qatar-led shuttle diplomacy.

The importance of momentous meeting between the leaders of Turkey and Egypt, which lasted for 45 minutes, does not stop at the threshold of melting away the personal prejudices that incited nine years of heated diplomatic tensions and state-sponsored media wars. This encounter marks a turning point in the bilateral ties between the two states. Yet, most important is its impact on the geopolitical and geo-economic future of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. On another level, it reframes Qatar in a whole new positive light as an active peacemaker and agenda-setter in the Arab Gulf region and beyond.

Zoom Out

Since its successful reconciliation with Egypt in 2021, the Qatari leadership has been determined to fix the rift between Egypt and Turkey. This coincided with a sincere desire by the Turkish state to end conflicts with Arab and non-Arab neighbors in the Middle East. Over the past year, Turkey restored its broken ties with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and even Israel. Meanwhile, Egypt and Qatar successfully rebuilt their bond of trust as sisterly countries by fostering economic and diplomatic cooperation.    

The conflict between Egypt and Turkey was not as whacking as the conflict between Turkey and Gulf states or as was the conflict between Egypt and Qatar. Despite that, the reconciliation process between Egypt and Turkey, which started in May 2021 with limited diplomatic talks in Cairo and Ankara, has been progressing at a snail pace. That is mainly because the heads of the two states have been avoiding each other out of fear of the reaction of the public citizens in their respective countries, who have been fueled by the rhetoric of hate and anger for years. The recent meeting between El-Sisi and Erdogan is believed to accelerate the process of diplomatic rebounding in the near future. 

Mending the broken ties between Egypt and Turkey is the last missing piece of the puzzle for forming ‘the coalition of odds’ that is believed to lead the future of the Middle East for decades to come. The term ‘coalition of odds’ was coined by the writer of this analysis, in 2020, to refer to the new alliance of regional powers that has been forming under the pressure of international crises and regional challenges over the past few years. 

This new alliance is mainly a quartet coalition of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt. Each pair of these four countries stand at opposite spots on the spectrum of national strategic goals. However, each of them represents a crucial cornerstone of geopolitics, geo-economics, and military supremacy that when integrated will comprise a mosaic of power that has never been seen before in the greater region of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. 

Together, this quartet of odds can contain Iran and mitigate the threats constantly raised by its militia. They can dominate the flow of world trade movement across the Red Sea and the Mediterranean thanks to their unique geographic locations and economic outreach in Asia, Europe, and Africa. Also, needless to mention their collective dominance over the majority of the world’s energy resources, including fossil fuel, hydrocarbon extraction, and green energy resources. And above all, they can form an unbeatable regional military coalition enhanced by the NATO experience that Turkey enjoys and the massive personnel and armament capabilities of Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.

Zoom In

Economic cooperation could be an ideal starting point for accelerating the process of rebuilding Turkish-Egyptian relations. In complete contrast to the diplomatic impasse that kept Egypt and Turkey apart for almost a decade, commercial trading between them has been steadily growing. This year marked an unprecedented increase of 32.6% in the volume of trade between the two countries, compared to last year, according to the estimates of the Egyptian Chamber of Commerce. 

According to the latest statistics by the Egyptian government, during the first quarter of 2022, Egyptian exports to Turkey grew by 178.9% (960.6 million dollars) from 537.1 million dollars at the beginning of 2021 to 1.4 billion dollars at the beginning of this year. In comparison, the volume of Turkey’s exports to Egypt increased from 3.31 billion dollars in 2020 to 3.94 billion dollars in the first quarter of 2022. Over the past 25 years, Egypt’s exports to Turkey have been steadily increasing by 9.63% each year, compared to a 10.2% annual increase in Turkey’s exports to Egypt.

Since the last quarter of 2021, Turkey has begun to receive, for the first time, cargos of liquified natural gas (LNG) from Egypt’s Idku and Damietta offshore plants in the eastern Mediterranean. The geographic proximity between the two countries made the transfer of liquified gas a breath in terms of speed and shipping costs. That should encourage the two countries to consider colliding forces to combat the ongoing global energy crisis. 

Turkey is situated at the southern gates of Europe and close to the North African countries that produce massive amounts of oil and gas, such as Libya and Algeria. Also, Turkey represents the adjoining entry point for the liquified natural gas coming from Egypt and Israel through Egypt's natural gas liquefaction plants to be exported to Europe. If the two countries agree to work together in that regard, they will not only solve the global energy crises but will dramatically lift up their struggling economies.

However, for this to happen, Turkey and Egypt need to clear the air about their conflicting economic and defense policies in the Eastern Mediterranean. Obviously, Egypt will not be able to back down from its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) agreement signed with Greece in 2020. Yet, this should not prevent Egypt from convening similar agreements with Turkey. Meanwhile, the time has come to give Turkey access to the East Med Organization, given the fact that it is the country with the longest border in the Eastern Mediterranean, regardless of its non-ending conflicts with Greece. 

Logically speaking, it is in Egypt's best interest not to involve in the century-long conflict between Turkey and Greece or side with one party against the other. Needless to mention, Egypt is set to harvest more lucrative benefits from a maritime agreement with Turkey than it can have from agreements with other countries on the northern side of the Mediterranean.

Consequently, that brings up the issue of Turkey’s and Egypt’s involvement at opposite fronts in the conflict in Libya. In addition to diplomatic talks, Egyptian and Turkish military leaders need to sit together to address the Libyan conflict, which each of them sees as integral to their national security. The Egyptian state is still concerned about the continued existence of Turkish troops on Libyan soil. 

Turkey still supports the Tripoli-based government against the parliament, and Khalifa Haftar’s forces in the eastern territories, which Egypt is a staunch supporter of. Egypt considers this a threat to its national security, despite the insistence of the Turkish state that the troops in Tripoli are only there to preserve the balance of power and prevent the eastern militia from taking over the government.

The Next Handshake 

In a televised interview last week, Turkey’s President Erdogan highlighted that his meeting with the Egyptian president was fruitful and left them “very happy.” But this is not enough. Despite its significant symbolism, the meeting between El-Sisi and Erdogan is merely the beginning of a series of serious negotiations that need to happen between the Egyptian and the Turkish states. The next handshake should not be limited to the diplomatic channels, especially given their record of failing to achieve real progress in that file for an entire year. Direct communications between the two presidents, consultations between the intelligence bureaus of both countries, and above all military-to-military talks could be way more effective in realizing successful reconciliation between Turkey and Egypt that is set to last for a long time on a solid ground of realistic visions.

Death Of Political Muslim Brotherhood

The impact of the unexpected death of Ibrahim Munir, the Deputy Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, will eventually spill beyond the group’s walls. Munir’s death marks the end of the political rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood, paving the way for the rise of the violent jihadist factions to leadership positions in the guidance bureau. 

Inevitably, this could lead to perilous alteration of the Muslim Brotherhood’s collective perception of their conflicts with the Arab governments that worked hard to weaken the group in the past few years. The recent ‘war of documents’ between the conflicting factions of the Muslim Brotherhood enhances this argument. It could also help observers predict the group’s future after Munir’s death.  

In mid-October, the London-based front, led by Munir, published a ‘Political Document’ to forestall the announcement of the Change Front’s document. While Munir’s document called for reconciliation with the Egyptian state and society, the Change Front incited the group’s bases in Egypt to wage jihad against the Egyptian leadership. 

The Political Document and the Change Document are almost identical in terms of the goals and priorities proposed for the group’s future in Egypt. However, Munir’s document is carried through a reconciliatory tone, while the Change Front’s document is loudly voicing a jihadist revolutionary approach. Munir’s document is mainly addressing the Egyptian people from a political perspective, which they believe is likely to be accepted among the Egyptian grassroots citizens, who previously rebelled against the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule in 2013. 

In contrast, the revolutionary approach of the Change Front’s document is mainly talking to the young members of the group, who still live in Egypt. The Change Front is a youth-led jihadist faction inside the Muslim Brotherhood that introduces itself as an alternative to the fighting elders. They have been active since 2015, under the title of ‘Kamalists.’ In late 2020, they changed their title to the Change Front, ran internal elections, and designed their own bylaws separate from the rules set by the group’s leadership.   

The Kamlaists are a group of Muslim Brotherhood youth, who were trained by Mohamed Kamal, one of the most prominent middle leaders of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Kamal organized several violent attacks on civilians and state facilities in Egypt, between 2013-2014, to avenge the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood regime from power. He used the anger of the group’s youth to fuel those attacks. His goal was to cause extreme chaos that forces the military to return the Muslim Brotherhood regime back to power. 

After he was killed in a clash with the Egyptian police forces in late 2014, his affiliated youth groups went on to form their own militias. The most famous of these militias are HASM and Liwa Al-Thawra, which are designated as foreign terrorist organizations in the United States. HASM leaders fled to Turkey, in early 2015.

Therefore, it was not a surprise to see two leaders of the HASM terrorist organization speak at the Change Front’s conference, held in Istanbul in October. They endorsed the Change document and asserted the importance of “waging jihad against the Egyptian state.” 

 The death of Ibrahim Munir, in early November, and the inability of the London-based front to assign a new leader, up till today, will make the Istanbul-based front stronger. This will indirectly enhance the position of the Change Front and increase its ability to recruit more supporters for its violent agenda. Meanwhile, those who adopt the political methodology inside the group will be sidelined. In such a scenario, the return of random acts of violence in the anti-Muslim Brotherhood Arab states is highly expected. 

Climate Change Impact on Global Security | Halifax International Security Forum 2022

 

I participated in a panel discussion on the impact of climate change on global security. 

This panel is part of the Halifax International Security Forum, held in November 2022, in Halifax, Canada. 

I focused on the part related to climate change impact on domestic and regional politics, governance systems, and government policies.

Turkey and Egypt: What Is After Presidential Handshake?

The Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan have shaken hands and smiled at each other, at the inauguration ceremony of the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Doha. If you have been following the past nine years of media wars and diplomatic boycotts that compounded a heap of personal prejudices between the two leaders, you will realize that this handshake was bigger than an act of courtesy. It is a historical moment marking a turning point in the relationship between Egypt and Turkey.

It would also be a mistake to expect this historic handshake to happen as a coincidence. The two presidents have previously met in several international forums, but have always been careful not to involve in any direct encounter with each other. However, this time each of them wanted, with sincere intentions, to swallow personal grudges for the benefit of their people. 

Over the past year, in particular, there have been lots of arrangements, on more than one level in the two countries and beyond, to bring the Egyptian and Turkish leaders together at this particular time and place. Since its successful reconciliation with Egypt in 2021, the Qatari leadership of Prince Tamim Bin Hamad has been determined to fix the rift between Egypt and Turkey and subsequently restore the geopolitical and geo-economic balance in the regions of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, where the two countries are key agenda-setters.

Nevertheless, the meeting between El-Sisi and Erdogan, despite its significant symbolism, is merely the beginning of a series of serious negotiations that need to happen between the Egyptian and the Turkish state. Diplomatic and military leaders from both countries need to clear the air by sincerely discussing their future policies on several critical regional issues where the two states adopt confrontational positions. That includes Libya, the maritime delimitations in the eastern Mediterranean, and the Muslim Brotherhood.

On the issue of Libya, a meeting between the Egyptian and the Turkish leaderships needs to happen to discuss their divergent perceptions about the presence of the Turkish troops in Tripoli. The Egyptian state is still concerned about the issue and sees it as a threat to Egypt’s national security, despite the insistence of the Turkish state that the troops in Tripoli are only there to preserve the balance of power and prevent the eastern militia from taking over the government. However, Egypt is still a staunch supporter of the eastern political elite and Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA).

In the eastern Mediterranean, Egypt will not be able to back down from its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) agreement signed with Greece in 2020. Yet, this should not prevent Egypt from convening similar agreements with Turkey or make it even hesitate to do so. In all cases, it is in Egypt's best interest not to involve in the century-long conflict between Turkey and Greece, or side with one party against the other. Needless to mention, Egypt is set to harvest bigger benefits from a maritime agreement with Turkey than it can have from any other agreement with any other country on the northern side of the Mediterranean. 

Regarding the Muslim Brotherhood, it would be unrealistic to expect that Turkey may extradite the members of the group, who sought refuge in Turkey to escape prison sentences in Egypt, following the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood regime, in 2013. However, in the past year, Turkey has been exerting tremendous effort to prevent them from using Turkish land as a platform to attack the Egyptian state. That should be appreciated by Egypt, especially since the Muslim Brotherhood group has become too weak to act as a threat to any party. The group is already collapsing from within and it needs years to rebuild its severely damaged bases and credibility. This is, also, something that President Erdogan is now clearly aware of.

The Middle East Between Biden’s Rock and Republican’s Hard Place

Since before the congressional midterm elections in the United States, observers in the Middle East have been wondering about their influence on the future of the Biden Administration’s foreign policy in the region. However, parallel to this, an equally important question should be asked about the potential impact of the Middle East countries’ policies on the future of the U.S. Administration of President Biden. 

The latest vote counting shows that the Republicans are closer to taking over the House of Representatives from the Democrats, who have been leading it since 2019. Meanwhile, the Senate is expected to split between the two parties or, in the best-case scenario, fall into the lap of Democrats who could win with a slight majority. In the shadow of the extreme political polarization that the United States has been drowning in for five years, it is valid to predict that the Republicans in Congress will be more hawkish, not on Russia or China, but on President Biden and his government. 

Logically speaking, they should exert every effort possible to further lower Biden’s already declining approval ratings, in order to pave the way for their presidential candidate in the 2024 elections, whether they choose to nominate Trump or someone else. This week, former President Donald Trump officially announced his bid for leading the Republicans in the coming presidential elections, building on the Republican comeback to controlling the lower house of the U.S. Congress. Meanwhile, Biden’s citizen approval rating is declining and his Administration's relationship with Middle Eastern allies is still relatively tense. 

Biden has exerted a remarkable effort to ease tensions with allies in the Arab Gulf region by paying a visit to Saudi Arabia and Jerusalem in the summer. For the first time, President Biden clearly admitted that his initial policy “to pivot away from the Middle East had been a mistake.” He told the officials in Saudi Arabia that “as the world grows more competitive and the challenges we face more complex, it is only becoming clearer to me that – how closely interwoven America’s interests are with the successes of the Middle East. We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran. And we’ll seek to build on this moment with active, principled American leadership.” 

However, it did not take too long for the tensions to rise again when OPEC+ decided to lower production volume in October. The Biden Administration and Democratic legislators saw this as an attempt to weaken their position in midterm elections and vowed to take revenge on Saudi Arabia. 

Building on historical experience, some could claim that a Republican-led Congress should be more favorable to Arab Gulf countries in contrast to Biden’s Administration. Most Arab Gulf countries, and Middle East countries in general, had a strong relationship with the Republican party and the Trump Administration. However, this is hardly going to be the case with the Congress members who will take the lead after the completion of midterm elections. 

Looking closer at the fabric of the elected congressional legislators, we will discover that a record number of 82 Muslim candidates have been voted in, on both the red and the blue seats. That is good news for American democracy, but, certainly, a headache for the Middle East leaders, not only in the Arab Gulf but also in Egypt and Israel. The aggressive stance of Muslim Congresswomen, Ilhan Omar, and Rashida Tlaib against Saudi Arabia and Israel are still solid. Both of them kept their seats throughout the midterm elections. The current tensions between the Biden Administration and the Saudi-led OPEC+ organization over the volumes of oil production are creating a fertile ground for such congressional pressures to grow and be more effective.

The Muslim representatives are also expected to give a hard time to Israel, especially in light of the re-election of Netanyahu as Prime Minister. Historically, Netanyahu had tensions with Democratic presidents compared to his warm connections with the Republican presidents. However, it would be unrealistic to expect that the newly voted congress, despite being led by a Republican majority, will be as supportive of Israel’s interests as the previous ones. 

One exception to that scenario is a strong congressional position against Iran. Most likely they will halt Biden’s talks with Tehran over the nuclear deal and show stronger support for the waves of protests that have been sweeping the country for more than a month calling for the fall of the Mullah regime. That will eventually serve the interests of the Arab Gulf countries and Israel, however indirectly.

The United States foreign policy, in general, is one of the areas where the political conflict between the Democratic president and the Republican-majority House is going to manifest. A Republican-led Congress has the power to obstruct the government’s activities abroad, due to its control over foreign spending appropriations, which intersects with decisions related to the budget of the Pentagon and the State Department, and the foreign aid or contributions they can offer to other countries. For example, Republican candidates have been talking about reviewing the size of U.S. military aid to Ukraine and the level of U.S. involvement in the war in Eastern Europe. 

Such a review will not only affect the balance of power in the Russia-Ukraine war but will also have an indirect impact on countries in the Middle East. Important U.S. allies, such as Egypt, are expected to be hurt in the process, mainly due to their vulnerable economic standing in face of the ongoing global economic crisis. A Republican Congress may, also, question the annual military aid to Egypt and delay its payment. Yet, they will not do this for reasons related to the Egyptian state's performance on human rights issues, as the Democrats do. 

They will simply do it to disturb the newly found balance in the relationship between Biden’s Administration and the Egyptian leadership of President El-Sisi. Before leaving office in December 2020, former President Trump, out of nowhere and despite his friendly relationship with the Egyptian President, made a video statement accusing Egypt of using the military aid money offered by the United States to purchase Russian-made weapons. Several republicans applauded him for saying that. Obviously, Trump’s goal was mainly to make it more difficult for the Biden Administration to start on a good foot with Egypt.  

In the past year, the Biden Administration has been trying to find a point of balance in its relationship with Egypt, between pressuring for human rights reforms and collaborating on solving regional strategic impasses. Right now, Egypt is America's best buddy among all the Arab countries, especially after recent tensions with OPEC+ leadership. It is in the best interest of Egypt and the United States to remain strong partners.

That was clearly exhibited in the warm conversations that President Biden and House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, had with the Egyptian President in Sharm El-Sheikh, last week. The photos of President El-Sisi laughing with US President Biden and walking arm-in-arm with U.S. House Speaker, Pelosi, down the aisle of the COP27 Summit, created a positive roar on social and traditional media. 

However, soon, Pelosi will hand the gavel to the House Republican leader Kevin McCarthy and Biden will get too busy with handling Republican pressures on his government, marking the beginning of a new era of two years or more, that may not be so favorable to most countries in the Middle East.

Newly-Found Balance in US-Egypt Relationship

Egypt and the United States have obvious disparities on the issues of civil rights and democratization. Yet, the mutual interests of the political leadership of the two countries are fostering their will to cooperate over their tendency to disagree. That was clearly exhibited in the warm conversations that the United States President, Joseph Biden, and House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, had with the Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, in Sharm El-Sheikh on Friday.

The photos of President El-Sisi laughing with US President Biden and walking arm-in-arm with U.S. House Speaker, Pelosi, down the aisle of the COP27 Summit, created a roar on social media. The pro-state media interpreted the footage as an emphasis on Egypt’s central role on the regional and world stages. Meanwhile, the media figures affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood group, most of them living outside of Egypt, got perplexed about how to justify the scene to the group’s bases inside Egypt. 

For weeks, they have been claiming that Biden was going to lecture El-Sisi about the importance of the Muslim Brotherhood and force him to bring them back to the country. They even called for a so-called revolution against El-Sisi on the same date of Biden’s visit. To their disappointment, that was not the case and Biden did not even mention the issue in his meeting with El-Sisi. 

Nevertheless, the topic of Egypt’s efforts to advance human rights reforms has been raised by both leaders, in Sharm El-Sheikh. At the public opening remarks that preceded their bilateral meeting, President El-Sisi made sure to bring up the issue in the presence of journalists. El-Sisi said he is keen on improving state performance on human rights and asked the United States for support and advice.

“First of all, I would like to emphasize the strength of the strategic relationship between Egypt and the United States that has not changed over 40 years. There has always been a common understanding regarding all the issues relating to this region;” said President El-Sisi. “But there’s always a point that is the center of the debate, that we appreciate very much, and this is the human rights issue. In this particular regard, we have a comprehensive approach that I would like to inform you about because we are very keen on improving this issue;” E-Sisi emphasized by counting the initiatives taken by the state in that regard, ranging from setting a national strategy for human rights, starting a national dialogue with the opposition parties, and convening a presidential pardon committee to look into cases of political prisoners. 

To that, President Biden responded with applause. That was not only to praise the Egyptian state’s efforts to improve its human rights record but most importantly to thank Egypt for its regional role in the Israel-Palestinian conflict and its stance towards the war in Ukraine.

“Egypt has been, by the way, a key mediator, and I appreciate what we were able to do about Gaza and the strong counterterrorism partnership that we have established;” stressed President Biden. “In the face of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Egypt has spoken up strongly at the United Nations, and that is appreciated very much as well.” 

Over 40 years, cooperation between Egypt and the United States on security and geo-strategic issues has been sustained, despite obvious disagreements over issues related to human rights and democratization. Right now, Egypt is America's best buddy among all the Arab countries, especially after recent tensions with OPEC+ leadership over oil production volumes. It is in the best interest of Egypt and the United States to remain strong partners. The United States' success in the Middle East is mostly dependent on Egypt's cooperation. On the flip side, Egypt's security and political stability is so correlated to a close relationship with the United States.

The newly found balance between pressuring for human rights reforms and collaborating on solving regional strategic impasses is going to shape the relationship between the Egyptian leadership of President El-Sisi and the United States Administration of President Biden for years to come. State supporters and opposition in both countries should accept and adapt to this reality. 

COP27 Prepares Egypt To Be A Hub for Clean Energy

The world has come to Egypt, the mother of the world, to discuss urgent strategies to save our Planet Earth from the horrific impacts of climate change on human health and the worldwide economies. The initial outcomes of the conference show that Egypt is up to the mission thanks to its natural resources and unique geo-strategic locations at the center of the world. 

In Sharm El-Sheikh, at the 27th edition of the United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Parties (COP27), about forty-thousand state leaders, decision-makers, experts, activists, and media personnel from 110 countries are currently collaborating on figuring out a realistic action plan to control the consequences of climate change on the sustainability of livelihood, which is rapidly shrinking, resulting in water scarcity, forest fires, and ravaged agricultural fields. The COP27 summit has so far succeeded in pressing world leaders to take tangible steps to limit the problem. 

The most notable of these initiatives is the Green Hydrogen Plant, which the Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, launched its beta operations on the third day of the conference. The plant, which is based in Al-Sukhna industrial city, quite close to the economic zone of the Suez Canal, is the first of its kind in Africa and the Middle East. The plant's first phase shall be working with a capacity of 100 megawatts to produce 15 thousand tons of green hydrogen that will be used as a feedstock for the production of up to 90 thousand tons of green ammonia per year. 

In addition, the Egyptian government has already signed three agreements and memoranda of understanding to establish three major projects with regional and international partners to produce energy from wind farms. The three projects are expected to produce a rough total of 20 gigawatts per year.

The green hydrogen plant and wind farms, in addition to the existing Benban Solar Park, are expected to turn Egypt into a crucial hub for green energy that is expected to serve countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. That adds to Egypt’s already rising profile in the eastern Mediterranean as a geo-strategic hub for natural gas liquefaction and exportation.  

In January, President El-Sisi launched Benban Solar Park in the southern city of Aswan to satisfy the needs of Upper Egypt cities and African neighbors for electricity. Benban Solar Park is the largest compound of solar plants in the entire world. Upon the completion of the project in 2035, it will produce about 1.8 gigawatts of electricity per year from 41 solar plants. That means about 20% of Egypt’s electricity production will come from clean resources. 

Egypt is one of the biggest winners of the COP27 conference. That is mainly because the conference has allowed Egypt to show its unique capabilities to host and operate clean energy projects on its land. However, as these projects are expected to enhance Egypt’s economy in the long run, they also need huge funding to be fully established. In that sense, Egypt’s partnership with sister Arab Gulf countries is crucial to guarantee its success in becoming a world hub for green energy. 

The Pain of Russia Going Against the Grain

 

The playbook of the Russian President is full of interesting tricks that he cleverly uses to manipulate opponents and allies to serve his goals and interests. 

One of these tricks is to purposefully go against the grain of pacts convened with western parties, even if it creates a situation that may temporarily hurt Russia’s interests. That is particularly true in times of wide-scale conflicts similar to the ongoing economic standoff between Russia and western powers. By doing so he emphasizes Russia’s importance as an indispensable actor on the world stage while confusing his opponents and forcing them to sail their ships his way.  

Another interesting trick is offering empty promises about unrealistic collaborations to his allies, turning them into proxies ready to take the risk and the guilt of jumping up the forbidden tree to pick the edible fruits that he cannot reach. The recent evolvement of the relationship between Russia and Turkey, in the shadow of the ongoing war in Ukraine, is an embodiment of this.

Against the Grain

In a literal sense of the word, Russian President Vladimir Putin went against the grain, last week, to halt the ships of his western opponents. He unexpectedly withdrew from the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which is brokered by the United Nations and facilitated by the Turkish military, only nine days before the completion of the initiative’s first term of 120 days. 

Out of the same mouth, Putin reiterated the unrealistic proposal to turn the Turkish Thrace region into a hub for storing and selling Russian gas to the European countries that may desire to go around the sanctions imposed on the Russian gas exports to solve their energy crises. The message that Putin has been trying to voice, here, is that Russia can do without the west by aligning with one of the most powerful members of NATO; Turkey.

On the evening of October 29th, the channel affiliated with the Russian Ministry of Defense on Telegram published a statement accusing Keiv of launching a “terrorist attack” on the Russian Black Sea fleet and civilian ships that were landing at the offshores of the occupied Crimea Island. The statement claimed that the damaged vessels at Sevastopol Port were responsible for “ensuring the security of the grain corridor,” although the grain corridor starts in Odesa about 200 kilometers away from Sevastopol. Upon this unfounded allegation, Russia decided to “stops its participation in the implementation of agreements on the export of agricultural products from Ukrainian ports.”

 

The Russian Defense Ministry’s statement claimed that the attacks were implemented by UAV drones and accused military “specialists from the United Kingdom” of being involved. Moscow has previously accused the UK army of sabotaging the Nord Streat pipeline. The UK and Ukraine refuted Russia’s accusations and labeled them as a pretext to justify halting the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The United States responded by accusing Russia of “weaponizing food” in a way that is hurting the well-being of humans worldwide. 

Beneficiaries of the Crisis

Indeed, the Russian withdrawal from the grain deal created a state of panic about food security, especially among the economically vulnerable countries in Asia and Africa. Sharp raises in the prices of grain products hit the market immediately after the Russian announcement. The Chicago Board of Trade recorded a rise of 5.9% in December futures contracts of wheat, 1.2% in corn contracts, and 1.3% in soybean futures, as a direct result of the threats facing the Black Sea grain corridor after Russia’s withdrawal. 

To avoid a backlash, especially from the Arab and Asian countries that are keeping a neutral stance toward Ukraine, the Russian Minister of Agriculture said that his country harvested 150 million tons of grain, this year. He offered to ship 500 thousand tons of grain to the poorest countries for free in the next four months, in addition to selling the rest to low-income countries, and whoever is interested, for an affordable price. On the next day of Russia’s withdrawal from the grain corridor deal, the Lebanese Minister of Public Works and Transport wrote on Twitter that the Russian Ambassador to Lebanon told him that “President Putin has decided to send 25 thousand tons of wheat and 10 thousand tons of fuel to Lebanon, to be delivered in the next two or three days.” 

 

The UN estimates that Black Sea Grain Initiative has “indirectly prevented some 100 million people from falling into extreme poverty.” However, the data shown on the United Nations website dedicated to monitoring the vessel movements in the Black Sea grain corridor show that the poorest countries are the least beneficiaries of the foodstuffs shipped from Ukraine in the past three months under the UN-led initiative. For example, Egypt, which is struggling with a severe economic crisis as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war, comes in the 6th position as a beneficiary of the grain corridor, after Spain, Turkey, China, Italy, and The Netherlands. While Egypt received 4.28 thousand tons, Spain and Turkey took 1.8 million tons and 1.3 million tons, respectively, out of the 9.8 million tons of Ukrainian foodstuffs shipped so far via the grain corridor.    

Turkey in the Middle 

The Turkish Minister of Defense, Hulusi Akar, whose troops monitor and facilitate the grain ships movement at the Joint Cooperation Center (JCC) in Istanbul, told the press, on November 1st, that the ten billion tonnes of grains and foodstuffs, which have been shipped from Ukraine to countries worldwide, over the past three months, have participated in relieving the prices and expected shortages of essential food supplies. “We all know that if the grain transportation stops, serious hunger problems in developing countries will happen, leading to an increase in prices of food commodities that may result in popular protests and political instability;” Hulusi Akar stressed, promising that Turkey will exert every effort possible to convince Russia to continue with implementing the deal. 

On the same day, Putin had a phone call with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, where he said that Russia may consider returning to the grain deal after receiving security guarantees. A readout of the call by the Kremlin highlighted Russia’s demand for “a detailed investigation into the circumstances of this incident,” as a prerequisite to resuming its involvement in the grain corridor. In addition, Russia requested “actual guarantees from Keiv of strict observance of the grain agreements, in particular on the non-use of the humanitarian corridor for military purposes.”

Turkey has been playing a terrific role in mediating talks between the Russian and the Ukrainian leaders and keeping food and humanitarian aid supplies flowing across the Black Sea, since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February. However, Turkey needs to be careful not to lose the crucial point of balance in its relationships with the west and Russia – that is; the equilibrium of being a reliable NATO ally and at the same time a trusted partner of Russia. Falling easy prey to Putin’s gaslighting promises of turning Turkey into a natural gas hub may cost Turkey more than it is expected to gain.

Saving Putin’s Face 

However, security guarantees are not all that Russia is looking for from breaking the Black Sea grain deal. In the phone call with Erdogan, Putin complained about the failure of the involved parties to “fulfill the second part of the agreement, related to unblocking the exportation of Russian agricultural products and fertilizers to world markets.” 

In other words, Putin is trying to save himself from losing the economic battle against the west in the coming few months. Russia has lost access to the Baltic Sea ports due to the economic boycott applied by European countries in solidarity with Ukraine. That caused Russia to lose a huge market for its food exports. At the same time, the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline and the insistence of European countries to seek alternative gas resources in the eastern Mediterranean is making Russia lose its economic leverage over Europe. Russia’s sudden withdrawal from the grain deal and teaming with Turkey to revolve around the European sanctions on its gas exportations are only means to the end of saving Putin’s face.